

EVERYBODY

THE WRITINGS OF ULRIKE MEINHOF

TALKS ABOUT

EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY KARIN BAUER

THE WEATHER...

PREFACE BY ELFRIEDE JELINEK

WE DON'T

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ULRIKE MARIE MEINHOF

ELFRIEDE JELINEK

Ulrike Meinhof is a historical riddle, an enigmatic woman, who like most people, can only be understood within the context of her time. She seized a historical moment and the possibilities it offered, a moment of the starkest contradictions in postwar Germany, a moment that spans Germany's coming to terms with its partially suppressed Nazi past, the student movement of 1968, and the reunification, which Ulrike Meinhof did not witness, and could probably not have imagined. I believe this historical moment of the RAF (Red Army Faction) and all the effects it had is still not fully understood even though it was so consciously experienced by so many, yet differently by every single one. With the exception of the left-wing group of readers of *konkret*, most Germans refused Ulrike Meinhof's texts from the very start; and so this historic moment passed and the attitude of not wanting to know added to a greater sense of isolation and lack of historicity in German postwar society. It also led to Meinhof herself becoming increasingly embittered. It is tragic to read her engaged texts about outsiders (she was especially concerned about institutionalized children), and find the tone of her work getting more and more apodictic, demanding, and self-righteous, a tone that in the end tramples everything down, every possible objection, perhaps from desperation because her texts have so little influence, perhaps for private reasons; and then to have a brutally commanding tone set in that is already very like the pitiless barked commands we find in her later texts from the underground, commands that today seem to carry the echo of the dark era she detested. This is truly a tragedy. And the way Meinhof was destroyed within and by the group she had joined and that became her life, in a situation that seemed to offer no exit route but suicide by hanging—this remains incomprehensible to me, as does any suicide. Terrifying and tragic, but also a missed opportunity for society to learn from this woman when she still had something to say that we could understand if only we wanted to.

IN SEARCH OF ULRIKE MEINHOF

KARIN BAUER

While I was rushing one evening in May 2007 to an art exhibit entitled “On Love,” the underground station was closed and passengers were rerouted to take various buses. Unsure how to continue my journey, I asked a fellow passenger for advice. She was a friendly, unassuming, middle-aged woman wearing short hair and a conservative dress. She gave me directions, and we struck up a conversation. When I told her I was in Berlin to prepare an edition of columns by Ulrike Meinhof in English translation, her face lit up: “That’s great!” she exclaimed, “absolutely wonderful. Ulrike was very important to us. When she died, I cried.” The woman fell into a pensive mood, and before I reached my destination and took my leave, she reminisced about her feeling of deep sadness over the death of a woman who had led a struggle with whose impetus she had sympathized, even as she had rejected its violent means.

At the Galerie Nord about fifty people had gathered to view the art work and listen to Ulrike Meinhof’s daughter, Bettina Röhl, read from her book about her mother, father, and their magazine *konkret*. Röhl sat in front of a painting of her mother by German artist Gregor Cüerten. Some people in the audience said that they found it counterintuitive to speak of a terrorist like Meinhof within the framework of an exhibition on love. One of the organizers explained that the idea of including Cüerten’s painting and of inviting Röhl originated with the idea of including in the show a representation of the notion of love of one’s country. The organizers thus situated Meinhof’s life and work within the context of patriotism—a hotly contested notion in German post-National Socialist society.

Some in the audience spoke of the new nationalism since German reunification in 1989 that had led some of the old radical Left to switch sides and align themselves with the nationalist Right. One person speculated that Meinhof, had she lived, would perhaps have done the same. While many in the audience interpreted the theme of love in personal and private terms, one person—very obviously nostalgic for the old radical Left—picked up on the theme of love for one’s country. “Your mother was a courageous woman,” he told Röhl. Meinhof,

he explained, “took seriously the moral obligation to fight against injustice.” He interpreted her fight as an expression of her love for humanity. Others countered that Meinhof was, after all, responsible for murdering people. What does that have to do with love or courage?

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Photograph of Bettina Röhl with a painting of her mother, “Ulrike Marie M.,” by Gregor Cüerten, 1999. PHOTO BY KARIN BAUER, 2007

The discussion continued for quite some time as Röhl attempted to walk the fine line between two seemingly conflicting roles: that of journalist, there to present the findings of her research, and that of a daughter whose mother had abandoned her to pursue militant left-wing politics.

The passionate responses to the Meinhof exhibit testified to the deep roots that her image has in the German imagination and, indeed, they testified to the trauma that is connected with her name. They also provoked other questions: What hides behind these reactions to Meinhof? What is covered up, diverted, repressed, and projected on to her image? More than thirty years have passed since Meinhof’s death, but her legacy lives on. For complex reasons that may be rooted as much in emotional as in rational ground, Meinhof’s ghost still haunts contemporary German society.

The response to Meinhof’s death in her prison cell in Stuttgart-Stammheim on May 8, 1976 was epic. Protests and riots took place in Germany and in major European cities. Bombs exploded in Paris, Rome, Toulouse, and Nimes. A police

officer was seriously burned in an explosion in Frankfurt. In Berlin more than four thousand mourners gathered to attend a funeral march.

The eclectic crowd of mourners included members of the liberal establishment, prominent intellectuals, writers, journalists, publishers, artists, activists, and dignitaries of the Protestant church, as well as members of fringe groups and masked activists attempting to keep their identity hidden from photographers, police, and agents of the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution. There were spontaneous expressions of grief, frustration, and rage, and immediately questions were raised disputing the government's claim that Meinhof had committed suicide in her cell. What is significant is not only the idea that a prisoner would have been murdered by the government in a prison cell, but the fact that so many citizens were willing to entertain the idea that this could be true. Most people accepted the conclusion of the two autopsies—that Meinhof had killed herself—but nevertheless argued that while the state had not de facto murdered Meinhof, it had done so through negligence and by subjecting Meinhof to inhumane conditions during her imprisonment. Some argued further that the state had in fact waged psychological warfare against Meinhof.

In his funeral address, the poet Erich Fried called Meinhof the most distinguished German woman since Rosa Luxemburg. Her lawyer Otto Schily, later Germany's Minister of the Interior from 1998 to 2005, expressed the hope that Meinhof's suffering would eventually turn into a sign of hope for humanity. Her publisher Klaus Wagenbach maintained that it was the "German conditions" that killed Meinhof, "the extremism of those who called the debates about changing these conditions extremist."¹ Wagenbach situated Meinhof in the larger political and historical context by pointing out the significance of her date of death: the thirty-first anniversary of the end of World War II.

At the time of the funeral, the construction of Meinhof as an icon had already taken many forms: she was portrayed as revolutionary martyr, a product of German circumstances, a woman who wanted to change the system and became its victim. Further fueled by outrage over Meinhof's death, the Meinhof legend now proceeded unmitigated by the realities of an actual living person. There were, of course, many—even the majority of Germans—who reacted to the news of Meinhof's death without regret. But they, too, were participating in the construction, or at least the reception, of Meinhof as an icon—a ruthless terrorist

who threatened the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). One citizen took out an ad that looked like an obituary in a German newspaper, in which he thanked Meinhof in the name of German tax payers for her decision to commit suicide.

Meinhof's status as founding member of the Red Army Faction (RAF) is and was different from that of the other RAF members. While the German public had likely never heard of Andreas Baader and Gudrun Enslin before their faces showed up on wanted posters, Meinhof, an established journalist, who wrote for magazines, radio, and television, was one of the most important and well-known figures of the German Left. She had sought to expose, advocate, and fight for political freedom and social justice. Her writings spoke to many, not just to social and political activists from the Left, but also to the liberal establishment that supported progressive reforms. As a woman in a profession dominated by men, she was one of the first to thematize the exploitation of women in the workplace and point out numerous instances of the subordination of women and mothers in society. She was an important supporter of the emerging feminist movement and an advocate of disadvantaged social groups.

The RAF, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, presented the strongest challenge the Federal Republic had encountered in its relatively short existence. The fight of six against six million, as the Nobel Prize laureate Heinrich Böll called it, was a fight the RAF could not win. However, it was the FRG that had much to lose. At stake was the establishment of a liberal democracy after the fall of the Third Reich, and the education and integration of a new generation into the political process. It was the so-called *Nachgeborenen*, those born after or during the war who were not responsible for the Third Reich, who began in the 1960s to ask questions, stage protests, and demand reforms if not a revolutionary change of society. Meinhof's decision to abandon protest and social activism for armed struggle, in the context of the protest movements of the 1960s, caused a string of reactions, reverberating in every major political debate at the time.

The state's reaction to the RAF set off a number of anti-democratic developments in the FRG: the curtailing of civil rights and extensive anti-terror legislation and other laws were passed ostensibly in defense of the constitution. In fact, it was all part of the RAF's strategy to force the hand of the state to expose openly its latent fascist tendencies.

Meinhof became the central figure around which questions of violence and the support of the underground struggle were polarized. Her friends and former colleagues were left wondering and debating, and some were faced with difficult choices. One of the prevalent questions discussed at the time among the Left was: Would you provide shelter to members of the RAF if they knocked on your door at night? The question was treated both as a matter of conscience and a matter of politics.

Meinhof's columns, published in *konkret* between 1959 and 1969, are extraordinary documents of her time. They give testimony not only to Meinhof's own radicalization, but also to the radicalization of the protest movement. The columns exemplify the increasing disenchantment with the possibilities for democratic change and the increasing discontent with a movement divided into ineffectual splinter groups. They also provide insight into the beginnings of the Meinhof myth and into Meinhof's self-promotion and participation in the construction of this myth.

Hers was an engaged journalism. Developing a seemingly infallible logic, her columns raised questions, opened perspectives, cited statistics, developed and advocated positions. Her goal was to inform and enlighten her readership, and to look beyond the surface of everyday life to find the underlying motives and causes for what she saw as the repressive mechanisms of the militarized, capitalist German state. Meinhof's development from pacifist to terrorist may indeed be seen, not as a radical break from her journalistic work, but as an extension of it.²

Indeed, Meinhof's columns express a passionate urgency for change. Firmly rooted in their historic time and place, they also debate issues beyond the narrower concerns of postwar Germany. Meinhof firmly opposed weapons, proposed measures to defuse the Cold War, spoke against the escalation of the Vietnam War, and took on issues of freedom of expression, social justice, and gender equality. She commented on major international events, from the Kennedy assassination to the passage of the German emergency laws, and she was an outspoken advocate of the rights of women and minorities. Her columns and features aimed to draw attention to the plight of the disenfranchised and the outsiders of society. Looking toward the Black Panthers, Weather Underground, and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in the United States, the Brigada

Rossa in Italy, and the Tupamaros in South America, Meinhof began to advocate the move from protest to resistance, and ultimately, to politically motivated violence.

To appreciate Ulrike Meinhof's concerns and to interpret her writings and actions, it is important to understand her background as a child born into National Socialist Germany, her Protestant upbringing, her coming of age after the war, her membership in the Communist Party, her developing notion of journalistic engagement, and her experiences as a woman. However, despite all efforts to gain insight into her psyche, Meinhof remains in many ways an elusive figure. The more one reads about her, the harder it is to come to terms with some of her choices. Though our grip on her life and person are slipping away, her writings are here to be read and discussed.³

Photograph of Ulrike Meinhof as a young journalist. COURTESY OF BETTINA RÖHL

The afterword of this volume by Bettina Röhl, who has done extensive research on her mother and *konkret* for her book *So macht Kommunismus Spaß*—which could be translated as *This is How Communism is Fun*—aims to tear down Meinhof as an icon of the Left. It reflects the harsh judgment of Meinhof by segments of German society. While Röhl’s assessment of Meinhof and the Left is not unique, it appears to be uniquely colored by certain traumatizing experiences during her childhood. Röhl’s book—published in Germany in 2006—offers a wealth of previously unpublished material on Meinhof, and while as a scholar I disagree with Röhl’s portrayal of Meinhof and the Left, I am grateful to her, her sister, and the publishing house Wagenbach for granting us permission to undertake this important and long overdue project of presenting Meinhof’s columns to an English-speaking readership. The columns in particular show that Meinhof was not an apparatnik of the East—as implied by Röhl—but a gifted writer with a dream, a tragic figure who now stands for the thwarted ideals and the frustration of a generation.

THE DEDICATED LIFE OF A CHRISTIAN PACIFIST

Ulrike Meinhof was born on October 7, 1934 in the northern German town of Oldenburg. Her mother, Ingeborg Guthardt, was the daughter of a Social Democrat and teacher from Hesse. She met Meinhof’s father, Werner Meinhof, when she was fourteen. He came from a family of Protestant pastors, academics, and civil servants. Rejecting academia, Werner left home at a young age and became a locksmith before continuing his studies, first to become a teacher and later to work toward a PhD in art history. Ingeborg and Werner married in 1928 after Ingeborg had obtained her university entrance diploma. Their first daughter, Wienke, was born in Oldenburg in 1931, and Ulrike was born three years later. Werner Meinhof received his PhD in 1936 and became curator of the Municipal Museum at Jena and a lecturer at the University of Weimar. He became associated with the Protestant “Hessian Dissent,” a group that opposed state control of church affairs, and was in contact with prominent theologians of the “Confessing Church,” which had formed in opposition to National Socialism.

In 1940, at the age of thirty-eight, Werner Meinhof died suddenly of pancreatic cancer.⁴

Widowed at the age of thirty-one, with no professional training and two young children to support, Ingeborg received a stipend to study philology at the University of Jena. Extended family helped to care for the children while she studied, and she soon took in a boarder, Renate Riemeck, to share expenses. Ingeborg Meinhof had met Riemeck at the university. They became friends and Riemeck soon became close to Ingeborg's daughters. She was charmed by the six-year-old Ulrike, and as Riemeck tells it, it was Ulrike who asked her to move in with Ingeborg and her daughters. Riemeck studied pedagogy and history. Both she and Ingeborg received their PhDs in 1943—Riemeck with a dissertation on medieval heretic, Ingeborg with one on ornaments in medieval art.

When German cities were under bombardment by the allied forces between 1943 and 1945, life was dominated by the calamities of war. It is difficult to assess the psychic damage inflicted upon children by war. One of Ulrike's godmothers, the Jewish literary scholar Grete Ulrich, was forced by the Nazis to wear a yellow star. Shortly before she was deported to Theresienstadt, Ulrich came for a last visit to the Meinhof family. Riemeck tells of the lasting impression that the aunt's disappearance made on Ulrike. Her generation experienced destruction and hunger as children and teenagers, living in fear for their lives and the lives of their families. As they got older, and after the Germans lost the war, the trauma was not generally discussed or acknowledged. This appears to be true for Ulrike as well.

After the war, Ingeborg Meinhof, Riemeck, and the girls left Jena, which was then under Soviet occupation, and moved to the west, first to Bavaria and then back to Oldenburg. Like most cities and towns in the west sector of occupied Germany, Oldenburg struggled to come to terms with a steady flow of refugees from the east. Both women accepted teaching positions, and because there was no other school that had room for her, Ulrike attended a Catholic school that had been previously closed by the Nazis. In a school essay, she wrote in positive terms about her encounter with Catholicism, which she felt had enriched her life.⁵

In 1949, Ingeborg died suddenly of an infection, and Riemeck took custody of the Meinhof daughters. Wienke was seventeen and soon left home. She became a nurse and then studied to become a teacher. (Later she directed a school for

children with special needs. Herself a communist, she always tried to stand by Meinhof. Today she is active in a project that seeks to secure housing for lesbians.)

Ulrike was only fourteen when her mother died. Riemeck became her friend and mentor, introducing her to politics, literature, and philosophy, and instilled in her a sense of moral obligation. Riemeck was teaching history and political education in Braunschweig, Weilburg, and at the University of Wuppertal, and became the youngest female professor in Germany. A fiercely intelligent and independent woman, Riemeck defied expectations by wearing pants and living with her female partner, Holde Bischoff. Bischoff was Riemeck's partner for fifty years and became a close maternal figure to Ulrike, and later to her twin daughters. Riemeck preferred to see herself in the paternal role, and once signed a letter to Ulrike as your "substitute father."⁶

Riemeck was for a few years a member of the left-leaning Social Democratic Party, and fought against the rearmament of Germany after the war and against nuclear weapons. She was in contact with leading intellectuals and theologians of the time, such as Martin Niemöller and the two future presidents of Germany, Gustav Heinemann and Johannes Rau.⁷ She published in the influential Protestant paper *Stimme der Gemeinde (Voice of the Community)* where she sought to oppose the conservative-restorative politics of the Christian Democratic Union, which had won a majority in German parliament. Arguing for a peaceful coexistence of communist and non-communist countries, Riemeck opposed a politics of confrontation and warned of the possible dire consequences of the arms race. In 1957, Riemeck organized an influential action committee against nuclear weapons and wrote an appeal to the unions to join the struggle against nuclear armament. In 1960, she became a founding member and unsuccessful candidate for parliament of the German Union for Peace. Because of her political engagement, the university sought to restrict Riemeck's participation in student oral examinations and thesis defenses, and as a consequence, she resigned her university post. Ulrike Meinhof, by then a journalist at *konkret*, supported Riemeck throughout her ordeal.

Meinhof was a serious and ambitious student, mature beyond her age. Like Riemeck, she was a committed Christian pacifist and a pipe smoker. She edited a student paper and sat on various student committees. Her primary interests

were literature and art history. She read with enthusiasm the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin and developed an interest in nineteenth-century Russian literature and in Hermann Hesse. In 1955, Meinhof began her studies in psychology and pedagogy at the University of Marburg. With Riemeck as a role model, Meinhof came to her studies with political awareness, a commitment to social issues, and belief in the value and necessity of political engagement. At the time, the German university system was conservative and the majority of students had no inclination toward political engagement. Especially among female students, Meinhof's political mindedness was an exception. Fellow students of Meinhof described her as serious, idealistic, Lutheran, German, and provincial—"a typical Protestant flute-playing girl."⁸ She was unassuming, dressed plainly, and had a direct and open manner. She did not use academic jargon and her demeanor was devoid of intellectual posturing; her concerns came, according to fellow students, from the heart.⁹ Meinhof became engaged to Lothar Wallek, but the engagement didn't last long. The fact that her fiancé was a nuclear physicist—she was adamantly opposed to the build-up of a nuclear arsenal—seems to have played a role in the break-up.

In 1957, Meinhof transferred to the University of Münster, where she became more deeply involved in political activities, especially in the Committee against Nuclear Deaths, an organization co-founded by Riemeck. As a peace activist and opponent of nuclear weapons, she organized rallies and wrote leaflets. The opposition to nuclear armament was mounting with the Declaration of Göttingen signed by prominent nuclear physicists and Nobel Prize winners. The scientists, including Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, and Carl Friedrich von Weizäcker, maintained that they could not be silent about the political questions arising from the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons: "We believe that to protect itself and world peace, it is best if a small country such as the Federal Republic empathically and voluntarily abstains from the possession of nuclear weapons."¹⁰ In an Easter radio address, the influential humanitarian Albert Schweitzer supported the declaration and called for a freeze of nuclear testing.

In Münster, Meinhof joined the *Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund*—the German version of SDS—and the Protestant Student Community, and became a founding member of the independent student group that called itself Workgroup for a Germany Free of Nuclear Weapons. In March of 1958, Germany ratified

NATO resolutions to station immediate-range missiles and nuclear weapons on German soil. The majority of Germans were not in favor of this, and in the following days, weeks, and months, the anti-nuclear movement gained in numbers and momentum, enjoying broad support from unions and professional, cultural, and political associations. People began talking about tactics to pressure the government to rethink the decision or to at least stop it from participating in the arms race. Meinhof mobilized students, organized demonstrations, and wrote petitions and leaflets to further her cause: “Anyone who is more afraid of a Russian dictatorship than a nuclear war is welcome to commit suicide, but I and millions of others should be allowed to live. The sin of suicide cannot be improved upon by using the term ‘destiny’ for what would in fact be mass murder.”¹¹ Meinhof gave her first public speech at an anti-nuclear rally in Münster in front of 1,200 people. Together with fellow student and friend Jürgen Seifert, Meinhof published a series of leaflets called *argument*.

Meinhof was becoming known within the anti-nuclear movement and in wider leftist circles. Those in her circle thought she would have a great political career ahead of her. In May 1958, Meinhof met the editor of the leftist magazine *konkret*, Klaus Rainer Röhl, at a press conference. It was, according to Röhl, “aversion at first sight.”¹² Röhl found Meinhof intelligent, too serious, and uninteresting as a woman—the “incarnation of intellectual honesty.”¹³ There was no erotic attraction for him. Meinhof, too, disliked Röhl. She thought he was an arrogant show-off who was not serious enough in his political work. Despite, or perhaps because of these strong feelings, they were drawn to one another, and in a short time, became lovers. Their personal and professional relationship was to last ten years.

IN TIMES OF PROTEST

Röhl’s magazine was an important voice of the Left and the emerging student movement. It published articles on politics, social issues, and culture, and it contained works of fiction and poetry by some of the most innovative German writers. *konkret*’s name refers to its goal to present to the reader ‘concrete’ information and practical insight. Using lower case for nouns and names was a sign of protest against the conventions of spelling and the hierarchies thought

to be associated with it. At the height of its popularity in 1968 and 1969, *konkret* appeared weekly or biweekly and exceeded a circulation of 230,000.¹⁴¹⁵ This number is all the more impressive considering the relative small size of Germany and the fact that Germany was only just beginning to overcome the strict conservatism of the postwar era.¹⁶ Also keep in mind that each issue of *konkret* was circulated among friends and roommates and was widely available in cafes, clubs, and at universities. It was the forum for alternative ideas.

The magazine thrived from its reputation as an audacious and fiercely independent publication. It initiated debates and helped to build an intellectual community, and it attempted to bridge the gap between students, intellectuals, and a broader interested public. It aimed to ward off elitism, and addressed those readers who “don’t read Marcuse and Marx and still belong to the extraparliamentary opposition or will encounter it. If these readers later read Marcuse and Che Guevara [. . .] they will have got to know them through *konkret*.”¹⁷ Participating in the establishment of a radical political culture, the magazine thrived from the happy union of intellectual, aesthetic, and popular appeal, and stood in the tradition of the political expressionism and the post-expressionist art movement New Objectivity of the Weimar years of the 1920s.

Few knew that *konkret* was until 1964 subsidized by the German Democratic Republic. To protest the ban of the Communist Party in the FRG, Röhl had become a member of it in 1956. He developed extensive contacts with the regime, so when he was approached by the East Germans to cooperate with them in a publishing venture, Röhl readily agreed. The magazine continued independently and in the same format while it received substantial funding from the Communist Party and the East German Socialist Unity Party. For the magazine, the subsidy was a dream come true, and for Röhl, *konkret* became a decently lucrative way to earn a living.¹⁷ *konkret* and the GDR shared various views and interests, such as the opposition to West German rearmament, the promotion of a politics of reconciliation, and furthering the process of legitimation that would allow the GDR to appear as a true and worthy alternative to capitalism. The East German government supported certain groups and ventures of the West German Left, and in the 1970s it took in and provided false identities to some members of the RAF wanted in the Federal Republic. While there were some connections between the GDR and the West German Left, it is important to note that the groups financially

supported by the GDR included only a small segment of the Left, most of whom were closely affiliated with the Communist Party. It is misleading to suggest that the German Left as a whole—or even large segments of it—was funded or manipulated by the East.

When Meinhof came to *konkret* from the anti-nuclear movement, she still perceived herself as a Christian pacifist. She began writing a regular column in 1959, and from 1961 to 1964, she served as *konkret*'s editor-in-chief. In this capacity she took charge of much of the operation soon after her arrival at the editorial office in Hamburg. She initiated changes, reorganized departments, set up an archive, and brought order into the editorial process. According to former editorial staff, she brought to her work an earnestness that often stood in conflict with the more playful, creative, provocative, and humorous style that had made *konkret* popular.¹⁸ Meinhof's positions were more no-nonsense, and she tended toward the analytical and unambiguous. It was perhaps this mixture of Röhl's flamboyancy and ironic provocation with Meinhof's political and moral commitment that made *konkret* successful beyond all expectations.

Under the direction of Röhl and Meinhof, *konkret* developed into a diverse and multi-faceted magazine for culture and politics, and was able over the years to secure contributions from some of the most talented writers and thinkers of the time, such as Martin Walser, Erich Fried, Gerd Fuchs, Peter Weiss, Hermann Peter Piwitt, Gerhard Zwerenz, Peter Hamm, Rolf Hochhuth, Hubert Fichte, Hanns Henny Jahn, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Arno Schmidt, Erika Runge, Gisela Elsner, Günther Wallraff, and Jochen Ziem. There was a section of literary criticism that commented on and published translations of foreign literature. It also introduced readers to East German literature and published texts by writers such as Christa Wolf, Sarah Kirsch, and Volker Braun. *konkret* engaged in a critical dialogue with the influential literary Group 47, which counted among its members the most prominent postwar writers, such as Ingeborg Bachmann, Heinrich Böll, Peter Handke, and Günter Grass. But from the perspective of *konkret*, the writers of Group 47 were bourgeois with liberal tendencies, whose engagement did not go far enough.

Despite its coverage of literature and the arts, *konkret* was decidedly political. Recurring themes were Cuba, anti-colonialism, German fascism, the anti-nuclear struggle, human rights, and social justice. Meinhof's columns reflected these

concerns. She successfully solicited contributions to *konkret* from a diverse group of writers, theologians, cabinet ministers, politicians, and activists. In the early 1960s, the magazine supported the pacifist Easter March movement against nuclear weapons and the rebuilding of a German army, and greatly contributed to the movement's success (within two years participation in the march grew from about two thousand in 1960 to over fifty thousand in 1962). The marches were a sign of hope. Suddenly there was talk of a "New Left," and a growing sentiment that it was possible for the people to influence political developments.

Meinhof was an incisive critic of anti-democratic developments in the FRG, though her early columns are still marked by a conciliatory and optimistic tone. In these early years, she held out the hope that reason may prevail in Cold War politics. In "Peace is Making History," Meinhof expressed optimism in view of Nikita Khrushchev's visit to the US in 1959. "The turning point is here," Meinhof maintained. "Peace has become the determining factor of political action." Meinhof still believed that the Social Democratic Party would play a role in the reconciliation between western democracy and eastern socialism. In "Shadows of the Summit Pointing West," Meinhof advocated a peaceful co-existence between the eastern and western blocs and—naively to be sure—saw the Soviet Union engaged in "an aggressive politics of peace." Clearly, Meinhof's aim was to mediate between the blocs and garner sympathy for Soviet perspectives.

A recurrent theme in Meinhof's columns was her opposition to Germany's remilitarization. As early as 1962, she warned of the passage of the German emergency laws, an amendment to the constitution that would add an emergency clause giving the federal government the right to suspend the rule of law during emergencies such as disasters, war, and uprisings. First introduced in 1958, the law was finally passed in May 1968 against widespread public opposition from the student movement, the Free Democratic Party, unions, and various groups, such as Democracy in Crisis. Such a law nullified Germany's attempt to overcome its recent fascist history, Meinhof argued.

In "Human Dignity is Violable," Meinhof drew a connection between the rearmament of Germany and the conservative proposals to amend the constitution. "Nuclear rearmament and democracy are irreconcilable. The statement can be cast in the negative: nuclear armament and the end of democracy are complementary; weapons of mass destruction and terror go together."

In “Germany without Kennedy,” in the wake of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Meinhof expressed her ambivalence about the hopes that had been pinned on him. What concerned Meinhof was Germany’s dependence on the US, and she urged Germany to make use of its sovereignty and do “everything that can justifiably be done on our part to stabilize Central Europe.” Again and again, Meinhof pleaded for a responsible Ostpolitik and advocated negotiations and mutual tolerance of East and West. In “Vietnam and Germany,” Meinhof objected to the claim that the US defended the freedom of the West against the threat from the East in Vietnam. The popular argument that “Vietnam today could be Germany tomorrow” aimed to create an atmosphere of fear that was then exploited to justify war and the stockpiling of conventional and nuclear weapons, she countered.

In her 1965 reflections on the bombing of Dresden, Meinhof not only thematized German suffering by recalling the 200,000 people who died in the bombing raid on the city of Dresden in February 1945 when Germany had already lost the war, but made Dresden into a case study for barbarous inhumanity. “If we needed proof that there is no such thing as a just war, then Dresden is the proof.”

In “On the Topic of July 20,” Meinhof exposed as problematic and hypocritical the Federal Republic’s consensus that the assassination attempt on Hitler by a few high-ranking German officers on July 20, 1944 was heroic. While there was reason to celebrate this brave act for its attempt to defeat National Socialism—the officers carried out “what had been the objective of the Left”—there was also cause for concern. By turning the resistance to Hitler into an heroic act of conscience and conscientious objection, the political dimension of the act was forgotten, along with the fact that it should not have required “a sensitive conscience or tender feelings of inferiority to become a political assassin when faced with the murders of millions of Jews, a criminal war and the horrors of the NS regime.” Forgotten or repressed was also the idea that the crimes of National Socialism lived on, Meinhof argued, as long as judges, politicians, and civil servants who served under the Nazis continued to serve the Federal Republic and were not punished for their crimes.

Meinhof gave early warnings about the anti-democratic consequences of the grand coalition between the major political parties, which finally did come to pass in 1966 and left the Federal Republic effectively without parliamentary opposition.

Her critique of conservative political agendas also included a critique of German mainstream media, which in her view contributed to the depolitization of the German population. In a late column “File Number XY: Dissolved,” Meinhof exposed the manipulative strategies employed by the host of a popular TV crime show that reenacted real crimes and asked the audience to help police solve them. Meinhof criticized the show for ignoring unsolved Nazi crimes while preying on Germans’ sense of guilt and fear by claiming that if Germans did not participate in the manhunts, someone might come and do it for them. Meinhof said this implied that Hitler was a crime fighter, “but a crime fighter who overshot his target—which is why we have to beware of the next guy and clean up the country ourselves And in the process, the Germans’ devotion to Hitler is being retroactively justified.” Meinhof was a stout critic of the way in which Germany dealt with its past. She bemoaned the continuities of the past to the present and the lax ways in which some NS criminals were prosecuted while others were able to continue their political careers. The ultra-conservative Bavarian minister Franz Josef Strauss, who had served as a political officer in the Wehrmacht, was a case in point.

In 1961, Meinhof’s column “Hitler Within You” ends with the statement: “One day we will be asked about Herr Strauss in the same way we now ask our parents about Hitler.” Strauss filed a lawsuit against Meinhof and *konkret* in response.¹⁹ Gustav Heinemann, minister of justice from 1966 to 1969 and president of Germany from 1969 to 1974, served as Meinhof’s lawyer. Strauss lost his case and *konkret* and Meinhof emerged from the trial stronger and more popular than ever.

Courted by the Communist Party because of her emerging profile as a speaker, writer, and activist, Meinhof accompanied Röhl on one of his trips to East Berlin to meet party representatives. The comrades in the East took an immediate liking to Meinhof. She had the seriousness and political passion that Röhl lacked. Meinhof joined the Communist Party in 1959. Since it was illegal in West Germany, Meinhof’s and Röhl’s contacts with the party took place under clandestine circumstances. Every few weeks and sometimes more often, Meinhof and Röhl would meet with party officials in East Berlin. The secret nature of the business and the illegality of their membership in the KPD gave Meinhof first-hand experience with the political underground. To be sure, Meinhof and Röhl were not alone among those courting Soviet and East German socialism. In leftist

circles, there existed some sympathy for what was seen by some as a socialist experiment. While most did not approve of the methods of the East German state, especially the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, many were careful not to condemn it outright. Many hoped that the GDR would eventually outgrow its paranoia and restrictive policies. The Communists were seen as anti-fascists who had been the victims of National Socialism, and many had perished in the camps or survived under horrific circumstances. Their resistance to fascism and Hitler gave them moral authority. The fact that West Germany had rebuilt the FRG from the ashes of National Socialism with some of the same politicians, professors, civil servants, judges, and teachers who had participated in it, and had outlawed the KPD, confirmed in the eyes of many on the Left that the West was a continuation of fascism under the guise of democracy and consumer capitalism.

Röhl, not a dogmatic Marxist, did not fit the mold of a loyal Communist toeing the party line. He was a flamboyant bon vivant, known as an adventurer and a cynic. His motto was “Enjoy capitalism, because socialism will be tough.”²⁰ Nevertheless, Röhl cooperated successfully with the East Germans until 1964, when the ideological conflicts between *konkret* and the GDR erupted and led to an end of the subsidy from the East. To his credit, Röhl risked losing his funds rather than bow to party pressure. For the East Germans, *konkret* had become too cheeky and independent in criticizing Stalinism and in sympathizing with the thawing of political dogmatism in the former Czechoslovakia. *konkret* expressed its solidarity with the artists, writers, and musicians who defied the narrow confines of state-sanctioned socialist realism. In 1965, Röhl was expelled from the Party, but Meinhof, who canceled her membership, was never taken off the membership roll.²¹²² Despite her continued official membership, Meinhof had irreversibly broken with the Communist Party too. When she was wanted as a terrorist, she did not—as some of her fellow RAF members did—take refuge in the GDR.

To everybody’s surprise, *konkret* not only pulled through the crisis that came with the break from the GDR, but was able to increase its visibility and circulation. After initially disbanding the editorial staff and thinking they were bankrupt, Röhl reopened his offices. He took over as editor-in-chief, and Meinhof went freelance while continuing to publish in *konkret*. Röhl published a 1964 July/August double issue with an emergency call for subscriptions, donations, and advertising contracts. The response was overwhelming. Subscriptions poured in,

and major publishing houses paid in advance for advertising, and political groups submitted donations. Even Röhl was surprised by the broad solidarity.

The magazine changed its look: bare-breasted women appeared on the cover; articles about sex, drugs, and rock and roll augmented political analysis and literary commentary. Like no other magazine at the time, *konkret*'s mix of politics and sex had its pulse on the anti-bourgeois zeitgeist and the emerging sexual revolution. Although Meinhof and Röhl were critical of some of the excesses of the sexual revolution, *konkret* became an alternative lifestyle magazine that provided information and a forum for the discussion of unconventional ways of life.

konkret had yet another run-in with Franz Josef Strauss, who accused *konkret* of being a danger to the moral fabric of society and "a glaring example of the depreciation of Christian values."²³ *konkret* opponents hoped to prohibit its sale to minors. Again, it received support from the liberal media fearing censorship. An addition to the youth protection law exempting political publications enabled *konkret* to prevail. The result of the well publicized campaign was that more people wanted to see what the controversy was all about, and *konkret* was able to increase its circulation to more than 100,000.

Meinhof now wrote a column published on page two or three of every issue. The columns were styled after a column by "Frau Sybille" in the magazine *Stern* and appeared with her photograph and handwritten signature. She no longer used the name Röhl, but signed Ulrike Marie Meinhof. She had become, in essence, a brand. Meinhof stood for the serious side of *konkret*'s blend of culture and politics. Her columns were anticipated and debated. Meinhof was on her way to becoming a star columnist.

The Röhls lived in a suburb of Hamburg, and later in Blankenese, a wealthy area of Hamburg, where they bought a villa with a large garden. Meinhof gave birth to twin girls in 1962. Shortly afterward, she underwent brain surgery for what turned out to be a blood clot rather than a suspected brain tumor. After a lengthy recovery from surgery, during which Riemeck and her partner took care of the twins, Meinhof adjusted to being a working mother. The Röhls' life now included children's birthday parties, nannies, and bedtime stories. They were part of Hamburg's high society, which was beginning its love affair with the Left. The Röhls were well connected in the publishing and art worlds, and

Meinhof was a sought-after figure among intellectuals, writers, publishers, and artists. Rudolf Augstein, publisher of *Der Spiegel*, and the Italian industrialist and financier Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, are said to have been enamored with Meinhof. Influential literary critics, such as Marcel Reich-Ranicki and Fritz J. Raddatz, kept her company, as well as leading Protestant theologians, such as Martin Niemöller and Helmut Gollwitzer. The Röhls were part of what was termed the Hamburg Party Republic. In the summer, the Party Republic moved up to Sylt, an exclusive island in Northern Germany where celebrities have houses and compounds. The Röhls spent their summers in the city of Kampen, which is known for its fine living. Radicalism was chic and could be taken to the beach and into the homes of the wealthy. Meinhof had what it took to be one of its stars: she was attractive and intelligent, a talented, intense writer who projected integrity and authenticity. She wore smart designer clothes and jewelry, she liked to dance and seemingly enjoyed the attention she received. When passionately involved in discussions, she would stay up all night to argue her point. She was engaged and engaging and not afraid to take a stance. She was able to connect with people from different backgrounds and was able to convince them to contribute to *konkret*.

Meinhof also became a sought-after television and radio journalist who wrote successful radio and television features that were concerned with the plight of the disadvantaged and disenfranchised. She wrote features on foreign guest and factory workers, and children brought up in institutions. She criticized the ways in which these groups were treated by the authorities and marginalized by society. She reported on the low wages and exploitation of women. She was the only female journalist who took on these political topics and who immersed herself in the milieu about which she reported. Aired at prime time, the features were about an hour long, and like her columns, they were well researched and incisively argued critiques of present conditions. Essayistic in style, they consisted of a montage of documentary materials, descriptive passages, commentary, and scenes acted out by professional actors.²³ Meinhof was a writer reluctant to make changes to her manuscripts. She mixed documentation with argumentation, insisting that in her work she wanted to come close, not to reality, but to the truth.²⁴

Despite her success, Meinhof was becoming dissatisfied with the limitations of journalism, and the discrepancy between her bourgeois life style and her political objectives. She became more involved with socially marginalized groups, the

student movement and the SDS, communist groups, Christian liberationists, anti-nuclear activists, trade unionists, and many others. She began to search for new and more effective political strategies.

The turning point of the protest movement in West Germany was reached on June 2, 1967, when a police officer shot Benno Ohnesorg, a student who participated in a demonstration on the occasion of the official state visit to Germany by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran and his wife Farah Diba. Meinhof's "Open Letter to Farah Diba" expressed in a polemic tone a profound solidarity with the Iranian people—and with developing nations in general—and the anti-totalitarian and anti-capitalist sentiment underlying the anti-Shah protests.

One of Meinhof's closest friends in Berlin, the Iranian publicist Bahman Nirumand, had just published a book fiercely critical of Iran.²⁵ The book was well-received, and on June 1, about three thousand students attended a lecture by Nirumand at the Free University of Berlin, where Meinhof's "Open Letter to Farah Diba" was distributed as a leaflet. Nirumand's lecture and Meinhof's open letter mobilized students for the anti-Shah protest the next day. In the afternoon the next day during a demonstration at Schöneberg City hall, where the Shah and his wife arrived to wave to the crowds, pro-Shah groups attacked anti-Shah protesters with wooden clubs, and police stood by impassively at first. Once they did react, it was with unprecedented brutality against the anti-Shah protesters, who were bludgeoned and arrested.²⁶

In the evening, a few thousand students gathered around the area of the German Opera in Berlin where the Shah and his wife were to attend Mozart's *Magic Flute*. Again, pro-Shah people were allowed to come to the front of the barriers to display their support. When the Shah arrived, anti-Shah protesters shouted: "Murderer, murderer" and slogans such as "Shah, shah, charlatan." They threw paint, tomatoes, and bags of flour across the road—but the objects landed nowhere near the Shah. After the Shah and his wife had entered the opera house, protesters began to disperse, but suddenly ambulances drove up and police launched a bloody attack on demonstrators. Police bludgeoned protesters using a so-called liver-sausage tactic whereby they would "hit it hard in the middle to make it burst apart at the ends."²⁷ Police pursued fleeing demonstrators, ending up with some in an alley way; there Ohnesorg was shot in the head by an officer.

Scandalized by police brutality and the cynical and biased reporting of the events by the conservative media, the protest movement was mobilized by Ohnesorg's death. In the following months, more and more protesters took to the streets, and the clashes with police became increasingly violent. The protesters spoke of having to exercise counter-violence; in their view, police had started the violence and committed murder.

The shooting set off within the APO (extra-Parliamentary opposition) discussions of violence and counter-violence and led to the founding of several militant groups, among them the Movement of June 2nd, which later joined the RAF in its armed struggle. Although the majority of the APO did not condone violence, discussions on political strategies became more accepting of alternative methods in the struggle against police and the state. The APO drew on a variety of political theories from Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Ho-Chi Minh to Carlos Marighella's notion of the urban guerilla and Che Guevaras's foco theory that one should not wait for revolutionary conditions but should rather create them. It also drew on Frantz Fanon's anti-colonial stance and Herbert Marcuse's notions of the natural right to resistance and his cautioning of "repressive tolerance." SDS leaders Rudi Dutschke and Hans-Jürgen Krahl²⁸ presented in September 1967 their so-called "Organisationsreferat," a paper discussing methods of political protest. "The urbanization of rural guerilla activity becomes historically possible when the 'propaganda of bullets' (Che) in the 'Third World' is complemented by the 'propaganda of deeds' in the metropolitan centers."²⁹ The problem of organization, the paper states, must from now on be conceived of as a problem of revolutionary existence. The possibility of using more militant methods of protest was discussed. The question of violence—if, how, and when to exercise or counter it—became the central issue, while an important differentiation was made between violence against things and violence against people.

The conflict between the movement and the state was also framed in terms of the past. Fascism became the lens through which the events were filtered. Commenting on the shooting of Ohnesorg, Theodor W. Adorno stated: "The students have taken on a bit of the role of the Jews."³⁰ Such references to and associations with fascism served to cast the protesters in the role of victims and underscore their right to resistance. Yet, the students were also accused of fascism, notably by Germany's eminent sociologist-philosopher Jürgen

Habermas, who opposed the methods expounded in the “Organisationsreferat” and accused the movement of “leftist fascism.” Nevertheless, the protest movement came to understand itself in generational terms as an anti-fascist uprising against state oppression and against the generation of parents and grandparents who had participated in the Third Reich. During a discussion at the Berlin SDS after Ohnesorg’s death, Gudrun Ensslin is said to have exclaimed: “They’re going to kill us all—you know what kind of pigs we’re dealing with—it’s the Auschwitz generation we’re dealing with—and you can’t discuss anything with people who created Auschwitz. They’re armed, and we’re not. We have to get armed, too.”³¹ —

The 1967 July issue of *konkret* contained the findings of a student commission on the shooting of Ohnesorg, and Meinhof produced a television feature about the events of June 2 in which she stated: “The protests against the chief of a police state [the Shah] unmask our state as a police state. Terror by police and the press reached its high point on June 2 in Berlin. We have come to understand that freedom in this state means the freedom of the police truncheon, and freedom of the press in the shadow of the Springer Corporation means the freedom to justify the truncheon.”³² — In the wake of June 2, *konkret* aligned itself more and more with the student movement, and starting in August 1967 issue, student leader Rudi Dutschke wrote a regular column for *konkret*. By the end of 1967, Meinhof’s sympathy and support for the movement had turned into a commitment to its goals and a wish for active participation.

As the protest movement gained momentum and as she increasingly questioned herself, Meinhof’s seemingly comfortable life fell apart very quickly. The Röhls spent the summer in Sylt and then visited their friend Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, who was financially supporting segments of the German radical Left in Berlin, and his German wife Inge, at their castle in Northern Italy. The following excerpt from a letter shows Meinhof as a tortured soul in search of fulfillment not only on a political but also on a private level: “Sometimes I have the feeling I am going crazy. My relationship with Klaus, my acceptance by the establishment, the work with students—three different parts of my life that seem irreconcilable and are tearing me apart, pulling me to pieces. The house, the parties, Kampen—it’s all only partially fun, but it is the basis I have to be a subversive element. TV appearances, contacts, public attention are part of my career as a journalist and a socialist and give me access to radio and television beyond *konkret*. It’s all

agreeable on a human level, but doesn't fulfill my need for human warmth, solidarity, and belonging to a group. The role that got me accepted only partially corresponds to my nature; it turns my ideas into those of a fool, forcing me to say things with a smile—things that are dead serious to me, to all of us. . . .”³³ —

By the end of the year, Röhl had fallen in love with a woman, and the marriage was over. In February 1968, Meinhof moved with her daughters to Berlin. Although she had contacts, acquaintances, and comrades there, she did not have a circle of friends as in Hamburg. Experimenting with alternative lifestyles in vogue at the time, she lived with various people, but the relationships did not work out as she had hoped. As a single, working mother, it was difficult for her to care for her children and pursue her profession. She continued to write her columns—in which she increasingly thematized the plight of working mothers—and recruited girls whom she had met in the institutions to help with her household. These “nannies” often lived in her home, but mostly, they were an additional burden rather than a help.

The anti-authoritarian rebellion of 1968 swept across parts of Europe, North America, and parts of South America and Asia. The US Civil Rights Movement had helped to set in motion a wave of protest against racism, imperialism, and inequality, and the Vietnam War had become a universal symbol for inhumanity and the abuse of power around the world. Everywhere solidarity movements with the anti-colonial struggle sprung up and protests against colonial powers and their attempts to dominate and exploit developing nations gained in strength. Events around the world radicalized the movement that year: In January, the North Vietnamese launched the Tet Offensive that caused massive casualties, and Americans became increasingly polarized over the war in Vietnam. In April, the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. sparked riots in major US cities. In May, attention turned to the Parisian student revolt. There was intense fighting between protesters and police. Rioters set up barricades and threw stones at police, and police attacked with gas grenades. Unlike the protesters in Germany, the French students were able to win broad sympathies among unions and workers, and on May 22, nine million French workers went on strike. The May riots in France set off a spark in Germany, too. There were solidarity demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins in many major German universities. On May 11, more than sixty thousand people protested all over Germany against the Emergency Laws. In Frankfurt, students renamed the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University the Karl

Marx University, and in the days before passage of the Emergency Laws, confrontations between protesters and police escalated. In August, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union put an end to the Prague Spring. In October, police and military troops clashed violently in Mexico City.

Meinhof was increasingly involved in the activities about which she wrote. As she witnessed Berlin's protest culture, the demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, subversive and provocative art, street performances, agit-theaters, poster culture, leaflets, lecture disruptions, fiery speeches and heated debates, her role shifted from observer to participant. Meinhof took part in important SDS debates about organized activities against the conservative Springer-Press, the German Emergency Laws, and the war in Vietnam. She defended the women of SDS who at a delegate conference in 1968 threw tomatoes at a male speaker who ignored their assertion that SDS was practicing the same strategies to oppress women as were prevalent in mainstream society. "The reactions of the men at the conference . . . showed that entire freight train loads of tomatoes will have to be thrown at appropriate targets for the message to really sink in," she wrote.

In "Everybody Talks About the Weather" she took up issues of gender in the context of the impending deportation of Nirumand from Germany. She argued that the matter of his deportation should be seen as a political rather than a private issue, and that the order affected first and foremost his German wife and daughter, who were in danger of being uprooted. "It is apolitical to protest about women, because women's issues are human, humanitarian issues. There! Everybody is talking about the weather again! What is viewed as a-political is the almost completely internalized oppression of women, an oppression that is still quite beyond comprehension."

The discussions of the SDS had mostly bypassed issues of gender and focused instead—and Meinhof was very much a participant in this discussion, too—on strategy, such as the breaking of rules and the legality of certain measures of protests and resistance. By temperament, age, and life experience Meinhof was drawn to those factions of the movement who valued political rationality, logic, and discipline. Although—or perhaps because—she was a well-known and well-respected journalist, she could not find her way into the core SDS group. Yet, she had numerous contacts in the movement, and Dutschke and Nirumand became her most important discussion partners during this time. Like Dutschke, Meinhof had connections to the liberal faction of the Protestant church, including

Gollwitzer and Niemöller. Dutschke engaged in dialogues with a number of prominent intellectuals, including Herbert Marcuse and Ernst Bloch, and Meinhof followed these discussions with great interest. More importantly, however, Meinhof and Dutschke shared the passion for figuring out ways to transform theory into practice. Meinhof's columns began to reflect the widespread sentiment that the situation in Vietnam and at home called for deeds rather than words. In "Counter-Violence," she indicated that the violence exercised by students is counter-violence both in the sense of counter, as exercising violence in response to violence, and "counter" (Gegen-) as in being against violence. Meinhof declared counter-violence as a form of self-defense.

Organized by the SDS in West Berlin, the Vietnam Congress brought together about five thousand delegates of the New Left from around the world. Participants included communist, socialist, Maoist, Trotskyist, Leninist organizations as well as independent artists, intellectuals, writers, journalists, and scientists. Speakers included the Italian industrialist Feltrinelli, writers such as Erich Fried, Peter Weiß, Bahman Nirumand, Rudi Dutschke, Haus-Jurgen Krahl, and Horst Mahler, and Dale Smith representing the Black Power Movement from the US. The list of supporters who sent greetings and messages reads like a who's who of the intellectual Left: lawyers, professors, unionists, theologians, literary critics, writers, and artists from around the world, including filmmakers such as Pier Paolo Pasolini and Luchino Visconti.³⁴ In his opening statement, SDS president Karl Dietrich Wolff appealed to participants to find ways to oppose the "power of the imperialist military machine" and to step up and coordinate their various anti-war activities across the globe. "Comrades! We don't have much time left. We, too, are being beaten every day in Vietnam."³⁵

Protesters identified with the victims of the war, and the outrage led to some reductive comparisons between the violence exercised by police against protesters and the violence exercised by the US in Vietnam. Berlin was equated with Saigon and Che Guevara's call to create "two, three, many Vietnams," published in *konkret* in 1967, circulated as political strategy. "We are Vietnam" and other such slogans marked Vietnam as a universal site of oppression in which the agendas of anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism could be merged.³⁶

The struggle of the Vietcong, of Cubans, and elsewhere in the developing world inspired the revolutionary imagination of the West. For the German Left

living in the shadow of the legacy of fascism, support of communist and socialist causes all over the world was a matter of conscience. On the eve of the Congress, Meinhof expressed the hope that participants might find ways to step up their opposition to the war and put pressure on the US to stop its continuation: “We can’t allow ourselves to be burdened by guilt, which will silence or neutralize our response to the revolutionary struggle of the Vietnamese people,” she wrote in *konkret*.³⁷ On April 11—only days after Martin Luther King was assassinated—Dutschke was shot by a right-wing construction worker who carried with him an article by the neo-fascist *National Newspaper* containing the headline, “Stop Dutschke Now.” The SDS declared the assassination attempt the result of a systematic hate campaign against progressive and democratic forces by the Springer-Press and the Berlin Senate. “Expropriate Springer” was the slogan of the day. Meinhof participated in a demonstration against Springer during which protesters slashed tires, threw rocks and Molotov cocktails—compliment of an agent provocateur of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution—and set delivery trucks on fire. Protests and battles with police continued in many German cities, as more than 45,000 protesters attempted to stop delivery of the *Bild-Zeitung*. At rallies and sit-ins, Dutschke’s photo was displayed next to that of Martin Luther King. They were perceived as the victims and martyrs of the same international movement.

Meinhof’s column about these protests introduced to the German Left the American SDS slogan “From protest to resistance.”³⁸ While resistance in the US context meant primarily resistance to racial inequality and to the draft, in Germany, the slogan evoked the failed resistance to National Socialism and the moral urgency to resist totalitarian structures.

“Protest is when I say this is something I don’t like. Resistance is when I put an end to what I don’t like. Protest is when I say I refuse to go along with this anymore. Resistance is when I make sure everybody else stops going along too,” read Meinhof’s much-cited lines. Compelling and poignantly argued, the lines exemplify the increasingly breathless, desperate, and exhilarating message of mobilization and dissent.

Meinhof became the spokesperson of a movement she would soon surpass. Expressing frustration and hope, the columns of 1968 engaged ever more radically in the project of enlightenment, in laying bare hidden mechanisms of

power and manipulation. Meinhof took apart arguments presented by politicians and journalists to expose their underlying ideological positions. She was at odds with the way in which the media reported the protests. Increasingly, she was not only at odds with the popular press, such as Springer, but increasingly also with the liberal media, including *Der Spiegel*. In “Water Cannons: Against Women, Too,” she admonishes *Spiegel* editor-in-chief Rudolf Augstein for his reservations about the movement. Again Meinhof argued that it was pointless to criticize demonstrators protesting the Vietnam War, totalitarian systems, and crimes against humanity for not playing by the rules of the bourgeois order. Protest against the system can not possibly come entirely from within the system, she declared.

In contrast to the majority of the media, Meinhof and *konkret* celebrated the movement and the radicalization that had begun with the death of Ohnesorg and had now reached its pinnacle with the shooting of Dutschke. The fact that the policeman who had shot Ohnesorg was not punished served as further evidence of the corruption of the system. Meinhof celebrated the April 1968 protests as a sign of progress toward a praxis of resistance. “Counter-violence, as was practiced over Easter, does not easily garner support; it does not easily attract frightened liberals to the side of the APO. Counter-violence runs the risk of turning into violence, when police brutality sets the measure for action, when helpless rage takes over from sovereign reason, when the paramilitary interventions by the police provoke paramilitary reactions,” she wrote in “From Protest to Resistance.”

In October, Meinhof went on assignment to Frankfurt. She was to report for *konkret* on the trial of Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader, Thorwald Proll, and Horst Söhnlein, who were accused of bombing a Frankfurt department store. Deposited in the furniture section, the bomb had caused damage of 300,000 marks. Nobody got hurt. During the tumultuous trial, Ensslin declared: “We did it to protest against the indifference with which people regard the war in Vietnam.”³⁹ Meinhof had expected that the trial would turn into a forum for political debate, but was disappointed that the political motivation and context of the bombing did not play out significantly. In the end, the judge acknowledged that the defendants were not typical criminals and may have had certain idealist motives. Nevertheless, he sentenced each defendant to a three-year prison term. The severity of the sentence was surprising to most observers and set in motion the chain of events that eventually led to the founding of the RAF.

Meinhof's column about the bombing and the trial reads labored and ambiguous. Meinhof visited Ensslin in prison, but did not—as first planned—write about it, because she feared that if she wrote about the conversation, Ensslin would not be released from prison in the near future. In contrast to Ensslin, Meinhof did not believe that the bombing disrupted consumer society or awoke people from their indifference toward the war. The insurance will pay the damage, Meinhof argued, and everything will continue as it was. In fact, Meinhof argued, the destruction of a few goods actually reinforces the system by discharging its surplus. Then, in an odd twist, Meinhof found some progressive benefit in the department store arson, concluding that the criminal act broke bourgeois law and thus questioned the laws of ownership and property. Nevertheless, she argued that “arson in department stores is not an anti-capitalist action; on the contrary, it maintains the system and is counter-revolutionary.”

By summer, negotiations with Röhl were forming to open a Berlin office of *konkret*. Starting in September, Röhl wanted to publish *konkret* bimonthly rather than monthly, and he asked Meinhof to take over again as editor-in-chief. Meinhof declined, but pledged her support. With Meinhof in Berlin, it made sense to set up an office there, as Röhl was hoping to win for *konkret* the support of some of the activists and writers at the forefront of the movement. The Berlin staff saw itself in opposition to conventional journalistic practices and promoted instead a model of collective authorship. Meinhof, Dutschke, Enzensberger, Nirumand, Gaston Salvatore, Peter Schneider and others wrote articles collectively and published them anonymously. The June 1968 issue reported on the Easter protests in Germany, the riots in France and the US, and the protests of students all over the world, and featured an article on “Violence in Metropolitan Areas.” At issue in this collective writing project was not only the discussion of political strategy, but also how this discussion was undertaken: “Active resistance is not only the foundation for the new type of human being, but already her partial realization.”⁴⁰ The goal was thus the formation of a revolutionary subjectivity, where collective production was favored over individual expression. The private was to be understood as political, and the individual was thought to have to overcome the barriers, norms, and inhibitions imposed on it by the system.

Insurmountable differences caused the termination of the cooperation between the Berlin Editorial Collective—with which Meinhof sided—and Röhl, who was unwilling to give complete autonomy to the Collective. He objected not so

much to the defense of violence as political strategy, but to articles that he found to be boring and badly written. The conflict between the Collective's progressive perception of authorship and Röhl's more conventional views provide the background for Meinhof's "Columnism." Yet in "Columnism," there are larger issues at stake; it contains a fundamental questioning of journalistic practice and of the power of language and its ability to effect social and political change. Meinhof wrote that columns are commodities; they are "luxury items, columnists are stars; they are the big fish in their own tiny pond." But their independence, she wrote, is illusory and a mere alibi to sell magazines and give the impression of freedom of speech. Meinhof said that columns are "a fraud for the readers, self-deception, a personality cult," and columnists are "powerless individuals, outsiders." Meinhof thus fundamentally questioned her own role as a columnist and "star," and as a writer who stands on the outside, at a distance—observing rather than participating.

For Meinhof, collective authorship may have offered the beginning of challenging conventions of writing and the prevailing status quo of publishing. But she went a step further: she no longer wanted to write about or for people, but with them. Meinhof wanted those who have something at stake to have a say in what is being written about them. She did not want to objectify, but to empower them. She wanted them to participate in the process of writing. Thus, Meinhof was pushing journalistic writing to the edge, abandoning notions of objectivity, becoming a committed participant in the collective project of writing and reporting.

"Columnism," one of Meinhof's last columns, was published at the end of a tumultuous year for her both politically and privately. Röhl responded by defending the magazine against Meinhof's charges that authors were pressured by deadlines. Yes, Röhl said, there is pressure to get the magazine published on time, but Röhl conceded that Meinhof wanted "something beautiful, enthusiastic, but impossible: the purity of the doctrine, careful research, the timeliness of *Spiegel* and the horizon of *Kursbuch* ,⁴¹ no naked girls on the front page and no concession to the market, but more money for the editorial board and on-time transfer of the honorarium."⁴² Meinhof's critique, said Röhl, would help *konkret* become a better magazine and her columns, he added, would "continue to appear in *konkret*. Where else?"⁴³

Despite Röhl's conciliatory tone, the conflict between the Hamburg office and the Berlin Collective escalated. Instead of her column, Meinhof submitted in March 1969 an anonymous pamphlet, written by a Berlin grassroots group. Meinhof rejected Röhl's offer to publish the pamphlet under her own name, but insisted that she should have the right to publish a text of her choice in the space allotted to her column. Röhl removed the pamphlet before the magazine went to print, and Meinhof quit. On April 26, 1969, she published an explanatory statement for her decision and a rather austere résumé of her career in the liberal newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau*: "I have terminated my collaboration with the magazine *konkret*. During the ten-year association, I was editor, editor-in-chief, columnist. I went to *konkret* because I considered collaborating with this newspaper a possibility to work politically. Between 1964 and 1969 I regularly wrote political commentaries, because there I could write what I considered to be true . . . I terminate my collaboration because the paper is in the process of becoming an instrument of the counterrevolution and I don't want to camouflage this . . . I give up the fight to avoid polishing the leftist image and lending the paper credibility—a paper that will turn against us when we need it."⁴⁴ —

In the end, Röhl and *konkret* did not turn against Meinhof, even when she went underground. Although *konkret* distanced itself from the militancy of the armed struggle, it reported on Meinhof rather sympathetically. Röhl published a volume of Meinhof columns in 1972, when it was advantageous for her that the public and the justice system remember that she had been a respected journalist. Röhl also shared (or perhaps sold) personal stories and private photographs of Meinhof with the media. Although he may have profited from the publication of the volume and gained publicity through Meinhof, he countered the image of her as the evil terrorist by portraying her instead as a serious journalist with a private life as a wife, mother, and socialite.

The story of Meinhof and *konkret* did not end with her resignation. Together with a group of collaborators, Meinhof planned to occupy and take over the *konkret* office in Hamburg. On May 7, 1969, a group of Berlin activists traveled to Hamburg, where they were met by police. Röhl had heard of the planned action and had moved the offices. Disappointed, the group went instead to Röhl's villa—that had been Meinhof's home—and vandalized it. When Meinhof arrived, most of the damage was done. But there is a photo of Meinhof in the garden of the villa after or during the action, wearing her trench coat and sunglasses, looking

utterly dejected. Meinhof apparently distanced herself from the action in private, but she never did so publicly.⁴⁵ —

Now that she was no longer working for *konkret*, she devoted herself to the script for the made-for-television movie, *Bambule*. The aim of *Bambule* was to dramatize the conditions and restrictive atmosphere of a public home for young women. Meinhof had already researched the topic for radio documentaries. Based on interviews with the girls and the story of Irene Goergens—who later became a member of the RAF and participated in the freeing of Andreas Baader—the story follows the life of the girls in the home. It shows the repressive, punitive atmosphere of the home, the monotony of the girls' work in the home's laundry facility, and it follows the fate of Irene, who escapes from the home. Irene learns how hard it is to survive outside the institution: her family can't support her; she has no marketable skills and no papers that allow her to find employment. The other girls she escaped with survive by prostitution, as this appears to be their only opportunity to make money. Disillusioned, Irene returns to the home and initiates a "bambule"—a rebellion—against the repressive conditions there.

A figure of identification for Meinhof may have been the social worker Mrs. Lack, who works at the home and tries to be an advocate for the girls, but ultimately resigns herself to the decisions of the authoritarian director. Meinhof made her an ambiguous figure who listens to the girls and is the only one who treats them with some kindness and understanding. However, the liberal Mrs. Lack—the name means, appropriately, varnish, patina, or polish—is ultimately powerless against the forces of the system.

By interviewing the girls, and offering some of them private support, Meinhof interacted both professionally and privately with them. She did not want to turn them into an object of her writing, but wanted to enable them to develop their own voices.

A few days before the film was to be shown, Meinhof went underground. The broadcasting of *Bambule* was cancelled over concerns that it would elicit sympathy for those practicing violence. It was not shown on German television until 1994. By then, it had become one of the most famous cases of political censorship in the postwar period.

The engagement with institutionalized youths brought Meinhof together with Ensslin, whom she already knew from the prison interview, and with Baader,

Astrid Proll, and others who later formed the RAF. Meinhof met them while they were working in Frankfurt on a project with youth from socially marginalized groups. Both Baader and Ensslin had spent fourteen months in jail for the department store arson, and had been released while awaiting the result of their motion for appeal. They hoped that their social engagement in the form of community service would sway the judges. "Project Staffenberg" was a project of their own design. It was to support homeless or institutionalized youths. In the summer of 1969, Baader, Ensslin, and other future RAF-members participated in a so-called "Knast-camp," a meeting of groups and individuals in support of prisoners' rights. Like these groups, Baader and Ensslin understood their project as political work aiming to empower disenfranchised youth and to turn young proletarians into revolutionary subjects.

The project ended abruptly, when the federal court rejected the appeal of their case. Rather than risk having to return to prison, Baader and Ensslin escaped to Paris, where they lived in the apartment of the French intellectual and activist Régis Debray, who as supporter of Che Guevara was imprisoned in Bolivia at the time. Thorwald Proll, a codefendant in the case of the department store bombing, and his sister Astrid Proll, joined Baader and Ensslin. Proll took a series of remarkable photographs of Ensslin and Baader in Paris. Later published in a coffee table book, the photos show a chic couple laughing and posing in Parisian cafes.⁴⁶

Soon afterward, Baader and Ensslin took on the pseudonyms Hans and Grete. Thorwald Proll returned to Germany, and Astrid went with Ensslin and Baader to Italy, where the couple had contact with German writers and Italian activists who opened their homes to them. Four months later, they returned to Germany with the goal of building up the movement for armed struggle. In February 1970, they went to Berlin and showed up on Meinhof's doorstep. Meinhof had a big apartment, the means to support people financially and in other ways, and was known to be generous. (She regularly harbored runaway girls from institutions and the street.)

Meinhof had become disillusioned with the movement as it lost momentum and common purpose. In the winter semester of 1969-1970, she taught a course at the journalism institute at the Free University of Berlin. Students were supposed to learn how to research, write, and produce feature programs. But, at least

according to one former student, Meinhof was hectic, unfocused, seemingly unprepared and unwilling to take on the role of lecturer. ⁴⁷ Meinhof turned the seminar into a platform for political agitation; she brought with her youths from the homes about which she wrote *Bambule* and allowed them to dominate the discussion. She told her students that she did not want to train them to produce features for public radio or television, but to do “agitation in the grass roots organization of the Left.”⁴⁸ Thus, when Meinhof opened the door of her home to Baader and Ensslin, whose application for a pardon—like the application for appeal—had been rejected, she had already pushed herself to the radical edge.

Baader and Ensslin took over Meinhof’s home. The twins were told that they were not allowed to tell anybody about the presence of Hans and Grete. There were nightly meetings and discussions. Among the participants in the meetings were also Peter Homann, who lived with Meinhof at the time, and Horst Mahler, a lawyer and defender at the arson trial of Baader and Ensslin.⁴⁹ Mahler was prosecuted for his participation in the protests against Springer. He was sentenced to three years probation and expelled from the bar association. Feeling marginalized in society and from their professions, group members were exploring alternative avenues of dissent. How was one to create a revolutionary climate? Protests were seen as mere rhetoric. What was needed was a propaganda of deeds. The armed struggle was about to begin.

THE RAF

Baader and Ensslin had met in the summer of 1967 after Baader’s release from prison for driving without a license and the theft of a motorbike. In the wake of the Ohnesorg shooting, a group of students met in the apartment of Bernward Vesper, Ensslin’s fiancé and father of her son, to celebrate an action staged to force the resignation of Berlin major, Pastor Heinrich Albertz. To circumvent a prohibition on carrying banners, a group of eight students, including Ensslin, staged the protest that had taken place on Berlin’s Kurfürstendamm. The group had painted the individual letters of Albertz’s name on the front of their t-shirts, and on the back of their t-shirts was printed the individual letters that spelled “resign.” The students were arrested, and their action received the attention of the media. To Baader’s thinking it was a mere child’s game and not radical enough.

Meanwhile some members of the group were contemplating the bombing of a church tower. Rumor had it around leftist circles that “there was someone really weird; he talks of nothing but terrorism.”⁵⁰ Baader thus gained a reputation as the enfant terrible of the movement. He was an outsider to the leftist scene, not a student but a petty criminal who carried himself like a dandy. At the time, he was hanging out in Commune I, the politically active, sexually liberated, and fabled commune that was openly rejecting bourgeois norms and conventions.

Born in 1943 in Munich, Baader had been raised by his grand-mother and mother. His father, a historian, had gone missing in the war. The boy was said to be a narcissist. After being expelled from school, Baader immersed himself in Munich and Berlin’s artistic and gay scenes. He was ostentatious and extravagant, posing for gay photographers, hanging out in bars and clubs, wearing expensive clothes and makeup. He was known to use drugs, and had an affair with a married painter, who supported him for several years. He moved in with the painter and her husband and fathered a child with her. Baader seemed to have no particular interest in politics, but was attracted to the protest movement when the action heated up in the wake of the Ohnesorg shooting.⁵¹

In contrast, Ensslin was a serious student who had studied German and English literature at the University of Tübingen, working toward her PhD. The daughter of a Protestant pastor, Ensslin had a religious heritage similar to Meinhof’s. During the late 1960s, Ensslin became committed to the political causes of the Left, along with an interest in literature. Together with Vesper, Ensslin had edited a volume of poetry by Vesper’s father Will Vesper, a prominent writer during the Third Reich, and they founded the publishing venture New Literature Studios, which produced an edited volume of essays against nuclear weapons. She had moved to Berlin with Vesper in 1964, but separated from him around the time their son Felix was born. He more or less raised Felix until 1971, when Vesper committed suicide.⁵²

In 1970, Baader was arrested once again, and imprisoned for driving without a valid license. Meinhof arranged to meet with him in the library of the Institute for Social Questions at the Free University of Berlin. Because of her position as a journalist, she had received permission to conduct with Baader research for a co-authored book about marginalized youth. After first being denied the request, Meinhof used her connections and submitted to the warden of the prison

a contract for the book with Wagenbach Publishers. The warden also received a visit from lawyer Horst Mahler, and finally relented.

Baader, accompanied by two prison guards, was granted permission to visit the Institute on the morning of May 14. The Institute was closed during the arranged time, and Baader's hand-cuffs were taken off. Meinhof and Baader pretended to research library materials until med student Ingrid Schubert and Irene Goergens, the young woman whose life had inspired Meinhof's *Bambule*, and two masked figures—one of them was likely Gudrun Ensslin—stormed the Institute. They were armed, and when one of the Institute's employees attempted to flee to his office, he was shot. Next, the intruders overtook the prison guards, and Baader, his liberators, and Meinhof jumped out a window and escaped.

The freeing of Baader did not go as planned. The group—naively, to be sure—had assumed that nobody would get hurt. The shots were, according to former members of the RAF, an accident that propelled the group into circumstances for which they were unprepared. The group that would become the RAF would have developed very differently if the shots had not been fired. As far as the event can be reconstructed, the Institute employee was shot by a “professional” hired by the RAF, because the group felt it did not have the experience and expertise to undertake such an operation. The gunman was apparently a criminal with no political motives; he was simply paid to do the job. The Institute employee was badly wounded and barely survived. The plan had also been for Meinhof not to escape with Baader and the others but to pretend to be an innocent bystander. The group must have felt that Meinhof would be most useful if she were not underground, remaining a covert supporter. Why did Meinhof jump out of the window with the others? Likely, she panicked when shots were fired and decided spontaneously that she would be implicated in the crime. This seems plausible, as she had not made any arrangements for her children in advance. After the botched action, she arranged for friends to pick up the children from school immediately.

Only minutes after the group escaped, the police began a state-wide hunt. Borders were strictly patrolled; police squads raided communes and apartments in Berlin and elsewhere. Search warrants went out and a wanted poster with Ulrike Meinhof's photograph was printed and hung up on advertising columns, in post offices, on news programs on television, and other public venues. Her picture was everywhere; ten thousand marks were offered as a reward for tips leading

to her arrest, and she became the most recognized face in Germany. Two days after the freeing of Baader, Meinhof lost custody of her children to Röhl, but the children's whereabouts remained unknown. A few days later, the TV broadcasting of Meinhof's film *Bambule* was canceled.

Gambar dengan hak cipta

Ulrike Meinhof wanted poster. COURTESY OF WWW.BAADER-MEINHOF.COM

On June 5 1970, the group's first communiqué appeared in the leftist Berlin paper *Agit 833* under the title "Build up the Red Army!"⁵³ In a raw, no-nonsense tone, the communiqué announced the beginning of armed resistance. Resistance, like the Red Army, were terms meant to underline the group's anti-fascist

impetus. “Comrades of 883,” the founding declaration of the RAF begins, “There is no point in trying to explain the right thing to the wrong people. We have done that long enough. We don’t have to explain the Baader liberation to intellectual babblers, pants-shitters, and know-it-alls, but to the potentially revolutionary segments of the people, to those who can immediately grasp the deed, because they are prisoners themselves, to those who don’t care about the blather of the Left, because it remains without consequences and deeds.”⁵⁴ The group declared that the freeing of Baader was only the beginning and that its aim was to escalate the conflict between the state and its opposition, between those who exploited the Third World and those who did not profit from Persian oil, Bolivian bananas, and South African gold. “The revolution will not be an Easter parade,” the group warned.⁵⁵ “Let the class struggle unfold! Let the proletariat organize! Let the armed resistance begin. Build up the Red Army!”⁵⁶ The declaration appeared with an image of a Russian Kalashnikov and a pouncing black panther, the symbol of the US Black Panther Party.

Likely, Meinhof was the primary author of the communiqué, but all public communications of the group were said to be written collectively, and no doubt, there was some to truth to that. Meinhof had finally achieved what she had been denied by *konkret*: collective authorship as an alternative mode of producing texts from discussion. This process of text production literally wrote the RAF into existence. Although the group was advocating the propaganda of deeds, communication was of prime importance and was needed to make the group’s actions readable to the public. Contrary to the RAF’s hopes and claims, they were not universally understood by a potentially revolutionary segment of society. The deeds needed to be explained. Without mediation, they would have been meaningless; the medium would have no message. Meinhof took on this task of mediator between the group and the public, but she could finally reject her position as distanced observer. This came at a price: Meinhof willingly sacrificed her autonomy as a writer. In later years, she may have internally rebelled against the dogmatism of the collective, but nevertheless stood by the group in solidarity even when the group no longer stood behind her.

Within the German Left, the freeing of Baader was sharply criticized. The majority did not approve of the use of violence, and the freeing of Baader, who

was little known and apparently mostly disliked, was not seen as a legitimate cause. The shooting of an innocent employee was condemned by *konkret*. Many feared that the actions of the group would lead to the criminalization of the Left, and the consensus was that this was no way to start a revolution.

To respond to criticism, the RAF invited to Berlin the French journalist Michèle Ray, a former Chanel model and wife of filmmaker Costantin Costa-Gavras, who was also a well-known commentator on Vietnam, Bolivia, and the Middle East. She was to report sympathetically on the group's political aims. Instead, a scandal ensued when she published a partial transcript of a tape on which Meinhof explains and defends the freeing of Baader: "Of course we say the cops are pigs. We say the guy in uniform is a pig, not a human being. And that's how we have to deal with him. We don't talk to him, because it is wrong to talk to these people. And so there may be gunfire."⁵⁷ However, in the tract "The Concept of Urban Guerilla," the group asserts: "We shoot when we are shot at. We let go of the cop who lets us go."⁵⁸

The commitment to build up the RAF and to begin the armed struggle led Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader, Mahler, and a group of supporters to make their way to Beirut and Amman via East Berlin to a training camp of the PLO's Al Fatah. The group of twenty men and women were to train for guerilla warfare. They learned tactical skills and how to rob banks. The cultural difference led to numerous conflicts between the Germans and the Palestinians, and conflicts arose within the group.⁵⁹ The Germans did not like the food or the disciplinarian structure of the camp, and they protested against the separation of men and women. There was strife between Baader and Mahler, and between the group and Peter Homann, who subsequently left.⁶⁰

Red Army Faction logo. COURTESY OF WWW.RAFINFO.DE

Homann went to Hamburg to seek out former *konkret* editor Stefan Aust, who was doing research for a segment on Meinhof for a TV program. Homann told Aust that the group had discussed the possibility of sending Meinhof's children to a Palestinian orphanage camp in Jordan. The girls were hidden in Sicily, Homann told Aust, who left for Italy immediately. Aust was able to trick those in charge of the children to leave them with him. He brought them to Rome, and a few days later was able to track down Röhl and hand over the children to their father.⁶¹ The group was angry with Aust, and he was threatened. In the end, the group did not retaliate, and Aust went on to publish, in 1985, an exhaustive book called *The Baader-Meinhof Complex*. Since 1994, Aust has been editor-in-chief of *Spiegel* magazine.

Röhl took the twins back to Hamburg, where he raised them with the help of Emma Biermann, a Communist Party member and mother of the prominent East German dissident writer and singer Wolf Biermann. For a few months, the children were under police protection until it seemed certain that the group would not try to kidnap them. The twins did not see their mother again until she was in prison two years later.

In September 1970, the group returned to Berlin. On September 29, members of the group successfully robbed three banks on the same day at the same time. Meinhof is said to have participated in one of these robberies, and in a robbery at a bank in Kassel in 1972. In the Berlin robbery, she apparently overlooked a container with 100,000 marks, for which she was criticized and ridiculed by the group. Nevertheless, the three groups managed to steal a considerable amount of cash.⁶² During one robbery, Mahler told bank customers not to worry: "It's not your money."⁶³ The group referred to the robberies as expropriations, and following the lead of Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla*, it used the expropriations for the purpose of political agitation and left behind leaflets stating: "Expropriate the enemies of the people."⁶⁴

In October, Mahler, Goergens, Brigitte Asdonk, and Mahler's assistant Monika Berberich were arrested in Berlin. A couple of days before, Meinhof had been sent to build up an infrastructure in West Germany. She was to obtain passports, weapons, and living quarters. In the following months, she organized the theft

of cars and passports, bought weapons, and participated in an attempted bank robbery that was foiled by police when group members were arrested stealing a getaway car. Meinhof's specialty was finding places to stay. She used her connections to friends and acquaintances, and talked them into providing shelter and support for herself and her comrades. Apparently, Meinhof had no particular talent for criminal actions, and she was often criticized by the group for her clumsiness and her oversights. According to one former RAF member, because of her skill in obtaining housing, Meinhof was able to gain some freedom for herself through the interaction with her hosts, "where she could yak politically, something she hadn't been allowed to do in the group for a long while."⁶⁵ —

Before the events of May 1972—the so-called May Offensive—a fair number of German citizens could understand at least partially what the RAF was about. Every fifth German citizen believed that the basis for the RAF's actions were political rather than criminal. A 1971 survey by the respected Allensbach Institute found that one in four Germans under the age of thirty expressed certain sympathies for the RAF. One in twenty German citizens declared a willingness to harbor a RAF member for a night.⁶⁶ —

Meinhof was the moral capital of the RAF, and it was she who was able to garner sympathy, if not for the politics of the RAF, then for the fading dream of a revolution. Known as a person of integrity, and respected as an incisive social and political critic, Meinhof had access to a network of intellectuals who were willing to help her even as they disagreed with her. While the group had no problem using these contacts, its rhetoric displayed a strong anti-intellectual bias. Leftist intellectuals were "babblers," "traitors," "cowards," and "pigs," who only thought, talked, or wrote but were afraid to take the step toward a revolutionary praxis. This rhetoric played on the conscience of intellectuals about their own roles in society and the seeming failure of the protest movement. Meinhof's friend from the Münster years, Jürgen Seifert, described the strangle hold of the RAF over the Left as "leaden solidarity."⁶⁷ —

In the spring of 1971, the RAF published communiqués "Concept Urban Guerilla" and "On the Armed Struggle in Western Europe," which were followed a year later by "Serving the People: Urban Guerilla and Class Struggle." "On the Armed Struggle in Western Europe," is said to have been written mainly by Mahler, while the other two are said to have been authored mainly by Meinhof.

Stylistically, there is much to confirm this assumption, as the Mahler text lacks the snappy precision and rhetorical gestures—such as short sentences, repetitions, incisive statements, the use of images, metaphors, and word play—characteristic of Meinhof’s writing. However, Meinhof’s writing style had changed considerably. The texts were no longer fluid and witty. Spiked with Mao quotations and combative jargon, they lack the immediacy and dialectical force of her *konkret* columns. While the RAF’s social and political analyses may have been valid in certain aspects, the totalizing gestures and hyperbole undermined their credibility and made them unappealing to most citizens. The communiqués were in some sense the textual equivalent of a machine gun ambushing the reader with theoretical abstraction. Fittingly, they appeared under the RAF logo consisting of a pentagram with the silhouette of a machine gun across the middle. The RAF had become a brand with its own logo.

The RAF described itself as an armed resistance group that “in contrast to other proletarian organizations of the New Left” did not deny its “prehistory as a student movement.”⁶⁸ But the RAF claimed that it had recognized the “primacy of praxis” and acted as an avant-garde preparing the way for revolutionary uprising.⁶⁹ Perceiving violent acts as a form of enlightenment, the RAF wanted to make visible the latent fascist tendency of the capitalist state, expose the vulnerability of the state, and open people’s eyes to the possibility that the system could be overthrown. “Concept Urban Guerilla” ended with a paraphrased quotation by Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver: “Either you are part of the problem or part of the solution. There is nothing in between.”⁷⁰ This either-or logic and the militant rhetoric did not persuade the proletarian masses or the leftist intelligentsia in Germany.

There was sympathy for the RAF, aroused to a large extent from the ruthless way in which the state conducted its searches and treated arrested members of the group, and from the ways in which conservative media hyped the searches and the activities and statements from the RAF from the Left. Germany appeared in a permanent state of emergency. With every bank robbery and identity theft, the police searches intensified. The first RAF member to be shot by police was the twenty-year-old hair dresser Petra Schelm, who was trying to flee. Three months later, Meinhof and two other members who were accompanying her to a public phone booth were stopped by police and one of the members shot one

of the officers dead. Three months later another police officer was shot, and his death was followed by the deaths of several RAF members. The cycle of violence escalated.

The German government, police, and the media were on high alert. There were dragnet operations, manhunts, and reports in the press and on television every day. Utilizing the newest technology, the German police built up a state of the art computer and surveillance system. Thousands of officers blocked entrances to the German autobahn and conducted searches and controls. Police raided private homes, and stopped people on roads and city streets. Demonstrators were photographed, records were established, and in the mid- and late 1970s a number of anti-terrorist laws were passed in response to the militant challenge to the German state. Police and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution established records on thousands of German citizens who, for no other reason than their leftist leanings, were suspected to be RAF sympathizers. Leftist groups were infiltrated by informants; libel and defamation suits were brought against those who denounced certain practices of the courts, and publications were confiscated under the suspicion of inciting violence. These measures fostered an atmosphere of outrage, frustration, and paranoia, and in many cases justified fear of the police and the state. The term used by media and police to discredit the Left was “sympathizer swamp.”

German citizens were asked to participate not only in the hunt for members of the so-called “Baader-Meinhof Gang,” but also in the hunt for sympathizers and clandestine supporters. Contrary to the assumption of the RAF that people would refuse to participate in the hunt, police fielded thousands of calls. Group members reportedly dressed and acted like ordinary citizens, drove nice cars, and lived anonymously in suburbs. Citizens were asked to keep a careful eye on their neighbors, as they may turn out to be terrorists or terrorist supporters.

Popular reporting on the hunt for terrorists was often highly eroticized. “Tender Nights in the Berber Tent” read one headline of a story reporting on the group’s stay at the Jordanian guerilla training camp. Ensslin was portrayed as “the ice-cold seductress.” ⁷¹ The portrayal of Meinhof oscillated between descriptions of her as a desexualized crusader, a tragically misguided Joan of Arc, and a highly eroticized seductress who took and dismissed lovers and incited young men and women to violence. The popular news and lifestyle magazine *Quick*

featured a photo essay on “Ulrike Meinhof and her Savage Girls.”⁷² The cover showed Meinhof surrounded by smaller photos of suspected female terrorists, including a bare-breasted Gudrun Ensslin. *Quick* suggested certain common traits of the women involved in militant violence: they come from bourgeois homes; they have been spoiled; they have a tendency to “act like men” (i.e., they’re homosexual), or they have radical boyfriends through whom they have entered the militant scene. In Meinhof’s case, *Quick* suggested the cause of her turn to violence may have been related to the brain surgery she underwent, and that her psychological development may have been caused by an unfulfilled need for love. Similarly, the tabloid newspaper *Bild-Zeitung* speculated that the cause of her turn to militant violence lay in her inability to find satisfaction in being a mother: “She wasn’t able to experience the family as a community of love and emotional bonds. Her children were a daily reminder that she was incapable of being a mother.”⁷³ Widely circulated photographs of Meinhof and her children reminded readers that “Once this was Ulrike Meinhof.”⁷⁴

The Ulrike Meinhof story that *Bild*, *Stern*, and *Quick* told was a story caught between arousing pity for the woman with a fatherless childhood, outrage over the abandonment of her children, and an abhorrence of her cunning challenge to the established order. The real scandal was thus not militant violence, but the rejection of a traditional female role.

In November 1971, *konkret* published an open letter by Renate Riemeck with the title “Give up, Ulrike.” Riemeck urged Meinhof to rethink her militant practice and to recognize that the activities of the RAF only provided an excuse for the state to launch a massive anti-Left campaign. Riemeck urged Meinhof to come to the realization that the conditions in Germany were not as they were in Uruguay and did not justify the use of violence. She suggested that Meinhof use her influence to correct the group’s destructive and self-destructive path. “You are different, Ulrike, very different from what people see when confronted with your picture on the wanted poster or what they hear about you in the press, on radio and television.”⁷⁵ Riemeck reminded Meinhof that she was older than the rest of the group and that she should know from experience in the anti-nuclear movement that political movements come and go, and that nothing was to be gained from running amok.

In January 1972, Nobel Prize laureate Heinrich Böll intervened—to his professional detriment—in the highly polarized public discourse on the RAF. The social democrat Böll had long been respected as the moral voice of the Federal Republic; he was not only a successful writer, but also a spokesperson for an anti-fascist and progressive-moderate humanism. In an article published in *Spiegel*, Böll voiced his outrage over the sensationalized reporting of the *Bild-Zeitung* that was fuelling a social climate of suspicion, public hysteria, and anti-intellectual resentment. “Does Ulrike Meinhof want Clemency or Free Passage?” Böll asked in the article that coined the phrase of a “war of six against sixty million.” A small group of “desperate theoreticians” declared war on the Federal Republic, but it is the responsibility of the democratic state and the free press to deal with the group fairly and according to the ethical precepts of the democratic rule of law. “There is no doubt: Ulrike Meinhof has declared war on this society; she knows what she is doing and what she had done, but who could tell her what she should do now? Should she really turn herself in at the risk of becoming embroiled as the classic red witch in the steam pot of demagoguery?”⁷⁶ Böll warned that the attitude toward the RAF was leading to a social and emotional cul-de-sac, a point at which no reconciliation would be possible. *Bild* was fostering a mentality of lynching and taking the law into their own hands; the “Baader-Meinhof Gang” was convicted before being tried. Echoing Meinhof’s column from 1969, Böll asked why the television show *File XY: Unresolved Crimes* (a program much like Fox’s *America’s Most Wanted*) did not instigate a manhunt for one of the many former Nazis who had escaped just punishment. The reporting in *Bild*, he said, is no longer protofascist, “it is bare fascism, sedition, deception, garbage.”⁷⁷

Böll’s intervention was met with strong opposition and indignation, especially from the conservative press. The debate was extensive and involved prominent politicians, commentators, and intellectuals who mostly criticized him. He was accused among other things of being a terrorist sympathizer; a campaign was then launched to discredit him. He received death threats and was continually harassed.

In December 1972, Heinrich Böll accepted the Nobel Prize for Literature. Two years later, the International Liga for Human Rights awarded Böll and Helmut Gollwitzer the Carl von Ossietzky Medal for their efforts to act as voices of reason and humanity in a republic that increasingly exhibited anti-democratic

tendencies. Böll's novel *The Lost Honor of Katharina Blum: Or How Violence Develops and Where It Can Lead* (1974) was inspired by his critique of the media and the ferocious debate following his *Spiegel* essay. It tells the story of an innocent woman whose life is destroyed by a ruthless police investigation and an intrusive tabloid reporter. In the end, the woman shoots the tabloid reporter. The preface to the novel states that the "characters and plot of this story are fictional. Should the portrayal of certain journalistic practices exhibit similarities to the practices of the *Bild-Zeitung*, then these similarities are neither intentional nor arbitrary, but unavoidable."

The RAF rejected Böll's efforts and found itself misrepresented by Böll as a small group who had declared war on sixty million people. "We didn't fight against sixty million, but against the government and the state," a former RAF member asserted.⁷⁸ Meinhof later characterized Böll as "corrupt" and complained that he wasn't willing to do anything serious. "The polarization is now simply clear: either anti-imperialist struggle, for the guerilla, internationalism or in the ass of the government, state security, Springer Press."⁷⁹

In March 1972, rumors emerged that Meinhof was dead. It turned out that she had spent some time in Italy, and, like the rest of the group, she was preparing what came to be known as the May Offensive. As members of the group had been arrested, new ones were recruited, among them Jan Carl Raspe and Holger Meins. One recruitment pool was the Socialist Patient Collective in Heidelberg, which eventually dissolved and joined the RAF. There were RAF groups in six German cities; by 1972, the RAF was estimated to have about thirty members, six or seven of which were considered its core.

The May Offensive of 1972 consisted of five bombings: the bombing of US Military Headquarters in Frankfurt on May 11 resulting in the death of one US soldier and injuring thirteen others; the bombing of police headquarters in Augsburg on May 12 resulting in ten injured; the car bombing on May 15 meant for Judge Wolfgang Buddenberg, injuring his wife; the bombing of Springer publishing house in Hamburg on May 19, in which thirty-eight people were injured; and on May 24, the bombing of US Military Headquarters in Heidelberg, in which three US soldiers died and five others were injured.

Imagem com direitos autorais

Painting of Ulrike Meinhof in a prison yard, by Johannes Kahrs. COURTESY OF ZENO X GALLERY

The arrests of the RAF's core quickly followed these attacks. On June 1, Baader, Meins, and Raspe were arrested when they were seen near a garage that served as a depot for explosives. Ensslin was arrested a week later when she was shopping for a sweater at a boutique in Hamburg. Meinhof and a young male companion Gerhard Müller were arrested on June 15. She was turned in by a teacher in whose apartment she had asked to spend the night. Police had no fingerprints of Ulrike Meinhof, and neither the prosecutor in the case nor a judge objected when police began to make plans to take an x-ray of Meinhof's head so that she could be identified by the clamp implanted in her brain during the surgery she underwent years earlier. When Meinhof refused to have the x-ray taken, she was forcibly anaesthetized and x-rayed so that her identity could be confirmed. 80

Meinhof was sent to Ossendorf prison in Cologne to the cell previously occupied for four months by Astrid Proll. The isolation cell was located in a special isolation wing of the prison where no sounds from the outside or inside of the prison could be heard and no one could be seen. Contact with other prisoners was not allowed, and Meinhof was excluded from all prison activities. Her lawyers complained about the entirely white furnishings, and that the light was not turned off. Meinhof lived, according to the complaint, “practically twenty-four hours a day in an indistinguishable environment.”⁸¹ To Mahler, Meinhof wrote that the political equivalent of the isolation wing is “to state it plainly: gas; I tell you that my Auschwitz fantasies are real.”⁸² In a “Letter from a prisoner in the isolation wing, June 16, 1972 to February 9, 1973,” Meinhof described the physical and psychic experience of isolation, which she endured for eight months:

The feeling your head is exploding (the feeling the top of your skull should really tear apart, burst wide open)—

The feeling your spinal column is pressing into your brain—

The feeling your brain is gradually shriveling up, like baked fruit—

The feeling you’re completely and surreptitiously wired, under remote control—

The feeling the associations you make are being hacked away—

The feeling you are pissing the soul out of your body, as though you can’t hold water—

The feeling the cell is moving. You wake up, open your eyes: the cell is moving; in the afternoon when the sun comes in, it suddenly stops. You can’t get rid of the feeling of moving. You can’t figure out if you’re trembling from fever or from cold—you can’t figure out why you’re trembling—

You’re freezing.

Speaking at a normal volume requires efforts as if you were shouting, almost yelling—

The feeling you’re growing mute—

You can no longer identify what words mean, you can only guess—

The sounds sibilants make—s, tz, z, sch, ch—are absolutely unbearable—

Wardens, visitors, yard, all seem to be made of celluloid

Headaches—

Flashes—

Sentence structure, grammar, syntax—are out of control. When you write, just two lines, you can hardly remember the beginning of the first line when you finish the second—

The feeling of burning out inside—

The feeling that if you said what is going on, if you let that out, it would be like splashing boiling water into another person's face, boiling drinking water that would scald him for life, disfigure him—

Raging aggression, for which there is no outlet. That's the worst. The clear awareness that you don't have a hope of surviving; the utter failure to communicate that; visits leave no trace. Half an hour later you can only mechanically reconstruct whether the visit took place today or last week—

But having a bath once a week means thawing for a moment, and can last a few hours—

The feeling that time and space are encapsulated within each other—

The feeling of being in a room of distorting mirrors—

Staggering—

Afterwards, terrifying euphoria that you're hearing something—besides the acoustic difference between day and night—

The feeling that time is flowing away, your brain is expanding again, your spinal column slipping back down, for weeks.

The feeling you've been flayed. ⁸³—

Other RAF prisoners were held under similar conditions and between May 1973 and February 1974, members went on three collective hunger strikes lasting several weeks each. The goal of the strikes was to end the isolation. Since most were not allowed contact with other prisoners, the RAF demanded the chance to

spend time together and to be housed in the same prison. Other demands included unsupervised visits, an end to censorship of prisoners' mail, and the establishment of co-ed prisons. In response to the strikes, the courts ordered the forced feeding of the prisoners. However, in November 1974, Holger Meins died as a result of the third hunger strike. Six feet tall, he weighed around eighty-eight pounds. At his funeral, Dutschke raised his fist and exclaimed: "The struggle continues, Holger"—a slogan that could later be found sprayed on walls all over Germany. Meins became a martyr, and in response to his gruesome death new prisoners' committees and "Red Aid" groups sprang up. A widely circulated photograph shows the emaciated corpse of the almost unrecognizable Meins dressed in a white silk gown, sunken eyes and cheeks, and a long dark beard. In the photo, Meins appears as a Christ-like figure, an ascetic who had given his life for the cause. The photo also conjured up associations with concentration camp victims. With resonances of fascism palatable, Meins's death brought about a wave of outrage toward the state that had allowed this to happen. It also brought about sympathy for the RAF, which experienced a surge in recruitment.

Once in prison, the impact of Meinhof's brain surgery became the subject of much speculation. During her trial, there was much debate in the media and among various so-called experts whether her brain had been damaged and whether her brain activity had been adversely affected by the surgery. The surgery was cited as a possible explanation for her process of radicalization. Meinhof herself vehemently objected to any attempt to explain her actions and her membership in the RAF as the result of physiological or neurological changes. She perceived any talk about it as an attempt to pathologize and depoliticize her actions, and not only forbade her various lawyers to use the possibility of a neurological impairment in her defense, but insisted that they actively dispute it whenever it was brought up. The saga of Meinhof's brain did not end with her death. It turned out that her brain was not buried with her body in Berlin, as had been assumed. Unbeknownst to Meinhof's family the brain had been preserved in formaldehyde in a laboratory at the University of Tübingen until 1997, when it was transferred to the University of Magdeburg. The scientists in possession of it studied it for abnormalities; they wanted to know if there was anything unusual about the brain of a terrorist, and they compared it to the brain of a murderer. ⁸⁴

While in prison in Ossendorf, in October 1972, Meinhof saw her children again for the first time in almost three years. The girls were now ten. In a letter, she had

told them, “In general, it is better to be mad than sad. Ah, wait—I look forward to your visit.”⁸⁵ After the visit, Meinhof wrote to them: “You were here! I think the whole prison was glad. That’s how it seemed to me. Will you visit me again?”⁸⁶

At the beginning of 1974, Meinhof broke off contact with her children and other relatives.

Meinhof continued writing in prison. However, this work bears only a faint resemblance to her earlier columns. She produced disjointed, commando-style texts consisting of pasted together quotations from other authors written in staccato and run-on sentences.⁸⁷

The RAF developed the so-called “info-system” through which they circulated messages among each other and communicated with the outside. The office of one of their lawyers functioned as a distribution center. Ensslin used Herman Melville’s *Moby-Dick* to give code names to members of the group: Baader was the captain, Ahab, who destroyed himself in the hunt for the great white whale, the state; Meins was Starbuck, the chief mate; Raspe was Carpenter, the maker of coffins for the victims of the hunt; Mahler was Bildad, the prosperous retired whaler; and Ensslin was Smutje, the cook who keeps the pans in order and preaches to the sharks. Meinhof did not find a place in this fictionalized community. Ensslin named her Theres, presumably after Saint Theresa, the Carmelite nun and patron saint of headache sufferers who reformed her own order.⁸⁸ Through the info-system, Baader and Ensslin would issue instructions to others, for instance, during the hunger strike. They would lead theoretical debates, harshly criticize each other, and exchange their equally harsh self-criticisms.

Written during her time in the isolation wing of Ossendorf prison, Meinhof’s defense of the attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games may well be the most repulsive and ill-conceived piece of writing she produced. During the Munich massacre staged by the Palestinian group Black September—named after the vast-scale expulsion and killing of Palestinians in Jordan in September 1970—eleven Israeli athletes were murdered by Palestinians militants. Five of the eight terrorists were killed during a botched rescue attempt. The Palestinian militants had taken the athletes hostage and one of their demands for the release of the Israeli hostages was the release of Baader and Meinhof from prison. Perhaps the short-lived fantasy of freedom and the thought that somebody would

demand her release from such harsh conditions in prison may partially explain the enthusiasm with which she defended the brutal action of Black September.

Seemingly blind to German history and the fact that Jews were, again, being murdered in Germany, Meinhof called the massacre a revolutionary action that was “at once anti-imperialist, anti-fascist, and internationalist.”⁸⁹ Meinhof maintained that by not heeding the demands of Black September, the politicians were responsible for the seventeen deaths. The hostage-takers had, according to Meinhof, been more than patient, and the Israeli athletes had been deceived about their possible release and abandoned by the imperialist governments of Israel and Germany. The reduction of the state of Israel to an imperialist system stands in contrast to Meinhof’s much more measured view of 1967 when she responded in her column “Three Friends of Israel” to Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights. While she criticized Israel’s dispossession of the Palestinians and the brutal methods with which it led its war, she conceded that because of Germany’s history of National Socialism, the Left had no reason to abandon its solidarity with those “who were persecuted over issues of race.”

In April 1974, Meinhof and Ensslin were taken to the high security wing of Stammheim near Stuttgart that had been renovated to house RAF prisoners. Baader, Raspe, and Irmgard Möller soon joined them. There they could communicate and visit one another’s cells. Each prisoner accumulated a formidable library. In October, Meinhof invited the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre to come to Stammheim to show his solidarity and to see for himself the conditions under which the prisoners were held. Sartre met with Baader. At a press conference afterward, Sartre expressed compassion for the group, which was weakened from a hunger strike, but he also maintained that he thought the group was dangerous insofar as the RAF was often thought to be synonymous with the Left. The conservative media now put Sartre on the list of sympathizers.

Meinhof was transferred to Berlin, where she stood trial and was sentenced to eight years for attempted murder during the freeing of Baader. After sentencing, Meinhof was brought back to Stammheim to face the myriad of charges incurred in connection with the violent activity of the RAF. The trial of Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader, and Raspe began in Stammheim on May 21, 1975 in a hall built for that purpose. The prison and the courtroom were secured like a fortress with armed police and a steel net over the courtyard to foil any attempt to free the prisoners by

helicopter. New anti-terror laws were passed, which made it easier to prosecute those accused of promoting a terrorist organization. Far-reaching restrictions for the defense were enacted, and lawyers could no longer defend more than one client in the trial and could be more easily expelled.⁹⁰—

Observers of the trial have called it a catastrophe for the democratic state.⁹¹—
The lawyers came under suspicion of supporting the group. Already in 1972, *Bild* had accused forty-five lawyers of being RAF accomplices. Defender Otto Schily—Minister of the Interior from 1998 to 2005—was expelled from the defense, but later reinstated. Although RAF members carefully prepared their defense, they rejected in principle being tried by what they perceived as an illegitimate institution of justice. The prisoners behaved in a manner unacceptable to the court. They shouted, made comments out of order, and insulted the judge and the court. Baader, for instance, called the ultra-conservative presiding judge a “fascist asshole.”⁹²—
Mostly, the prisoners were absent from the trial; they either refused to appear or behaved in such a manner that they were expelled. The RAF was arguing a political defense, attempting to show that the use of violence by the RAF against certain institutions was justified as a moral imperative. The court rejected all attempts to turn the case against RAF members into a political trial. The RAF was to be treated like a group of criminals, even as the treatment of the group and the suspected sympathizers—the changes in laws, the way in which the trial proceeded—indicated otherwise. The trial lasted 192 days before the guilty verdict and a life sentence was rendered for each of the defendants.

While the main members of the first generation RAF were in prison, militant violence escalated in Germany. In 1974, Federal Judge Günther von Drenckmann was murdered by the Movement June 2nd, a group close to the RAF. In 1975, June 2nd kidnapped Christian Democratic candidate for the Berlin House, Peter Lorenz. In exchange for Lorenz, the kidnappers demanded that five political prisoners—among them Mahler, who refused to go—be released and flown to a country of their choice. After the release of the prisoners, Lorenz was let go. In April 1975, the Commando Holger Meins raided the German embassy in Stockholm. Two embassy employees and two members of the Commando were killed. In December 1975, RAF members participated in the holdup of the OPEC conference in Vienna, where two died and several were hurt. It was assumed that

the RAF members at Stammheim kept close contacts to those committing these acts.

In the meantime, for the first generation RAF, daily life in prison offered nowhere to turn but toward and against one another. They accused each other of being weak, caving in to police, and not getting the anti-imperialist struggle right. They fought about defense strategies, theoretical issues of guerrilla warfare, and their opinions about the supposed weaknesses of other RAF members. The hunger strikes took their toll, too, and the correspondence between the prisoners became increasingly tortured.

Meinhof's relationship to Baader and especially to Ensslin became strained. Baader referred to Meinhof as "one of those liberal cunts." Ensslin called her hysterical, gloomy, and vampiric, and complained about Meinhof's apparently treacherous laughter. Ensslin writes to Meinhof, "You are the knife in the back of the RAF . . . the problem is that you, and the others, have now become a burden, you're appallingly disoriented pigs . . . You're the one destroying us—something the law could never do."⁹³ She portrays Meinhof as an outsider, a traitor destroying the group for which she—Ensslin—speaks. Meinhof responds to these accusations with self-denigration and self-criticism. In one memorandum, she calls herself a "hypocritical pig of the ruling class. . . . As far as I can think back—family, socialization, religion, Communist Party, my job at *konkret*—of course, I didn't want to stay that way when I entered the RAF." In another, she writes, "I was an elitist swine—I pretended to know everything better . . . a stupid, intellectual snob . . . liberalism against oneself is simply deadly, and it is clear where this opportunism comes from. It is the product of a fascist psyche—a *petit bourgeois*—who circles around herself according to the rituals of the market (dominations and subordination, admiration and contempt, pity, penance, bad conscience, conceit, etc)."⁹⁴

On May 4, 1976, Meinhof, who had not taken part in the court proceedings since March, briefly appeared in court, but left after a short stay. Later that day, Ensslin spoke to the court and accepted in the name of the RAF responsibility for the bombing attacks in Frankfurt and Heidelberg during the 1972 May Offensive, but stopped short of accepting responsibility for the bombing of the Springer Publishing House in Hamburg. Meinhof had written the letter claiming—for the RAF—responsibility for the attack in which office staff and print workers

had been injured.⁹⁵ Ensslin stated that they—there is no specific indication who “they” is other than the RAF—had “disowned” the action while it was in progress.⁹⁶ Aust and others see Ensslin’s disassociation from the Hamburg bombing, which had presumably been planned and executed by Meinhof and her Hamburg group, as a public declaration of an end of group solidarity. Ensslin, Baader, and Raspe had turned themselves into spokespersons for the RAF, and Meinhof was isolated.

On the morning of May 9, 1976—Mother’s Day—Meinhof was found dead in her prison cell. She was hanging from the grill of her cell window. Immediately, there were doubts about the findings of two autopsies conducted on her body. Many of her close friends, however, believed that Meinhof had committed suicide, citing the significance of the date, May 8, the anniversary of the end of World War II. That Meinhof did not leave a suicide note led many to believe that she deliberately aimed to keep the circumstance of her death in doubt. Some, including her sister and the poet Erich Fried, entertained the idea that Meinhof had been murdered. Others argued that it’s impossible to commit suicide in prison, that Meinhof had been driven to her death by the inhumane treatment she experienced from the state and the RAF members.

Shortly after Meinhof’s death, the Socialist Office organized an “Anti-Repression Congress” in Frankfurt in which twenty thousand participated. Speakers included Oskar Negt, Fried, and Joschka Fischer, Germany’s foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005.⁹⁷ In his speech, Fischer recalled the spontaneous and violent demonstrations—one police officer was seriously burnt in a fire bomb attack—and the outrage that “Ulrike was driven to her death in prison by reactionary forces.”⁹⁸ However, Fischer criticized the “comrades of the urban guerilla” for coopting Left resistance with their isolated actions. “Precisely because our solidarity is with the comrades in the underground, because we feel closely connected to them, we ask them to end their death trip and come down from their ‘armed self-isolation,’ put away the bombs and the rocks and take up again a resistance that stands for life.”⁹⁹

But the RAF did not heed Fischer’s wish. The deadliest year for the RAF was yet to come in 1977, a year etched into German memory. In April, the Commando Ulrike Meinhof, including Knut Folkerts, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, and Christian

Klar, murdered Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback and later that year followed a series of events known as the German Autumn: In July banker Jürgen Ponto was killed; in September, the president of the German Employer Association and Daimler-Benz board member Hanns-Martin Schleyer was kidnapped. In exchange for his release, the kidnappers demanded the release of several prisoners, among them Baader and Ensslin. In support of the demands, Palestinian fighters hijacked a Lufthansa plane on October 13. The plane landed in Mogadishu. The pilot was murdered, but a special unit of the German forces freed all passengers around midnight on October 17. On the morning of October 18, 1977, Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe were found dead in their cells. Baader had apparently shot himself with a pistol he had hidden in his record player; Ensslin was found hanging from a window rod. Raspe died of a shot to his head in hospital the same morning; Möller was found with stab wounds from a knife and was the only one to survive. To this day, Möller claims that she never tried to commit suicide, and that there was no suicide pact. As with Meinhof's death, the deaths of October 18 left a nagging doubt in some; others argue that this ambiguity was intended in order to discredit the prison and the state. On October 19, Schleyer's body was found dead in the trunk of a car.¹⁰⁰

The RAF continued its violent path until it declared its dissolution in 1998. Most former RAF members have been released from prison, including Brigitte Mohnhaupt in 2007 after twenty-four years. Christian Klar's application for pardon was denied by the German president. He will likely be released within the next two years. More than sixty people died as a direct result of the RAF during its twenty-eight years of existence: thirty-seven victims of the RAF and June 2nd, and twenty-seven group members. Many were injured on both sides.

THE AFTERLIFE OF ULRIKE MEINHOF

Images and reflections of Meinhof abound, marking each step in her remarkable transformations: Meinhof at the Derby wearing an elegant suit and white gloves; cool Meinhof, wearing a trench coat and her signature Reban sunglasses; Meinhof as devoted mother; Meinhof's melancholy gaze on the wanted poster; Meinhof on the day of her arrest, underweight, a puffy face, short hair and thin eyebrows; and Meinhof with her hands behind her head, walking in the prison yard.

Famously, there are four iconographic paintings of Meinhof in Gerhard Richter's *RAF-cycle October 18, 1977*. The blurred, gray paintings are based on widely circulated photographs indicating, according to Richter, the pitfalls of ideology: "Deadly reality, inhuman reality. Our rebellion. Impotence. Failure. Death. That is why I paint these pictures."¹⁰¹ Richter suggests that the images reflect the death of idealism and the utopian dreams of a generation, which died along with the RAF. The blurred images and their repetition—there are three almost identical paintings of Meinhof's corpse—further imply a fundamental questioning of the massive reproduction of images of Meinhof and her comrades by the media. Richter's paintings have often been referred to as a labor of mourning. The very act of mourning for RAF members has always outraged segments of German society, but the inability or failure to mourn—especially by those traumatized by the failed rebellion—only results in its perpetual return. The ethereal quality of the paintings suggests that the ghosts of Meinhof and the RAF haunt us still.

Both the photograph of Meinhof on the wanted poster and her image in Richter's paintings point to one of the many paradoxes of Meinhof as an icon: she does not look like the dangerous criminal portrayed by the media. The Madonna-like face, with a downcast glance, exudes not violence, but introspection, a counterpoint to the atmosphere of hysteria from which she arose.

A controversial exhibition held in 2005 at the Berlin Kunst-Werke entitled *Regarding Terror: The RAF* showed the astonishing breadth of artistic responses to the RAF. Artworks that specifically responded to Meinhof included works by artists from a variety of backgrounds: Joseph Beuys' *Dürer, I will personally guide Baader + Meinhof through Documenta V* (1972) is one of the earliest. With his two yellow signs on which the words of the title are written, Beuys suggests that he and his art could mediate between society and its militant outcasts. In contrast to the RAF's primacy of praxis, Beuys advocates the aesthetic integration of reason and emotion. New York-based artist Dennis Adams presented the video *Outtake*, which shows the distribution of copies of stills from a key scene of Meinhof's *Bambule* to passers-by on Berlin's Kurfürstendamm. *Outtake* raises questions not only about the subject of Meinhof's film—the conditions of the girls' home—but also about censorship and its negative effects on the formation of a democratic public sphere. By making available what had been censored and

kept from the public for twenty-four years, *Outtake* encourages a belated public debate about the controversial film.

The German painter Johannes Kahrs exhibited a large work on paper of Meinhof in a prison dress with her hands behind her head. The pastel drawing is inspired by a famous photograph taken while Meinhof was on a walk in the prison yard. Showing her as withdrawn and melancholic, the drawing makes visible Meinhof's vulnerability and offers a counter-image to the strong and belligerent side of her character emphasized by the press.

The controversy over the exhibit began long before it opened, instigating a fervent debate in the German public on the legitimacy of the RAF as a subject for such exploration. Critics feared that the artworks would mythologize the RAF and trivialize its deadly deeds. (A similar controversy erupted already in 1989 when Richter's *October Cycle* was first shown in Krefeld.) Family members of RAF-victim Hanns-Martin Schleyer petitioned German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to intervene and stop all plans for the show. Some sponsors withdrew their support, and eventually the exhibit was put together without public funds. Curators came up with a creative way of financing the exhibit: they auctioned off on e-bay artworks donated by artists sympathetic to their cause.

Meinhof's legacy has also made it to the stage in a variety of ways. *Ulrike* by Dutch composer Raoul de Smet was performed in Gent in 1989. Like de Smet and Richter, choreographer Johann Kresnek also presented a tragic Meinhof in his dance theater. New York Squat Theatre staged *Andy Warhol's Last Love* by Adele Edling Shank and Theodore Shank, in which Meinhof rises from the dead to engage in a dialogue with Warhol and then shoots him. Italian writer Dario Fo wrote a piece about Meinhof, "I, Ulrike, am crying." Heiner Müller's figure of Ophelia in his play *Hamlet Machine* was inspired by Meinhof. In the play, Ophelia exercises domestic violence by vandalizing her own home.

More recently, Nobel Prize winning author Elfriede Jelinek presented *Ulrike Maria Stuart: A Queens' Drama*, which reconfigures the power struggle between England's Elisabeth I and Scotland's Mary Stuart—as portrayed in Friedrich Schiller's eighteenth-century bourgeois tragedy—in terms of the struggle between Ensslin and Meinhof. In the play, which premiered at the Thalia Theater in Hamburg in 2006, Jelinek relates to Meinhof's incessant production of words and sentences as a "vampiric act of the writing subject."¹⁰² She sees Meinhof

as a tragic figure, “a woman who breaks down because of the injustice in the world”; the play shows how someone is turned into an icon, “one no longer has to deal with her as a political phenomenon.”¹⁰³ Critiquing the nostalgia for revolutionary movements—a nostalgia for a time of innocence, when a group of committed individuals believed that they could change the world—Jelinek points toward some of the incongruities of the situation of the children of the sixties generation.¹⁰⁴ Socialized in a world of globalized capitalism, they express a longing for a “simpler” world—a world with straight-forward world views and choices. *Ulrike Maria Stuart: A Queens’ Drama* is not only a critical deconstruction of the Meinhof myth, but also a scathing look at what is left today of the revolutionary zeal that drove Meinhof and others of her generation. The play shows not only the futility of engagement of the Left, but also the ridiculous “despair over the futility,” a despair that has left the younger generation cynical and empty.¹⁰⁵

In turning from these vertiginously chaotic, inconsistent, and charismatic images of Meinhof to her columns, the aim is not to remember her as a figure of innocence or earnest conviction. We cannot and must not erase the violence associated with her name. But we should not let the later part of her life define her completely or let the voices that speak about her or purport to speak for her set the agenda. It is time to let Meinhof speak for herself and to listen to her voice. In presenting this selection of columns, my hope is that we can appreciate her writing for its wit, her criticism for its incisiveness and clarity, and her ceaseless engagement for its commitment to democracy and human rights. Perhaps we can counteract the “despair over the futility” of political engagement and redeem her hope and vision for a better future.

NOTES

¹ Klaus Wagenbach, “Grabrede für Ulrike Meinhof,” ed. Peter Brückner, *Ulrike Meinhof und die deutschen Verhältnisse* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2001), p. 196.

² Arlene Teraoka argues this in connection with her analysis of Meinhof’s essayistic style. See Arlene Teraoka, “Terrorism and the Essay,” ed. Ruth-Ellen

Boetscher, *The Politics of the Essay: Feminist Perspectives* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).

3 My biographical sketch of Meinhof and the account of Meinhof and the RAF is informed by the works of Stefan Aust, Mario Krebs, Bettina Röhl, Klaus Rainer Röhl, Wolfgang Kraushaar, Gerd Koenen, and Jürgen Seifert. The Meinhof biography by Jutta Dittfurth appeared too late and could not be consulted.

4 Mario Krebs, *Ulrike Meinhof* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1988), p. 17.

5 Bettina Röhl, *So macht Kommunismus Spass! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl und die Akte Konkret* (Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 2006).

6 Bettina Röhl, p. 164.

7 Gustav Walter Heinemann, (1899-1976) was a founding member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and mayor of the city of Essen. He was Minister for Interior Affairs under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer from 1949 to 1950. In 1952, he left the CDU and founded the *Gesamtdeutschen Volkspartei*, a party that was disbanded after a few years. He joined the Social Democratic Party and became Minister for Justice from 1966 to 1969. In 1969, he became the first SPD member to be elected as President of Germany. He was president of Germany from 1969 to 1974. He was well-respected for his integrity and his liberal and open-minded views. Heinemann was Ulrike Meinhof's defender in the case brought against her by the conservative politician Franz Josef Strauss. Johannes Rau (1931-2006) was prime minister of North Rhine Westphalia from 1978 to 1998 and president of Germany from 1999 to 2004. Friedrich Gustav Emil Martin Niemöller (1892-1984) was a prominent anti-Nazi theologian and Protestant pastor. He is best known as the author of this poem:

When the Nazis came for the Communists,
I remained silent;
I was not a Communist.
When they locked up the Social Democrats,
I did not speak out;
I was not a Social Democrat.
When they came for the trade unionists,
I did not speak out;
I was not a trade unionist.

When they came for me,
there was no one left to speak out.

8 Krebs, p. 31.

9 Krebs, p. 31.

10 Die Göttinger Erklärung, April 12, 1957, http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/JahreDesAufbasInOstUndWest_erklaerungG.

11 Jürgen Seifert, "Ulrike Meinhof," ed. Wolfgang Kraushaar, *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006).

12 Klaus Rainer Röhl, *Fünf Finger sind keine Faust: Eine Abrechnung* (Munich: Universitas, 1974), p. 99.

13 Klaus Rainer Röhl , p. 99.

14 Klaus Rainer Röhl, p. 262.

15 Konrad Hermann Josef Adenauer (1876-1967) was the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from 1950 to 1966. Like no other politician, Adenauer defined the rise of the FRG from the ashes of World War II.

16 Klaus Rainer Röhl, p. 262.

17 Klaus Rainer Röhl, p. 143-50.

18 Krebs, p. 74.

19 Franz Josef Strauss (1915-1988) was a German politician and long-time minister-president of the state of Bavaria. He was a member of the NSDStB (National Socialist German Students' League) as this was mandatory for students at that time. During World War II, he served in the German Wehrmacht and as political officer. After the war, he was appointed deputy Landrat (county president) and was involved in founding the Christian Social Union, a conservative party with a stronghold in Bavaria. He became a member of the first Federal Parliament in 1949 and, in 1953, Federal Minister for Special Affairs under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. In 1955 he became federal minister of nuclear energy and in 1956 defense minister, charged with the buildup of the new German Army, the *Bundeswehr*. In 1961, he became chairman of the CSU.

Strauss was forced to step down as defense minister in 1962, in the wake of the *Spiegel* Affair, in which Rudolf Augstein, owner and editor-in-chief of the influential *Der Spiegel* magazine, was arrested on the charge of treason after publishing an article on the sorry state of the *Bundeswehr*. During the investigation, Strauss admitted to lying to Parliament and was forced to resign. Strauss had his comeback as minister of the treasury in 1966. He was one of the most vocal critics of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. In the 1980s, he was the defeated Christian Democratic/Christian Social candidate for chancellor. From 1978 until his death in 1988, Strauss was minister-president of Bavaria.

[20](#) Klaus Rainer Röhl, p. 174.

[21](#) Bettina Röhl, p. 428.

[22](#) Klaus Rainer Röhl, p. 159.

[23](#) Krebs, p. 120.

[24](#) Krebs, p. 122.

[25](#) Bahman Nirumand, *Persien, Modell eines Entwicklungslandes oder Die Diktatur der Freien Welt* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1967).

[26](#) Stefan Aust, *The Baader-Meinhof Group* (London: The Bodley Head, 1985), p. 42.

[27](#) Aust, p. 42.

[28](#) Hans-Jürgen Krahl (1943-1970) was a prominent student leader and a member of SDS in Frankfurt. He was a student of Theodor W. Adorno. Rudi Dutschke (1940-1979) was the most prominent spokesperson of the German student movement. He survived an assassination attempt, but died from health problems resulting from the shooting.

[29](#) Wolfgang Kraushaar, "Rudi Dutschke und der bewaffnete Kampf," *Rudi Dutschke-Andreas Baader und die RAF* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition HIS Verlagsges, 2005), p. 21.

[30](#) Wolfgang Kraushaar, *Frankfurter Schule und Studentenbewegung: Von der Flaschenpost zum Molotowcocktail 1946 bis 1995, Vol. 1* (Hamburg: Rogner&Bernhard, 1998), p. 254.

- [31](#) Gerd Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt: Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967-77* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2001), p. 383.
- [32](#) Bettina Röhl, p. 560.
- [33](#) Klaus Rainer Röhl, p. 212-13. Röhl cites the letter, but does not state to whom it is addressed.
- [34](#) Sibylle Plogstedt, ed., *Vietnam-Kongress* (Berlin: Internationales Nachrichtenund Forschung-Institut, 1968), p. 163-75.
- [35](#) Kraushaar, *Frankfurter Schule*, p. 298.
- [36](#) Petra Rethmann, "On Militancy, Sort of," *Cultural Critique* no. 62, 2006.
- [37](#) Krebs, p. 149.
- [38](#) Karin Bauer, "From Protest to Resistance," eds. W. Mausbach, M. Klimke, and C. MacDougall, *Changing the World, Changing Oneself: Political Protest and Collective Identities in the 1960s/70s West Germany and US* (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008).
- [39](#) Krebs, p. 167.
- [40](#) Koenen, p. 129.
- [41](#) *Kursbuch* is a magazine featuring in-depth analyses of current political and cultural trends and events.
- [42](#) Klaus Rainer Röhl, p. 263.
- [43](#) Klaus Rainer Röhl, p. 263.
- [44](#) Klaus Rainer Röhl, p. 272-73.
- [45](#) Krebs, p. 177.
- [46](#) Astrid Proll, ed. *Hans und Grete: Pictures on the Run 67-77* (Zurich: Scalo Publishers, 1998).
- [47](#) Ben Lewis, *Baader-Meinhof: In Love with Terror*, UK: television documentary, 2002.
- [48](#) Krebs, p. 190.
- [49](#) Horst Mahler was a prominent lawyer involved in the APO and the founder of the Socialist Lawyers Collective. Mahler became a founding member of the

RAF. He was arrested in 1971 and sentenced to fourteen years in prison for participation in a criminal association and for his involvement in several bank robberies. In 1975, he refused the offer to leave prison—a demand of the kidnapers of Peter Lorenz. After serving his term and being released in the early 1980s, Mahler was successful in his bid to be allowed to practice law again—his lawyer was Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder, chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005. Mahler became an active member of the ultraconservative and nationalistic National Democratic Party and the far-right think tank the German Colleg.

[50](#) Aust, p. 47.

[51](#) See Gerd Koenen, *Vesper, Ensslin, Baader: Urszenen des deutschen Terrorismus* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2003).

[52](#) Felix's fate and Gudrun Ensslin's relationship to her sister are fictionalized in Margarethe von Trotta's film *Marianne and Juliane* (1981).

[53](#) ID-Verlag, ed., "Die Rote Armee aufbauen: Erklärung zur Befreiung Andreas Baaders vom 5. Juni 1970," *Rote Armee Fraktion: Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF* (Berlin: ID-Publisher, 1997).

[54](#) "Die Rote Armee aufbauen," p. 24.

[55](#) "Die Rote Armee aufbauen," p. 25.

[56](#) "Die Rote Armee aufbauen," p. 26.

[57](#) Ulrike Meinhof, "Natürlich kann geschossen werden," *Der Spiegel*, vol. 24, no. 25 (1970), p. 74.

[58](#) "Concept of Urban Guerilla," *Rote Armee Fraktion*, p. 30.

[59](#) Aust, p. 96-101.

[60](#) Aust, p. 101.

[61](#) Aust, p. 104.

[62](#) Butz Peters, *Tödlicher Irrtum: Die Geschichte der RAF* (Berlin: Argon Verlag, 2004), p. 216.

[63](#) Peters, p. 215.

[64](#) Peters, p. 216.

[65](#) Peters, p. 224.

[66](#) Koenen, p. 392.

[67](#) Oskar Negt, *Achtundsechzig: Politische Intellektuelle und die Macht* (Göttingen: Steidl Verlag, 1998), p. 260.

[68](#) "Concept of Urban Guerilla," *Rote Armee Fraction*, p. 36.

[69](#) One of the few scholarly attempts in English to explain the RAF was undertaken by Jeremy Varon in *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, The Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Varon's account of the Weather Underground seems rich and nuanced and his study offers a number of important insights about the RAF to an English-speaking readership; however, it also bases its interpretation of the RAF on a number of controversial presuppositions about the postwar German psyche and stereotypes about Germanness.

[70](#) "Concept of Urban Guerilla," *Rote Armee Fraktion*, p. 48.

[71](#) *Bild am Sonntag*, June 11, 1972.

[72](#) *Quick*, vol. 27, June 28, 1972.

[73](#) *Bild-Zeitung*, June 9, 1972.

[74](#) *Bild-Zeitung*, June 6, 1972.

[75](#) Renate Riemeck, "Gib auf, Ulrike," cited in Röhl, *Fünf Finger sind keine Faust*, p. 305.

[76](#) Heinrich Böll, "Will Ulrike Meinhof Grade oder freies Geleit?" ed. Frank Grützbach, *Heinrich Böll: Freies Geleit für Ulrike Meinhof: Ein Artikel und seine Folgen* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1972), p. 28.

[77](#) Böll, p. 29.

[78](#) Peters, p. 263.

[79](#) Pieter H. Bakker Schut, ed. *das info: Briefe der Gefangenen aus der RAF 1973-1977* (Hamburg: Malik Verlag, 1987).

[80](#) Aust, p. 233.

[81](#) Krebs, p. 241.

[82](#) Peters, p. 306.

[83](#) Peter Brückner, “Brief einer Gefangenen aus dem Toten Trakt,” *Ulrike Meinhof und die deutschen Verhältnisse* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2001), p. 152-53. Translated by Luise von Flotow.

[84](#) The story of the disappearing brain recalls another brain that disappeared and reappeared in a jar of formaldehyde—that of Albert Einstein.

[85](#) Krebs, p. 246.

[86](#) Aust, p. 241.

[87](#) Ulrike Meinhof, “letzte texte von Ulrike,” anonymous, 1977.

[88](#) Aust, p. 247-49.

[89](#) “Die Aktion des ‘Schwarzen September’ in München: Zur Strategie des antiimperialistischen Kampfes,” *Rote Armee Fraktion*, 151. According to Aust, the communiqué was written and made public by Meinhof without prior approval from the group.

[90](#) Uwe Wesel, “Strafverfahren, Menschenwürde und Rechtsstaatsprinzip: Versuch einer Bilanz der RAF-Prozesse.” *Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus*, p. 1048-57.

[91](#) Wesel, p. 1,057.

[92](#) Peters, p. 343.

[93](#) Aust, p. 276.

[94](#) Typescript of a draft of August 13, 1974 and “hier ist meine selbstkritik” of June 10, 1974. Archive of the Hamburger Institute for Social History, Me, U/012, 007.

[95](#) Aust, p. 344.

[96](#) Aust, p. 344.

[97](#) Joschka Fischer participated in the riots at the demonstration after Meinhof’s death, during which a firebomb injured a police officer; however, he was never charged with any wrongdoing. In 2001, Bettina Röhl went public with a photograph from 1973 showing Fischer involved in a brawl with a police officer. Röhl implicated Fischer also in the firebombing that injured the police officer.

Fischer denied any involvement in the latter, and personally and publicly apologized for the beating of the police officer in 1973. By and large, the German public accepted Fischer's apology, and this was seen by many as a hopeful sign indicating that Germany was on a path to reconciliation with the protest movement.

[98](#) Koenen, p. 332.

[99](#) Koenen, p. 333.

[100](#) Karin Bauer, "Hanns Martin Schleyer: Mulhouse, 19. Oktober 1977," ed. Michael Sommer, *Politische Morde vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), p. 223-30.

[101](#) Gerhard Richter, *The Daily Practice of Painting: Writings 1962-1993*, ed. Hans-Ulrich Obrist (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 175, Translated by David Britt.

[102](#) Conversation with Elfriede Jelinek printed in the *Ulrike Maria Stuart* program booklet for the performance in Hamburg at the Thalia theater in 2006, p. 10.

[103](#) Conversation with Nicolas Stemann (director of *Ulrike Maria Stuart*), printed in the *Ulrike Maria Stuart* program booklet for the performance in Hamburg at the Thalia theater in 2006, p. 25.

[104](#) Ironically—or perhaps fittingly—it was a member of this younger generation who objected to the play and attempted to interfere with its production. Bettina Röhl felt that she was personally misrepresented by one of the figures in the play. Nevertheless, the play went ahead, but as a cautionary measure preventing a possible law suit, Jelinek decided not to publish the script.

[105](#) Conversation with Elfriede Jelinek printed in the *Ulrike Maria Stuart* program booklet, p. 18.

COLUMNS^a
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ULRIKE MEINHOF

SHADOWS OF THE SUMMIT POINTING WEST

(1960)

1960 promises to become a milestone in the much deplored, praised, and always newly exorcised twentieth century: the century of Einstein's theory of relativity and two terrible wars, of fascism and people's revolutions, of concentration camps and struggles for independence. In May 1960 the third postwar summit will be held in Paris. It is the third summit since the world was split into two blocs and the first summit since Cold War politics disqualified itself from the category of wise policy and became a concept with which to denounce others.

Potsdam, Geneva, Paris. Truman, Attlee, and Stalin met in Potsdam; Eisenhower, Eden, Bulganin, and Faure in Geneva. Eisenhower, Macmillan, Khrushchev, and de Gaulle will face each other in Paris. The change in names reflects projected or already established changes in political ideas. In Potsdam they decided to divide Germany into four occupation zones; a new economic order was to be set up, the NSDAP forbidden and all active National Socialists were to be removed from public office. Though the anti-Hitler alliance was no longer fully intact, there was still a certain consensus on these issues. The Paris Accords¹ ended just before the Geneva Conference, thus finalizing the military integration of the Federal Republic into the West Bloc. So in Geneva there were smiles all around, but nothing was achieved. The Paris Conference will take place in the context of a crumbling NATO alliance, Khrushchev's proposals on arms reductions, the Camp David talks that bore witness to the sincerity of US/Soviet intentions in regard to détente, but also in the context of the war in Algeria, the French nuclear bomb, and German-American tensions.²

The summit begins on May 16. Before that date, however, virtually all of the most prominent international leaders will be crisscrossing the planet, right up to the moment the NATO council meets in Istanbul in the spring. The travels our statesmen will embark on are not just in preparation for the Paris Conference; they are being undertaken in anticipation of the situation this summit is expected to create: people know that the opportunities to equalize economic downturns can

no longer be found in forced arms policies and are therefore trying to establish trade connections, open up markets, go in search of friends and clients.

When we look back over the developments of the last two years which underlie the situation today, we note a diplomatic offensive on the part of the Soviet Union that began in 1958 when the Soviet government sent out a “message” to “all the governments of the world” proposing a meeting of all leading statesmen to settle disputes. Then came the memorandum of March 19, 1958, that Smirnov, the Soviet ambassador, delivered to Bonn six days before the majority CDU government decided to equip the *Bundeswehr* with weapons of mass destruction. Then there was the *aidemémoire* from the Soviet government dated July 9, 1958, calling for a conference of experts to discuss a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. Meanwhile, in the Federal Republic, the anti-nuclear movement had been crushed by the Karlsruhe decision against a referendum,³ and the plan to make Central Europe a nuclear-free zone had been banned from political discussion (Strauss⁴ called the supporters of the Rapacki plan⁵ “potential war criminals”). In October the US voluntarily ended their nuclear weapons tests and the Federal Republic’s Ministry of Defense began buying Honest-John missiles and sending *Bundeswehr* soldiers to the US and North Africa for instruction on nuclear cannons.⁶ The result was the Berlin Note sent by the Soviets on November 27, 1958.⁷

The “war” of the notes was followed by Mikojan’s⁸ visit to the US, Macmillan’s⁹ trip to Moscow, Khrushchev’s appearance in Washington, and the American President’s world tour, and it will be followed by further consultations among the statesmen and finally by the summit conference.

Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle, and Khrushchev will meet in Paris in May. They will arrive with four different concepts, accompanied by countless, diverse expectations from people, statesmen, and parties. In last year’s election, the leader of England’s Conservative Party already created the impression that his party was best placed to engage in peace talks. Labor, with its much better election platform, was not able to clearly differentiate itself from the government’s program. The Conservatives usurped everything that seemed desirable in terms of the arms reductions the English public emphatically demanded. Macmillan went so far

as to fully identify with Khrushchev's suggestion that there be a total reduction in arms and supported him in every detail. This strategy, apparently devised to attract voters, was realistic enough for its main ideas to be maintained to this day: a politics of détente, the refusal of nuclear weapons testing, and the willingness to reduce arms. The main focus of English economic policy is on the Commonwealth, and not on the reduced territory of Europe. Western European attempts at integration can only restrict the influence England enjoys in the remaining parts of its empire. Moreover, in the struggle to maintain the so-called Free World, England, as the traditional seat of parliamentary democracy, can only feel compromised by a partner such as the Federal Republic, or France, or even Spain. And finally, like France and Belgium, Great Britain is still engaged in Africa; if it wants to successfully offset the East Bloc's attractiveness for African freedom fighters—in both ideas and material improvements—it must keep a free hand in regard to investments and maintain a politics of goodwill in South Africa, even if this is only feigned. These international interests in Great Britain will determine Macmillan's position in Paris, and hold some promise for establishing a balance with the East, a balance that is not only necessary but has become possible.

Enough has been said and written about the changes in American foreign policy since Camp David. Eisenhower's trip around the world was an attempt to explain America's policy of reconciliation worldwide. At the same time, the new policy was implemented to make the gains that the "Dulles Concept" could not. ¹⁰

Because the Americans can no longer fulfill their NATO obligations in material terms but do not yet dare to cancel them, they are trying to pass the responsibility on to their European partners, where—due to confused Euro-politics—these obligations will hopefully just cancel themselves out. This is an important issue in America's policies on Germany. The Federal Republic, which they spent many years and significant funds developing, may occasionally balk at their policies, and may attempt to annul certain established positions (in his Berlin Declaration Adenauer had the audacity to undermine the western conception established a year earlier at the Geneva Conference of foreign ministers and thus also undo a whole year of world politics). But as surely as Berlin's freedom was never seriously under threat, it is certain that the present status of the city as a trade object between East and West makes it useful in East-West negotiations.

America does not want a war, and definitely not over Berlin. America needs peace. Berlin does too!

De Gaulle, the French partner in this year's conference, has not only been able to defuse some of the government crises with his comeback, but has also abolished the Republic, without, however, being able to achieve solid support within the country. The war in Algeria is dragging on. Europe is only of interest for economic reasons, not political reasons, and militarily, only because it could become a fourth nuclear power led by the French—a position of supremacy, for which Europe is only the vehicle, not the actual goal. The French are after rights, not duties.

One of De Gaulle's objectives for this summit is an internationally binding paragraph that prohibits involvement in the business of other countries. This will allow him to treat the war in Algeria as a family affair of the French. He needs the support of Khrushchev for this, who wants a similar agreement to protect the East Bloc states, especially the GDR,¹¹ from possible western interventions. In the East there is even talk of "aggressions." Neither Khrushchev nor De Gaulle approve of the way the Federal Republic is developing, though their reasons may differ. De Gaulle, the nationalist, is afraid of Bonn's striving for hegemony. Khrushchev, the leader of the East Bloc, is afraid of possible West German expansion. On the other hand, there is the so-called Bonn-Paris axis—welded together by a shared position toward the US. Much to De Gaulle's annoyance, the US has refused to support him in the war in Algeria but is demanding higher contributions to NATO in order to ease its own financial burdens, and contrary to Adenauer's declared plan it is seeking a change in the status of Berlin in order to pacify Central Europe. The Bonn/Paris alliance thus exists for wholly negative reasons so that we can hardly expect to rely on De Gaulle, despite all his declarations that "Berlin shall remain free." France, with its relentless nationalism, seems willing to use almost any means to achieve its ends, but is divided in regard to internal and external ambitions, and thus may be a partner for détente, despite the weakening of its democratic system.

Khrushchev, the Communist, peasant storyteller, and the leader of the country that already dismayed European diplomats when it first developed in its current form, was the focus of world attention because of the moon shot¹² that took place before his trip to the US. More recently, he has surprised us by reducing

the Soviet Army by 1.2 million men. It is true that he is exchanging soldiers for weapons of apparently enormous size, and our busily anti-eastern press is correct in seeing this as no reduction of Soviet military potential. But a country that has embraced world Communism and been accused for years of wanting to conquer the world through military actions gains some credibility when it insists on slogans such as “peaceful coexistence” and decreases that part of its military potential that plays a decisive role in occupying other countries. In the pursuit of an aggressive politics of peace, the Soviet Union is the country least affected or irritated by internal difficulties or disagreements with its allies.

What the Soviet Union wants is clear: disarmament in the interest of increasing recognition of its system, and the overall political reinforcement of the GDR.

This leaves us with the question about the position of the Federal Republic. Germany is not the center of the world. Nor does it become the center of the world if we gaze at it and pretend it is. But Germany is racked by crises, and so every German policy has the chance to contribute to improving the political situation of the world. And what does Bonn do? It proceeds to nuclear armament. At the same time, federal ministers are promoting reactionary attitudes that scrawl the shadows of an unholy past back onto the walls while the government is planning Emergency Laws to abolish the little bit of democracy that still remains in this country.¹³ The government is preparing to use a majority vote in the *Bundestag* to eliminate everything that the well-intentioned constitution once stipulated as free. This is the same party that uncompromisingly says no to all moves toward reunification, all demands for disarmament, and all plans for détente. Yet it seems to have understood that it is hamstrung by this obstinate approach to foreign affairs, and that a veto by the Federal Republic will not halt this year’s developments. So, the response is to get tough. We can see a time coming when the citizens, dumbed-down by Soraya and Anastasia scandals,¹⁴ will finally grasp the bankruptcy of these policies and refuse to shoulder an arms budget of eleven billion DM, especially in the face of détente initiatives in the rest of the world. This explains the plan to abolish all of the citizens’ democratic rights, and to do what is always done in these situations—rule against the interests and the will of the people. The consequences of such policies are: no nuclear-free zone in Central Europe; no document on German interests at the summit; and lastly, nuclear weapons for the GDR. Two German states; two sets of German nuclear arms. And then what? Germany has the choice between a constructive politics of

peace and a policy that will renew its guilt, after two world wars and twelve years of fascism.

NOTES

1 The Paris Accords came into effect on May 5, 1955 and lifted the official occupation of West Germany by the Western Allies.

2 Talks between Soviet head of state Nikita Khrushchev and US President Eisenhower took place at Camp David in the fall of 1959. In a speech held before the General Assembly of the UN, Khrushchev, the first Soviet leader to ever visit the US, suggested general, controlled disarmament.

3 In May 1958, Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) in Karlsruhe had issued a court order that prevented a referendum on the subject of nuclear arms for the *Bundeswehr*.

4 Franz-Josef Strauss (1915-1988) was the Minister of Defense under Adenauer from 1956. He stepped down in 1962 as a result of the *Spiegel* Affair. See "Hitler Within Us" for more on Meinhof's dealings with Strauss.

5 The Rapacki-Plan was named after the Polish Foreign Minister who proposed creating a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe in 1957.

6 Honest-John rockets were multi-purpose weapons that could also take nuclear warheads.

7 Khrushchev's *Berlin Note* proposed withdrawing all occupying forces from Berlin and proclaiming it a "demilitarized Free City."

8 Anastas. I. Mikojan (1895-1978) was first deputy prime minister of the Council of Ministers from 1955 to 1964, and later state leader of the USSR.

9 Harold M. Macmillan (1894-1986) was British prime minister from 1957 to 1963, and head of the Conservative Party.

10 John Foster Dulles (1888-1959) was US Secretary of State under Eisenhower, and architect of the "roll-back" policies that sought to use all possible means to suppress Communism.

11 GDR stands for German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

[12](#) Meinhof refers to the Soviet launch of satellites that brought to the world the first photographs of the surface of the moon. The intense and expensive effort by the US and the Soviets in the 1960s to achieve first an unmanned and then ultimately a manned moon landing can only be understood in the political context of the Cold War era.

[13](#) Discussions about the Emergency Laws defined the internal policies of those years. Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989) was a member of the conservative Christian Democratic Union, minister for the interior from 1953 to 1961, foreign minister from 1961 to 1966, and minister of defense from 1966 to 1969 in federal governments. He supported the creation of the Emergency Laws. Ten years later the Laws were passed by the *Bundestag*. Meinhof addressed this issue in many of her columns.

[14](#) The affairs and scandals around Soraya, the divorced wife of the Shah, kept the yellow press busy for years. Anastasia claimed to be the youngest daughter of the last Czar of Russia and tried for decades to have her identity legally recognized—in the last instance in the *Bundesgerichtshof* (federal supreme court).

NEW GERMAN GHETTO SHOW

(1960)

For two months now the writing desks of newspapers, publishers, scientists, politicians, and even unionists have been graced with a new example of the authoritarian thinking and ghetto mentality of this western republic of the German nation. The people being targeted this time are not members of the Polish intelligentsia, or Jews, or even half-hearted or partial Communists; this time they are the skeptics who oppose the nuclear politics of the Federal Republic, people who maintain their positions even when these are shared by the extreme Left, people who find the issue itself more important than the world views of many of its proponents. In September 1957, the journalist Winfried Martini for the *Rheinischer Merkur*¹ published melancholic meditations on the role played by our intellectuals in politics. Clearly underlying this text was the thesis of his book *Das Ende aller Sicherheit*, where he advocates getting rid of democracy, an act which he labels “political freedom,” and calls for the establishment of an authoritarian class-based rule of law along the lines of the regime of Salazar, the Portuguese dictator who “lives according to the strictly spiritual discipline of Thomism.” They used to warn us about intellectuals whose statements conform too closely to government directives and they turned the scientist’s proverbial unworldliness into a virtue; now the warnings of the Göttingen 18 have been dismissed as a scholarly gaffe.² *The Red Book (Rotbuch)*, published in 1960 by a committee that calls itself “Save the Peace”—a book that landed on our writing desk—takes a first stab at listing those public personas in the Federal Republic whom these saviors of peace consider suspicious; while this list “in no way reflects the qualifications of those who have signed it,” and while it only contains a “miniscule number of Communists,” the fact remains that wherever these names come up—on petitions, appeals, or invitations to participate in events or conferences—“it is wise to find out whether they may be serving as a front for Communist culture functionaries or other clandestine organizations” (p. 136-137).³

Here I find it useful to recall that McCarthy was the head of a Senate Committee “for the investigation of un-American activities;” only about ten people were ever arrested, but hundreds and thousands were on those dreaded lists that broadcasters, the press, associations, organizations, and high government agencies were plied with and which caused manuscripts to be refused, promotions to be blocked, all free discussion of America’s internal and external policies to be cut short, and the democratic climate in the US to be completely poisoned. The “brag list” produced by the “Save the Peace” club thus hooks into the worst traditions of a friendly country, and is published by a committee whose name would lead one to expect that it would cauterize these points of contact rather than prepare a comeback for them on German soil.

This *Rotbuch* is more than a monstrous index prepared by a few professional Communist-haters. Its political inspiration is all too close to the interventions perpetrated by our government in the East-West discussions and in the bills being prepared by the Ministry of the Interior to curtail our sovereignty. Even if this particular club were to close down—which is exactly what we hope will occur—its founders and supporters remain ministers in the Adenauer cabinet.

The press, broadcasting and publishing networks, unions, the military, peace movements and anti-nuclear campaigns, the “culture section” of the parties and their youth organizations have all been combed for information on the political views and curricula of their members, and where data were missing the blanks have been filled in with speculations designed to reveal the relationship between freely proclaimed opinion on the one hand and the Pankow doctrine⁴ on the other—reflecting negatively on both—the purpose being to solve the problem of democratic opposition in the Federal Republic once and for all. The book seeks to “unmask the Communist infiltration,” which thrives on the “naïveté” and “ignorance” of its “victims” (p. 8); it wants to help in the struggle for victory in the Cold War, for “should we lose it, a hot war will inevitably break out upon us,” and it wants greater recognition for the important role played by “the infiltration sector as a determining front in our democracy’s political defense system” (p. 7-8).

The book offers a pellucid picture of its underlying concept of western class-based government, and a closer look at the meaning of its content is quite frightening; but it also makes possible a clear position in the face of a wolf who has already shed his sheepskin and is about to bite.

The vocabulary is militant, reminiscent of the jargon of the Freikorps⁵ after the First World War; this is just an external feature, but frightening enough after the experience we acquired in that department and the innocence we bitterly forfeited. The attitude is fundamentally elitist; it starts with the minister of the interior resorting to a theory that has always served openly fascist countries as an irrational justification for implementing illegitimate claims to power, an approach that we actually see in use here. For who can have authorized the publishers of this book to accuse hundreds of professors, journalists, unionists, broadcasters, students, and young people of being ignorant or naive in the face of a phenomenon that these people in particular have focused on for years? It is this “group” of “chosen individuals” who feel they are responding to the “call” for a “common ideal.”⁶ And their thinking is reminiscent of Stuckart/Globke’s commentaries on race.⁷ Moreover, their wanting to win the Cold War rather than ending it as quickly as possible through bilateral agreements means wanting to drag it out—but how much longer? How much more time is required for the spirit that “called upon” the publishers of this book before they turn the extended arm of the Cold War into a fuse for a hot war, and bring the diabolical game of the past to its end, its final closing?

And so they take their stand: militant, if not militaristic; with elitist, if not anti-democratic attitudes; as determined cold warriors if not challengers demanding a preventative war against the GDR⁸ and the Soviet Union, à la Herr Schlamm.⁹

The material is organized according to this perspective. Every chapter has an introduction that is meant to focus, or rather blur, the reader’s understanding of how seriously our freedom is being threatened. It pillories professors whose students proudly proclaim to have attended their classes; it attacks writers who have become known as “the few great ones” since Thomas Mann and Musil, as well as painters, sculptors, and composers whose names belong in the repertoire of the educated class in Germany—however little this class knows about these artists.

“The main arena of this Cold War” is allegedly public opinion, and it is allegedly the objective of Communist agitators to undermine, pervert, and confuse the public (p. 10). The publications helping to do this dirty work range from the *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* to *konkret*, and from

the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* to the *Frankfurter Rundschau* to *Diskus*.¹⁰ Anyone who voices a protest against arms buildup or argues for the freedom of speech is deemed to be acting within a fifth column. Open opposition is not viewed as a demonstration of our democratic rights, even duties; instead, it is perceived as belonging to the realm of deliberate obfuscation and perversion.

Under the heading “Subverting the West Germans’ Will to Defense” (sic!) every possible attitude critical of the *Bundeswehr*¹¹ is ascribed to East Berlin agit-prop; there are references to the “fuss about generation 22” (p. 28); differences in opinion on international and national politics are shrugged off as having been “deliberately created” (p. 93), while the rejection of military and other traditional associations (in particular Verband deutscher Soldaten and Stahlhelm und Kyffhäuser)¹² is judged to be part of the category entitled “Subverting Defensive Thought”! (p. 94).

Anyone who fights for peace “is—wittingly or unwittingly—someone who fights for world revolution,” since the “peace slogan” simply conceals a “deliberate deception” of gigantically Leninist provenance, as those suffering from naïveté soon learn (p. 102). And in line with the dishonesty of the supposed initiators of the West German “peace movement,” the motives of the professors and teachers connected to this movement derive from attitudes that use “oppositional grandstanding” to compensate for the “lack of public attention they garner in their professional work” (p. 3). Absolutely no one and nothing escapes censure: political parties, churches, and universities are rated failures by these “saviors of peace.” Members of the *Bundestag*—Helmuth Kallbitzer, Helene Wessel, Arno Behrisch, and Peter Nellen—Association of German Students, the Socialist Student Association, the Falken, the Union of German Public Employees, the Association of German Unions, Association of German Catholic Youth, the Protestant Youth of Germany, the teacher-training colleges, the Further Education Centers, the Church-led community centers, the British Member of Parliament Conny Cillacus, the church representative Kloppenburg, and the former representative of the Protestant Church in the GDR Probst Grüber—all of these people, and many more, their numbers are legion—are labeled with stereotyped vocabulary such as “infiltrated with Communist ideas, suspicious, untrustworthy, susceptible,” and so on.

In the spring of 1957, eighteen German physicists published a manifesto in which they warned against the Federal Republic participating in the nuclear arms race and announced they would not take part in nuclear arms production in Germany. The West German public was shocked at Mr. Adenauer's condescending response that judged the political warning issued by these eighteen German scientists to be incompetent and unnecessary, and sought to expunge it from the arena of German political discussion. This response revealed a new lack of respect for scholarship and a disregard for the lively pluralist democratic life that had supposedly been guaranteed when a parliamentary democracy was established after 1945. Media reactions followed, from people such as Herr Winfried Martini, mentioned above, and included even more aggressive reactions from the local Christian Democrat press. For instance, in the summer of 1958, when students and teachers went out into the streets to publicly proclaim their opposition to nuclear rearmament in the Federal Republic, a daily newspaper in Münster wrote, "Don't believe the slogans of those . . . who are willing to abandon you and their family, their beliefs and their freedom, their existence and their future to the dictatorship of Bolshevism. Give these people the answer they deserve: rejection and calumny." This was directed at the local committee "Fight Nuclear Death," which had been co-founded by professors at the university. This persecution of heretics spread through the local papers of all the federal German lands, while the big daily papers remained silent, hardly mentioning the protests of hundreds of thousands of citizens or describing the anti-nuclear movement as a motley group of isolated sectarians without influence. Two methods were mobilized toward the same end. When neither one worked, and when the Standing Committee for the Assembly of all Opponents of Nuclear Rearmament was created in Gelsenkirchen, Mr. Schröder pulled out all the stops and called upon the *Bundestag* to engage in a witch hunt and inquisition—not in order to pursue enemies of the Constitution, but to silence and eliminate democrats and opponents of nuclear arms.

Ideas prepared in the press and broadcasting were then formulated in the highest places in the *Bundestag*; at the same time the law prohibiting referenda on nuclear rearmament was passed. Voters were thus deprived of having a say on a question of life and death in German politics, and their representatives had the choice of behaving like obedient and diligent little bourgeois citizens (*sine ira et studio*) or suffering threats as a result of ministerial interventions both on the job and when exercising their rights to free speech.

The third phase has now set in with this *Rotbuch* from the “Save the Freedom” committee that lists the names of its victims in neat alphabetic order over pages and pages, mingling the living with the dead, annulling their anonymity, and opening a new German ghetto show. The “meditation” on the political role of the intellectual in our country has become an invitation to a pogrom; individual voices of warning have become grand inquisitors of the Christian Democrat persuasion; saviors of freedom have shown their true colors as pioneers of a new German fascism.

The system is clear, and quite hideous. But this is not yet enough. The opposition has accumulated facts that cannot be neutralized without the use of force. And so, when there is no proof of subversive contacts, the last resort is to take offensive action in the media, and publish lies and crass falsehoods. The *Rotbuch* even goes so stupidly far as to repeat libelous assertions that the federal government’s *Bulletin* already had to deny earlier, and thus offers the reader such a plethora of naked untruths that it destroys even a potential willingness to believe what is in the book. The screw has been turned too far, the attack parried. Legal actions are coming on hard and fast; Jesko von Puttkammer¹³ procured a court order from the federal prosecutor, and word has it that the club is breaking up.

But this is not the first such case. Which is not just an innocuous fact. Let us recall that when the fuss over the Lex Soraya¹⁴ died down, Herr Schäffer’s¹⁵ much worse Law on the Protection of Honor appeared; when the anger over Herr Schröder’s 1958 Emergency Laws in Stuttgart seemed to have evaporated, he pushed for an Emergency Service Law—in other words, a law instituting a German territorial army. We do not yet know what kinds of changes in the Constitution will come out of this *Rotbuch* that was put together by a disgraced committee, whose founding members are to this day cabinet ministers in the Adenauer government, ministers who are planning measures to tap telephones and censor mail; ministers who have initiated the production of West German rockets; ministers who want to mobilize the *Bundeswehr* against striking workers; ministers who continue to push for the nuclear rearmament of the *Bundeswehr* at a time of worldwide détente; ministers who proclaim the “liberation” of the German East; ministers who demand the death penalty for traitors.

We are not ready to believe that Bonn is planning a “Blitzkrieg” against the GDR although recognizing that something is unreasonable does not necessarily

mean it will not happen. There has already been a time in Germany when people thought “This can’t be true,” and it was true, and cost millions of them their lives. Clearly, this must not happen; clearly, the political tendencies of the Federal Republic today justify every kind of fear; clearly, in this situation optimism is the reserve of fools, and all those who feel the suspicion, the mistrust, and the discomfort of the moment must come together in order to prevent what happened in the past from happening again. They say an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and we hardly need proof that prevention is what is required today.

NOTES

1 The *Rheinischer Merkur* is a conservative Christian weekly newspaper founded in 1945 by journalist Franz Albert Kramer (1900-1950). The first edition was published March 16, 1946 in Koblenz.

2 This was a group of eighteen West German nuclear scientists who published an anti-nuclear weapons manifesto on April 12, 1957. The text of the “Göttinger Erklärung der 18 Atomwissenschaftler” was published in *Vaterland. Muttersprache* (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1994), p. 139.

3 *The Red Book* was published in spring 1960. It contained the names of 452 university teachers, writers and artists, among them Wolfgang Abendroth, Max Born, Otto Dix, Werner Egk, Ida Ehre, Leonhard Frank, Willi Geiger, Albrecht Goes, Helmut Gollwitzer, Karl Hubbuch, Hans Henny Jahn, Erich Kästner, Wolfgang Koeppen, Peter Lühr, Alfred von Martin, Martin Niemöller, Carl Orff, Otto Pankok, Hans Purmann, Franz Radziwill, Ernst Rowohlt, Luis Trenker, Fritz von Unruh, Wilhelm Wagenfeld, Alfred Weber, and Günther Weissenborn. They were suspected of being “Communist culture workers” and presented as employees of Moscow. The Committee “Save the Freedom” was founded by the ultra-conservative Franz Josef Strauss and Christian Democratic member of the *Bundestag* Rainer Barzel (1924-2006).

4 Pankow is a neighborhood of Berlin formerly in the Soviet zone, and here alludes to the Government of East Germany, many of whose key offices were located in Pankow.

5 Freikorps are paramilitary groups of former soldiers returning from the First World War.

6 Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989) was a member of the conservative Christian Democratic Union, Foreign Minister from 1961 to 1966, and Minister of Defense from 1966 to 1969.

7 Wilhelm Stuckart (1902-1953) had been a National Socialist politician, and Hans Globke (1898-1973) wrote the official commentary on the Reich Citizenship Law (Nuremberg Laws). Despite his Nazi past, Globke was for many years the director of the Federal Chancellery under Adenauer.

8 GDR is the German Democratic Republic in East Germany.

9 William S. Schlam (1904-1978) was a conservative, anti-Communist commentator in *Die Welt*.

10 These are newspapers or journals, which range from far left on the political spectrum, e.g. *konkret*, to liberal or center-left, e.g., the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.

11 *Bundeswehr* is the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany.

12 The *Verband deutscher Soldaten*, the Association of German Soldiers, is a vestigial veterans' organization from the time of the German Kaiser (emperor), with nationalist sympathies. The *Stahlhelm*—steel helmet—is a metonymical reference to the pre-1945 German military. The *Kyffhäuser* is the mountain on which there is a famous memorial to the iconic German Kaiser Friedrich Barbarossa (1122-1190).

13 Jesko von Puttkammer was head editor of the social democratic *Vorwärts*; he later became the ambassador to Israel, Yugoslavia, and other countries.

14 The Lex Soraya, an innovation in the penal code, set out to punish reports on the private lives of foreign heads of state. It was quickly approved by the federal cabinet under pressure from the Shah of Iran, but was defeated in the *Bundestag*.

15 In his period as Minister of Justice (1957-1961) and as part of his "Great Legal Reform," Fritz Schäffer (1888-1967, CSU) designed several projects on the "Protection of Honor." In other words, this conservative agenda attempted to turn printing or telling the truth about somebody into a crime, if that truth was deemed to be an intrusion into the person's private sphere. Anyone convicted of the crime of "publicly discussing the private affairs of strangers" was to be

incarcerated for two years. The move was directed primarily against the press and was meant to suppress reports “without regard to the truth or untruth of the statement. No proof regarding the truth of the statement may be brought.”

A MAN WITH GOOD MANNERS: A DAY IN COURT WITH KARL WOLFF

(1964)

Sometimes the people let out a moan. Then again they sit silent and still for hours, focused, helpless. As incriminating evidence about Karl Wolff keeps coming from the witness stand, I hear an ethnic German from the Banat¹ whisper into the ear of a general staff officer's widow who is still fighting for her pension, "It's unbelievable to see the Germans washing their dirty linen in public again." "The guy ought to be hanged! Right away! Hang the whole lot of them!" a gentleman born in 1922 complains during the break. An old woman seated behind the press section keeps on muttering, "That's what was running our government. And now they're all innocent. No! Terrible. Yes, they gassed them. Transported them. Even the little kids. No. Arrogant specimen. Trying to talk his way out of it. Women too. All gone. Yes. No . . ."

During the six weeks of the Karl Wolff trial the German public has not been able to make up its mind about what to think of the man who was the personal aide of SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, a general of the Waffen-SS, the highest-ranked SS and police officer in Italy, the contact between Himmler and Hitler. The public knows that he was a man of the world, and still is today: a handsome showman, a society man. He was blond then, he's gone white now, his eyes are still brilliant blue. He's a warrior, a Teuton, a fullblood Aryan, progenitor of many children with two different wives whom he was more or less faithful to. A man who had principles, the wrong ones unfortunately, but still principles that may be out of date now: people don't wear hats and aren't Nazis anymore. At most, they oppose Jews—Goldwater, for instance.² Wolff is accused of having been an accomplice in the killing of 120 Jews on one occasion, 300,000 on another, and 6,000 on yet another—clearly he is accused of murder. When Vera Brühne was on trial two years ago in the same courtroom in the Palace of Justice in Munich, accused of killing a doctor and his housekeeper, a total of two persons—she was also a handsome person, elegant, blond, slim, a woman

of the world, but unprincipled, more unfaithful than faithful in her relations with her husband and other fornication partners—the German public was through with her after only one day in court. The mood was against her, and the case was clear. Later, we discovered that the jury, under pressure from public opinion in the city and the country, had no choice but to find her guilty. It is cheap to mock an accused; it is vile to make fun of someone already in police custody; it is impossible to make up for the opportunities to resist National Socialism that were missed by expressing a dislike for someone like Karl Wolff. And it is deplorable that the prudishness felt for Brühne was more poisonous than the aversion for the presumed crimes of an individual like Karl Wolff. This is naïve, and obscurantist—in every sense of the word. The writer, fortunately a member of the generation that did not experience National Socialism consciously, and thus missed the opportunity to be guilty-by-association—for admiring the system or for lacking the civil courage to oppose it—has never seen so many former SS men in one place as in the witness stand at the Karl Wolff trial. They wear their C&A suits over squared shoulders,³ still bring their heels together sharply, though silently, these days, say *Jawohl* instead of *Ja*, and when they leave the courtroom, one after the other, they bow briefly and with restrained masculine verve before the accused, Karl Wolff, SS-Obergruppenführer and general of the Waffen-SS a.D.⁴ They say that today they think differently than they did then, that given the conditions at the time they could not act differently, that they suffered stabs of conscience even then. But when they finally get around to recounting their own memories and opinions, they turn out to be just as unrepentant, unimpressed, incorrigible as they were then.

The witness Wilhelm Karl Hinrich Koppe, sixty-eight, married, most recently the director of a factory, resident in Bonn, was a third level police general, in other words a commanding general during the war—which he emphasizes—a general in the Waffen-SS, an SS-Obergruppenführer, a high-ranking SS and police officer in the Warthegau from December 1939 to December 1943. He tells the tale of how he brought the activities of the Jewish extermination camp at Kulmhof (Chelmno) to a standstill. “I knew there were extermination actions. I heard about them by chance. One day,” Koppe recounts, “I was with Greiser (the *Reichsstatthalter* in the Warthegau who was hanged in Posen in 1946)⁵ to discuss problems related to resettlement. It was my responsibility to settle Germans in the Warthegau. Himmler always used to praise my organizational skills. I re-settled

about 300,000 people. From the Baltic states, the Dobrudscha, from Galicia.” The judge interrupts, “One of the requirements for resettling people was the expulsion of the population living there, wasn’t it?!” The witness, “*Jawohl*, the expulsion of Jews and Poles. That was pretty efficient. Anyway, while I was sitting with Greiser, Bouhler (head of the Führer’s Chancellery, who committed suicide in 1945) called. The conversation was about schnapps. Greiser hung up. I asked, ‘Is Bouhler ordering schnapps from you?’ Greiser said, ‘No, no it’s for the task forces. For the extermination of Jews.’ I reacted right away. I said, ‘Listen here, kids, this will destroy our entire re-settlement plan. It’s not something we can hide.’ The extermination camp Kulmhof was right in the middle of the settlement area. I was furious, and summoned the inspector of the security police. I asked him, ‘Why didn’t you tell me about Kulmhof?’ The inspector replied, ‘That’s not my responsibility.’ I had the right to inspect everything myself, but seeing as I didn’t have the authority to issue directives, there was no point. I could not request something from a lower-ranking officer. I would have had to issue a command. And then there were the questions from the settlers. They’d see the trucks with the Jews, and they’d ask, ‘What are you doing with the Jews? You keep taking them in there and they don’t come out again.’ It made me blush red with shame. So I brought Kulmhof to a standstill!” He does not say how, he just says that he did.

The witness relates another episode about how he, the SS-Obergruppenführer, put a stop to the extermination of Jews. “Early in December 1943, I was transferred to Krakow, and General Lieutenant Schindler⁶ came to see me. He was concerned about the Jews working in the weapons factories. Schindler said, ‘Please help me keep some of the Jews here, otherwise the weapons systems will collapse.’ My first response was that I wasn’t authorized. Then I asked him, ‘Would you be willing to come under my command if Speer⁷ names me head of weapons in the Warthegau?’ Schindler said, ‘Of course. If it’s a question of weapons, I am quite ready to do without a star. I’ll make all kinds of sacrifices.’ So I went to Berlin to see Speer. Speer agreed. From then on, I could say, ‘If you take the Jews away, we’ll lose the war!’ I’m an idealist,” the witness asserts. “I joined the party because Germany, my Fatherland, was in danger of being overrun by Communism. At the end of 1931, I was assigned the task to set up SS-Sturm in Hamburg-Harburg. It was a big success. I mean, it’s wrong to say it like that—from today’s perspective—but that’s how it was back then.” He encountered Wolff in Berlin in September 1940. “I was having talks with headquarters. When

you arrived in Berlin back in those days you always asked which of the higher-ranking fellows was around. They told me Wölffchen was in town. So we got together in the Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse (the head office of the SS-Reichsführer) or in the Kaiserhof over a cup of coffee. We talked about the situation at the front. I was already pretty skeptical then. We'd had some big victories but the end of the war was not in sight. Wolff said our heroic armies were marching forward. He reassured me. I said, 'Listen, kids, don't you worry about the bombs and all that in the Führerbunker?' I said, 'Wölffchen, wouldn't it be smart to get the weapons industry . . . ' Wolff interrupted me saying the Führer has thought of everything. A giant weapons center is being constructed in the east. There is loads of Jewish manpower. Poles and Jews. Hundreds of thousands. A million. It's already starting up, with a gas plant, an electricity station, rail connections, and all. I went home, much relieved. Later I discovered it was all a utopia." After the war he had "a hard time of it," using the false name Lohmann under which Stuckhardt, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for the Interior, had provided him with a passport. He met with Wolff a couple of times, once in Wuppertal, once somewhere else. He can't remember what they talked about.

In fact, none of them seem to know much about their meetings with Wolff; they just can't remember. Even the statements they made during police questioning a year or two earlier have been erased from their memories. "I am so forgetful," says Himmler's former personal driver, now a bus driver in Wedel/Holstein, "that I have to note down my bus driver rank every week, otherwise I forget what it is." Now the topic is the review of Camp Soribor in the summer of 1942 or spring of 1943. Soribor was an extermination camp for the Jews of the Warsaw ghetto, established by Globocnik, one of the higher SS and police leaders in the General Government. (He is said to have committed suicide in May 1945.) It is certain that Himmler and Globocnik participated in the review, but the court wants to know if Wolff was there too. During police questioning one witness had made the surprising statement: "Once, I remember exactly, I came to a small station with Himmler and Wolff. A locomotive and one train car were waiting there. Himmler and Wolff got in." This had been an additional rail line. The train returned six or eight hours later, moving in the opposite direction and with the locomotive pushing the car. When the court asks, "Was Wolff there too?" the witness can't remember. "I don't want to protect Wolff. I didn't think it was right that he made money on all that." (The reference is to Wolff's magazine article from 1961 entitled "Eichmann's Boss, Heinrich Himmler" and began with the

words “I, Karl Wolff, SS-Obergruppenführer and General in the Waffen-SS a.D. am speaking up. My conscience forces me to do so” (à la I, Claudius, Caesar and God). The witness said, “I thought about it the whole year. I cannot give that as evidence under oath.”

The man used to drive Himmler to Dachau and watch them do experiments on humans. “Was Wolff there too?” “I suppose. Can’t say.” “Did Wolff know about the experiments on humans?” “No. Wolff was good to everybody, to the plain folk too. Whenever something was not real, he didn’t want anything to do with it.” During police questioning he had said, “As Himmler’s most trusted associate Wolff had to know something.” (Wolff did know. That had already been established in Nürnberg.)

Max Ruhnke, a businessman, Globocnik’s personal aide, the man who organized the special train, the train that consisted of a locomotive and one train car, never did and still doesn’t know a thing. Nothing about the million and a half Jews who were murdered in the Lublin region under the direction of Globocnik (the assessor’s comment about Globocnik is: “an incredible exterminator of humans!” The witness, “If you say so . . .”). He knows nothing about Wolff joining in the sightseeing trip to Camp Soribor. But he remembers every detail until the moment the train departed: there had been trouble because the train hadn’t arrived, apparently couldn’t enter the station, and all the planning was upset. Himmler had been furious. Wolff calmed people down. There were cars available—a Mercedes and a Horch—but Himmler apparently didn’t want to travel in the convoy of cars. Finally they did decide to take a car and met the special train along the way, at the station Himmler’s driver had described. Question: “How long did the gentlemen’s visit to Soribor last?” Witness: “From lunchtime till evening.” “Did Wolff go too?” “I couldn’t say.” Then memories seem to dawn: “I think I remember that Wolff was there for a short time, but when the convoy left he did not go along.” End of statement.

And so it goes on. With every former SS man giving evidence, mornings and afternoons. The witnesses for the prosecution are the comrades of the accused. The opportunity to try an outstanding representative of the Third Reich, a man who was higher-ranking than Eichmann, a man who was Himmler’s trusted associate, who competed with Heydrich to become Himmler’s deputy, whose colleagues from the SS, the *Reichstag*, the immediate environment of Himmler and Hitler were executed if they hadn’t already committed suicide—this singular

opportunity is fizzling out. The accused, and not the court, is determining the direction of the trial. The supporters of National Socialism, and not its opponents, are unveiling the truth about the regime. I overheard the young people sitting on the public benches wondering whether there wasn't something to National Socialism after all.

After two shorter trials in 1946 and 1948 a re-trial of Karl Wolff was held in Munich in 1964; Wolff was found guilty of being an accomplice in the murder of 300,000 people and was condemned to fifteen years in penitentiary, and stripped of his civil rights for ten years. He was released in 1969.

NOTES

1 Banat is a region that overlaps the boundaries of Romania, Hungary, and Serbia with many formerly ethnically German communities.

2 Barry Goldwater (1909-1998) was the Republican candidate in the 1964 US presidential election.

3 C&A is a department store chain in Germany and other central European countries, known for reasonably priced, generic clothing.

4 The suffix "a.D." stands for außer Dienst, literally translated, "out of service," meaning retired.

5 The *Reichsstatthalter* was the local representative of the Nazi regime whose job it was to implement the Nazi ideological agenda in a given occupation zone. The Warthegau, or Wartheland, and Posen are regions of Poland the Nazis seized and occupied in their invasion of 1939.

6 Not to be confused with Oskar Schindler, Generalleutnant Schindler was the Nazi inspector-general for weapons in the occupied zones of Poland.

7 Albert Speer (1905-1981) was an architect and Hitler's inspector-general for planning in the capital of the Reich. After 1942, he was minister of munitions and general economic planning for the Reich. He was tried and convicted at the

Nürnberg trials (1945-1946), and released from prison in 1966, claiming he knew nothing of the mass-murder perpetrated by the Nazis.

ON THE TOPIC OF JULY 20

(1964)

On July 20 we all agreed to agree. The nuclear arms protesters agreed with the arms racers, the inspector general of the *Bundeswehr* agreed with the simple soldier, the unions agreed with the government, and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* agrees with us. The events of July 20 were so enormous and their outcome so tragic that no one can capitalize on them or use the celebration of the day for the petty quarrels of daily politics. And so the anniversary of July 20 has become a day of concord. As a certain yellow press would have it, on this day we all somehow feel better, and more earnest—there is a touch of *vanitas* in the air, and the minikini discussions fade out as we sip our Mampe cocktails.¹

This concord is both true and false. And the reason lies in the background to the events of July 20, 1944. The officers who finally took action that day in the name of the German resistance to Hitler, and whose act became more visible and splendid than everything that Communists, Social Democrats, unionists, Christians, and students ever managed to accomplish, those officers did something that no other members of a ruling class had ever done before in the name of the entire German people. Those arch-conservative politicians, aristocrats, and officers tried to carry out what had been the objective of the Left: they tried to destroy National Socialism, end the war, and re-establish the rule of law. This complete agreement—between the interests of a small class of powerful men and all the classes of the German people—this is what the East usually refuses to acknowledge in its evaluation of July 20, 1944; but this is what unites all those in the West who ceremoniously celebrate the day.

But as far as we are concerned today—the nuclear arms protesters on the one side and the arms racers on the other, the inspector general of the military and the simple soldier, the unionist and the federal government—the concord is completely fake. Discord is the order of the day, not sentimentality. And discord has its root in the hypocritical discourse about conscientious objection: when

the events of July 20 are presented as having been perpetrated by conscientious objectors, the way Trettner, Lübke, von Hassel, and the federal government present them; when people retreat to this last bastion of unverifiable motivation and simply seek excuses for those who were not part of the group, for those who did not act or rebel.² But it did not require a sensitive conscience or tender feelings to become a political assassin when faced with the murders of millions of Jews, a criminal war, and the horrors of the NSREGIME. The crimes of National Socialism drove the men and women of July 20, 1944 into the resistance. The crimes that live on today in the Nazi judges that have still not been dismissed, in the person of (Karl Friedrich) Vialon,³ for example, the state secretary for development aid, who was the head of the finance section in Riga under the NS *Reichskommissar* for the East and thus responsible for the administration and sale of Jewish property, and whose resignation the socialist and liberal students of Berlin demanded on the twentieth anniversary of July 20. The people who so easily talk about “conscience” did not listen to their own consciences when they gave this man his job; and they do not listen to their own consciences when they renew the attacks on Communists and accuse non-Communists of being fellow travellers, when they plan the renewed suppression of basic rights, or when they want nuclear weapons in Germany. Nuclear arms for an army that does not even have the discipline to act on the principles of moral leadership, and whose commanders and sub-commanders cannot even lead forced marches in a reasonable manner during peace time—can we expect that anyone who hounds a recruit to death in 30 degree temperatures will use nuclear arms in a measured, humane, and responsible way? This is when the talk about conscience turns into silence.

It is high time for us to realize that the gas chambers of Auschwitz have advanced to technical perfection in the shape of the nuclear bomb, and that the game being played with the nuclear bomb with an eye to the Germans in the GDR, the Poles east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, the Czechs in Sudetenland, and the Russians in the Baltic States is a criminal game of Hitleristic dimension. It is high time for us to realize that the struggles against injustice and violence waged by the men and women of July 20 are not yet over. Surely the worst does not have to happen for us to oppose government policy. And the comeback of someone like Franz Josef Strauss is not the moment for a political assassination

either. Still, the differences that defined people on July 20, 1944 are as intact as ever.

NOTES

1 Mampe was a Berlin company (est. 1852) that produced a liqueur called the “Lufthansacocktail” (named for the German airline), which was a very trendy drink in the 1960s.

2 Heinz Trettner (1907-2006), a general in the *Bundeswehr*, and occasionally inspector general of the *Bundeswehr*, in the Third Reich, was a high-ranking general in the Wehrmacht and part of the “Legion Condor.” Kai Uwe von Hassel (1913-1997) was the federal Minister of Defense for several years (1963-1966). Heinrich Lübke (1894-1972) was a German politician during the Weimar Republic and in the Federal Republic, and was President of the Federal Republic from 1959 to 1969. He was a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

3 Karl Friedrich Vialon (1905-) was a jurist in the German courts from 1927 to 1937 and member of the Ministry of Finance from 1937 to 1945; he held numerous government posts during the Third Reich and in the Federal Republic. In 1966, he was forced to resign from his post in Federal Chancellery because of his past role as commissioner of the Reich in the eastern territories.

DRESDEN

(1965)

Twenty years ago, during the night between Fat Tuesday and Ash Wednesday, February 13 and 14, 1945, the largest air attack by allied bomber squadrons ever flown in the Second World War was unleashed against a German city. It was the attack on Dresden. The city was bombed three times within fourteen hours. The first attack lasted from 10:13 pm to 10:21 pm. When the English bombers flew off, they left behind them a sea of fire that set the sky ablaze over eighty kilometers. The second attack took place between 1:30 am and 1:50 am. When the bombers departed they could see Dresden on fire from a distance of three hundred kilometers. The third attack was flown by an American squadron of bombers from 12:12 pm to 12:23 pm.

More than 200,000 people lost their lives. In his book *The Fall of Dresden*, David Irving, an Englishman, wrote that it was the first time in the history of the war that an air raid had so destroyed its target that there were not enough uninjured survivors to bury the dead.

Dresden had a population of 630,000. On the day of its destruction, over a million people were in the city (estimates range from 1.2 to 1.4 million): refugees from Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia, evacuees from Berlin and the Rhineland, transported children, prisoners of war, and foreign workers. Dresden was a collection point for wounded and recovering soldiers. Dresden had no armaments industry. Dresden was a city without defenses, without Flak or anti-aircraft capacities. In all of Germany, Dresden was considered a city that would never be bombed. There were rumors that the British would spare Dresden if Oxford were not attacked, or that after the war, the Allies would make Dresden the capital of Germany and would therefore not destroy it. There were other rumors too, but basically, no one could imagine that a city that was setting up new civilian and military hospitals every day, a city that was receiving hundreds of thousands of new refugees every day, refugees that were mainly women and children, would be bombed.

The only point of military interest in Dresden was a large train yard used to transfer goods and troops. But in the three attacks—the first that dropped mainly highly-explosive bombs to burst windows and break down roofs so that trusses and apartments would have that much less protection against the next load of fire bombs; as all these attacks ran according to plan and with the greatest precision—this train yard was hardly hit. A few days later, when heaps of dead bodies were stacked in the halls of the train yard, the rail lines had already been repaired. But Dresden burned for seven days and eight nights.

The English soldiers who flew the raids were not told the truth. They were told that their fleet would be attacking the head military command post of the army, located in Dresden. They were told that Dresden was an important center for supplies to the eastern front. They were told that the target was a Gestapo headquarters in the center of the city, an important munitions factory, a large poison gas plant. As early as 1943 there had been public protest in Britain against the bombing of the German civilian population. The Bishop of Chichester, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the President of the Church of Scotland had protested. They and a Labour member of Parliament were told there was no truth to claims that an order had gone out to destroy residential rather than military centers. Until the end of the war, until March 1945, the British government and its Prime Minister Winston Churchill managed to conceal the truth about the actual, deliberate, and planned attacks by British bombers on German cities. Dresden was the climax of this policy. Dresden was reduced to ruins two years after the outcome of the Second World War had already been decided in Stalingrad. When Dresden was bombed, the Soviet troops were already at the Oder and Neisse rivers, and the Rhine had become the western front. One year later, on February 13, 1946, Sir Arthur Harris,¹ the commander-in-chief of the Royal Air Force who led the attack on Dresden, boarded a ship in Southampton to leave the country that was no longer willing to credit his achievements. At the same time as the German people learnt the truth about Auschwitz, the British learnt the truth about Dresden. The perpetrators were refused the honors they had been promised by those in power. Here, as well as over there.

In Dresden, the fight against Hitler degenerated into the same thing that it professed to be fighting, and had probably fought: it became barbarous and inhumane, and there can be no justification.

If we needed proof that there is no such thing as a just war, then Dresden is that proof. If we needed proof that the defensive position must always turn into an aggressive position, then Dresden is that proof. If we needed proof that the people are always abused by the governments that enter into war, and are degraded into being both the pretext and the victims of applied barbarity, then Dresden is that proof. The fact that Dresden was not mentioned at the grave of Sir Winston Churchill raises suspicions that Dresden is still to be blamed on the people who were themselves deceived. This is the same tone that the federal government uses when it refuses to annul the period of limitation set for crimes committed during the Nazi period. When the perpetrators of crimes are let off, the people become the criminals.

NOTES

1 Sir Arthur Harris (1892-1984) was known by the nickname Bomber, or the more dubious Butcher Harris.

HITLER WITHIN YOU

(1961)

The attempt to turn twelve years of German history into a taboo subject has failed. From Heusinger to Foertsch, from Oberländer to Globke, from Heyde/Sawada to Eichmann¹ we have seen that you can live in the Germany of 1961, regardless of Stalingrad and Oradour, regardless of Auschwitz and Buchenwald.

The narrowing gap between the fronts of history and politics, between the accusers, the accused, and the victims haunts the younger generation. This generation was not involved in the crimes of the Third Reich or in determining the direction that was taken in the postwar period; it has grown up with and into the arguments of the present, entangled in the blame for something it is not responsible for. The realization that this generation is innocent cannot, however, be used as an instrument by those who want to refuse young people the right to have their say about history; nor does it free this generation from facing the responsibilities of the present.

Students are especially important in this regard. More than any other sector of the population, they have access to sources of information and facts, and in a few years they themselves will be playing important roles in universities and schools and government, carrying out what they are demanding today.

On the occasion of the Eichmann trial, Dieter Bielenstein, the media spokesman for the Association of German Student Organizations published a text that seeks to speak for this younger generation, a text we consider inadequate but remarkable enough to cite it here in its entirety, with added comments:

The trial of Adolf Eichmann once again brings the injustices of our history into full focus. If we understand this correctly, we will not be able to say that only others were the murderers, and that we merely suffered their actions. The older people will have to remember that the Nazi posters "Juda! Die!" used to hang in public view, and that they continued to vote for Hitler. Then, overnight or at dawn, Jewish neighbors and friends

disappeared—and we were silent. Too cowardly to ask where they had gone, or maybe because we approved. Even though the Eichmann trial is being held in Jerusalem, we feel it among us. We are all concerned, and some people—including those of social standing and renown—may be named as guilty of or at least complicit in the crimes. We will have to condemn them, even if they wanted to control the crimes or alleviate the suffering. Some who were responsible for crimes of the past may well see themselves as exonerated because within the evil, they sought better alternatives. Regardless, they should be forever excluded from all high positions or public recognition, because in this democracy of ours, any participation in the crimes of the National Socialists has the effect of poison, the effect of justifying the actions of those who remain incorrigible, and who are once again making themselves heard.

The students of the Weimar Republic were militant in their anti-Semitism, even before the National Socialists entered the arena. In 1926, the German Student Body decided by secret ballot to include “racial features” as a criterion for membership, and excluded Jewish students as a result. The orgies of hatred that culminated in book burnings after the Nazis “seized power” were largely carried out by students. And then they demanded that Jewish academics should no longer be allowed to publish in German, but should be forced to use Hebrew or some other foreign language. Soon after, Jewish academics were removed from their jobs, and the students applauded or remained silent. Thomas Mann’s honorary doctorate was revoked by the university in Bonn; the brown shirts ruled the field. We cannot ignore that this anti-Semitic attitude, this hatred and slander began in 1920, and that from that point onward the traditional student fraternities, especially those in the Germanic University Circle, fostered and promoted this demon.

Today, the students of those years are our professors, lawyers, teachers, journalists, and administrators. They are the old gentlemen in our fraternities, and they are our parents. This is not meant as a blanket accusation or a call to report on the past of any one individual. But it does point to the fact that we cannot remain silent on this topic, that as students we must take up a position and not allow the past to rest, and that we must demand answers from the older generation.

If the silence at universities means that the demon remains intact, and if statements are made that display incorrigibility, then we shall not hesitate to proclaim that there is no room at our universities for professors or student associations that do not draw conclusions from the German catastrophe. In November 1957 and October 1959, the Association of German Student Organizations set up German-Israeli talks that explored how knowledge of Jewish history is created and transmitted in various areas of education and publishing. In June 1960 the association organized an educational conference on the theme of "Pedagogy and Judaism"; it published a book with the same title shortly afterward. For the past three years dozens of young German students have been traveling to Israel every summer to work on kibbutzim. Ten of our universities have German-Israeli study groups, which many of the 130 Israeli students presently in Germany belong to. The chairman of the Israeli student association took up an invitation from Bonn last year. All these developments do not, however, allow our younger generation to define a "new beginning." We cannot and must not erase the memory of the recent decades of our history. We must use this history to find a new and a better way into the future for our people.

I have not enumerated these activities as an alibi. It is troubling enough that the Union of National Students—which is now prohibited—displayed radical rightwing and anti-Semitic tendencies. A number of other student associations are also close-mouthed about their position during the Weimar Republic, although they have every reason to make public statements. Our universities still do not have a single institute for research on Judaism and Jewish history. University lectures and school textbooks still leave much to be desired in this area.

And so it is the task of the student body to be watchful and to admonish our academics, ensuring that they learn to fulfill their political duties in society.

So far so good.

Bielenstein restricts his comments to criticism of the so-called "old Nazis" and the efforts made by the German student associations to establish good relations with the state of Israel. Anyone who speaks of "old Nazis," however, should also

take the next step, which is to recognize and criticize the equally old political ideas that still hold sway. Anyone who castigates anti-Semitism must also speak up for freedom wherever it is being threatened today. Anti-Semitism cannot be countered by a few student excursions to Israel; pro-Semitism is only half a response. The only possible response to anti-Semitism is the rejection of every kind of political terror that administrative powers can impose on those who think differently, those who believe differently, and those who feel differently. The response to concentration camps is not just to close them down, but to guarantee total political freedom for political opponents. The response to the invasion of Poland does not lie in refusing diplomatic relations with Warsaw; the attack on the Soviet Union cannot be made good by the appointment of someone like Herr Foertsch, nor can the invasion of France be expunged by the *Bundeswehr* holding maneuvers in Mourmelon; the banning of the German Association of Unions is not resolved by Emergency Laws; police actions against black students in 1961 are not a response to the exclusion of Jewish students from German universities in 1933.²

Anti-fascist sandbox games cannot make up for the (lack of) resistance against National Socialism—not for the younger generation or the older generation. The response to National Socialism must be found in internal and external policies, for today and tomorrow. It means freedom for political opponents, the separation of powers, and the sovereignty of the people. It means reconciliation with former opponents, co-existence rather than war, negotiation rather than rearmament.

One day we will be asked about Herr Strauss in the same way we now ask our parents about Hitler.

Because of this column, Franz Josef Strauss (1915-1988), Minister for Defense (1956-1962), brought a libel suit against Meinhof and konkret. Issued in March 1962, the suit accused Meinhof of “insulting the Minister for Defense through the dissemination of printed matter.” The suit never went to trial, however, because the lower court in Hamburg found no substance to the claim; it found the accused “to have spoken in the name of legitimate interests.” In February 1963, Meinhof wrote an ‘épilogue’ to the libel suit in which she stated, “We were not concerned with ‘Strauss,’ the individual. I repeat: one day we will be asked about Herr Adenauer, Herr Höcherl and Herr von Hassel in the same way we ask our

parents about Hitler today.” (Hermann Höcherl (1912-1989) was a member of the Christian Social Union (CSU), the conservative Bavarian sister party to the CDU, and Minister of the Interior from 1961 to 1965; Kai Uwe von Hassel (1913-1997) was a CDU politician).

NOTES

1 From 1931 to 1944 Adolf Heusinger (1897-1982) was a member of the general staff; from 1957 he was the inspector general of the *Bundeswehr* and from 1961 to 1964 he presided over the Standing Committee for the Military within NATO; Friedrich Foertsch (1900-1976) was a general in the *Wehrmacht* and inspector general of the *Bundeswehr* from 1961 to 1963. Theodor Oberländer (1905-1998) had to step down as Minister for Refugees in 1960 when his National Socialist past was revealed as a result of a sentence handed out in absentia in the GDR; Hans Globke (1898-1973) was a jurist and high ranking public servant in the FRG. During the Third Reich, he had helped to formulate the emergency legislation that gave Hitler unlimited dictatorial powers. Werner Heyde (1902-1964) was a top administrator in the National Socialist “Euthanasia” program who was not tried at Nürnberg because he fled. He returned to his profession as psychiatrist in 1949 under the alias of Dr. Fritz Sawada, serving at times as chief expert witness for the *Landessozialgericht* in Schleswig-Holstein. At his arrest in 1959, he was accused of murdering 100,000 people. It was revealed that several prominent judges and doctors were aware of Sawada’s true identity for years. A photograph of Heyde’s arrest in 1959 is the basis for Gerhard Richter’s iconic oil painting *Herr Heyde* (1965). Adolf Eichmann (1906-1962) was a high-ranking Nazi tried and hanged for crimes against humanity in Israel.

2 Police actions against black students took place in Bonn, Frankfurt, and other cities. A number of African students were hurt in demonstrations against the assassination of Patrice Lumumba (1925-1961), the first post-independence Prime Minister of Congo.

HUMAN DIGNITY IS VIOLABLE

(1962)

The Constitution is the only instrument of our federal democracy that was not imposed by the dictates of some interest group or derived from some perfectionist worldview (*Weltanschauung*). The context in which it was created and its content make it a part of history—postwar history, to be precise.

The parliamentary council that met at the Herrenchiemsee, and that brought together the best among those in the three Western zones who were still around after twelve years of Nazi rule in Germany, set out to devise the fundamentals of a (new German) world that could not be destroyed by any form of barbarism, and to do so in a manner that respected international and national law and was ethical, moral, humane, and in tune with history. Given the intended object and the possibilities it presented, this may already have been excessively optimistic. But it was an emotional moment, and a wide swath of the people took it very seriously. When we look at the expressions on the parliamentarians' emaciated postwar faces, their plan seems plausible. Few at that time were able to perceive much more than the most external aspects of reality, or see through them.

The text was based on two major ideas:

- Democracy is the only form of statehood that can ensure human dignity; dictatorship is barbaric, inhuman, terrorist, and retrograde.
- War is no longer an option in the twentieth century. War profits or booty do not outweigh the losses: not the material losses, and even less so, the human losses.

These two precepts, arrived at through experience, were the basis upon which the Constitution created a state under the rule of law, a state that was well-defined and complete, carefully planned and guaranteed through diverse means, a state never before known in Germany. And from the very beginning, military service and remilitarization were excluded from the Constitution, banned from the future Federal Republic. In its original form, the Constitution was totally libertarian and totally anti-militaristic. It made no room whatsoever for remilitarization,

and ensured that basic rights and freedoms would apply without any limitations, except in the case of criminals, within the federal realm; they were valid for all time, for all people, for all situations, for the fat years and the lean.

These pillars of the Constitution provided not only a legal framework, but also a political program. Henceforth, internal opponents as well as external adversaries were to be countered in accordance with the foundational, and now founding, notions of nonviolence and the full protection of the law. The law in Germany would never again be manipulated through power struggles. The politics of peace in the sense of a permanent state of disarmament would never again be subject to party politics, or decided by majority rule.

But then came 1956, when the two-thirds majority in the *Bundestag* changed the Constitution by adding the so-called defense articles (*Wehrartikel*), and basically rubberstamping what had already been put in place politically. In fact, as early as 1949, the Chancellor had offered the Western allies German participation in matters of defense, a move that prompted Gustav Heinemann¹ to resign from Adenauer's cabinet in 1950. In other words, already seven years earlier, and in utter disregard for the spirit and the letter of the Constitution, Adenauer had set up and pursued his own policies. The Constitution had allowed no room for remilitarization; remilitarization not only betrayed it, but tore it wide open. Or to put it differently: the policies of the federal government could no longer be implemented within the framework of the 1948 Constitution. And since the government was not about to abandon its policies, and since the SPD had no intention of insisting on changes in policy either, it was the Constitution that had to change, to ensure that the actions of the executive remained within the bounds of the legal. Its content was expanded, and its spirit mutilated.

The talk these days of tearing down the second pillar that ensures the current relevance of the Constitution, the talk these days of restricting the total freedom guaranteed by the Constitution—not forever, as in the case of remilitarization, but as an “emergency measure”—this kind of talk means that once again the policies of the federal government cannot be implemented within the framework of the Constitution, or as Robert Jungk² put it so succinctly at the student congress against nuclear weapons in 1959, “Nuclear rearmament and democracy are irreconcilable.” The full meaning and relevance of Jungk's statement are only now becoming evident. The connection he established (between un-democracy

and nuclear weapons) has been clearly revealed in the way Social Democratic policy has developed in the three years since. In 1959, Walter Menzel,³ former president of the “Committee Against Nuclear Death,” could still publish a text in *Vorwärts* that argued in principle and fundamentally against new German Emergency Laws. That was the year of the *Deutschlandplan*.⁴ That was 1959, and under the protection of the SPD it was still possible to publicly discuss a German confederation and a German peace treaty. That was the year the Rapacki plan was still being given exposure in the press, when talk of negotiations with Pankow were considered shocking and inappropriate, but continued to stimulate responses from those concerned.⁵ That was when the phrase “We will not rest while nuclear death threatens our people” was not just a slogan, at least not for a part of the Social Democratic Party machine, nor a reason for immediate exclusion from the party, but a deadly serious reason to take action and develop political will. But the moment the SPD began to support the foreign policy of the federal government, it also joined in the support for an Emergency Laws. When Herbert Wehner⁶ said yes to NATO in 1960, federal deputies Arndt and Schäfer⁷ began to participate in constructing the discourse on the Emergency Laws. When Schmidt⁸ started fantasizing about solid or liquid-fuel rockets, the SPD gave in to talks about the Emergency Laws. Once the SPD and the CDU came to an agreement on nuclear weapons, the SPD also fell into line on the Emergency Laws. Menzel has been silent ever since, and Wolfgang Abendroth,⁹ head ideologue of those opposing the Emergency Laws, has been driven out of the party.

Nuclear rearmament and democracy are irreconcilable. The statement can be cast in the negative: nuclear armament and the end of democracy are complementary; weapons of mass destruction and terror go together—in technical, organizational, and factual terms. The political program of the Constitution focused on “peace and freedom” is thus annihilated.

If the Emergency Laws were passed, it would invalidate the conclusions that the emaciated men at Herrenchiemsee felt compelled to draw in 1948, after the collapse of Weimar and twelve years of National Socialism. Such a law would erase the first German attempts to overcome the country’s recent fascist history; it would not erase this history. The realization that only democracy can guarantee human dignity, in the same way that only a complete ban on weapons can

guarantee peace, would thus be nullified. The attempts to change course would be crushed, the willingness to face the past destroyed. The only remaining freedom would be the freedom to support the government, and not oppose it—at least not through direct confrontation or strikes or demonstrations. Freedom would, in fact, be abolished before it had even survived its own ordeal by fire. Formally, and in terms of perception, this would mean that, in the future, any crowd expressing oppositional views could be mowed down as in Hungary's November 1956, and war need not be avoided by deploying intelligent policies; it would just be prepared as a possible "state of emergency," in line with the Federal Republic's new self-image.

Human dignity would again be violable, and dictatorship an option. War would become a definite possibility for the second half of the twentieth century.

NOTES

1 Gustav Heinemann (1899-1976) was the Minister of Justice (1966-1969) and President of the Federal Republic (1969-1974).

2 Robert Jungk (born Robert Baum, 1913-1994) was a publicist, journalist, and pioneer of the peace and environmental movements.

3 Walter Menzel (1901-1963) was a Social Democratic Party (SPD) politician.

4 *Deutschlandplan* was a play by SPD to reunite the two German states, published on March 18, 1959.

5 The Rapacki-Plan was named after the Polish Foreign Minister who proposed creating a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe in 1957; Pankow was the seat of the GDR government.

6 Herbert Wehner (1906-1990) was the SPD Minister for pan-German affairs (1966-1969). He was a member of the German Communist Party and during the Nazi years was in exile in Moscow and Sweden. Upon his return to Germany in 1946, Wehner joined the SPD and was instrumental in the SPD's adoption of the Godesberg Program, in which the Party rejected its Marxist past and affirmed West Germany's role in NATO.

[7](#) Adolf Arndt (1904-1974) and Dr. Friedrich Schneider (1915-1988) were SPD members of the federal parliament from 1949 to 1969 and from 1957 to 1980, respectively.

[8](#) Helmut Schmidt (1918-) was a SPD member in the German federal parliament (1953-1962; returning in 1965), House Leader (1967-1969), Minister of Defense (1969-1972) and Chancellor (1974-1982).

[9](#) Wolfgang Abendroth (1906-1985) was a socialist political scientist and law scholar, banned from the SPD in 1961.

not even that was celebrated on May 23, 1964. It seems the libertarian aspects of the Constitution are now posing a problem for the government. In fact, there are plans for a further amendment to the Constitution, an amendment that will allow the most important basic rights to be cancelled in the case of some internal or external emergency—basic rights such as the freedom to express your opinion, the freedom to assemble and associate with whomever you want, the freedom of movement across the entire territory of the Federal Republic, the prohibition against forcing women into military service, the guarantee that the postal service remain free and uncensored, and so on.

The Constitution has not improved in the fifteen years of its existence. It is unrealistic to want to return to a time before 1956, but it is equally unrealistic to simply accept the planned Emergency Laws as a *fait accompli*. And there are still the unfinished tasks the Constitution requires, namely the creation of two laws—one to establish public control over party funding, and the other to prohibit participation in aggressive military actions, a law that might even rein in a man like Strauss.

NOTES

1 From August 10 to August 23, 1948, a group of constitutional experts from the West German occupation zones gathered on the Bavarian island of Herrenchiemsee. The political leaders of the German states (*Länder*) gave them the task of drafting the basis of a constitution for the West German Federal Republic.

2 The Marshall Plan made American financial aid available for the reconstruction of Germany.

GERMANY WITHOUT KENNEDY

(1963)

The grief is dying down; the emptiness remains. The man who the people of the world saw as the peacemaker is dead. The man who was backed even by those people who opposed their governments is no more.

Conservatives did not find him amenable; liberals found him incompliant. The powerful had to get along with him while the powerless pinned their hopes on him.

Three gunshots in Texas put an end to all that. Lead articles were stammered together, the stock markets wobbled, speculation was rampant. We know that everything has changed, and we are waiting—we waited for hours, then days, and now weeks, hoping everything might return to the way it was. There were no outbreaks of panic, only a sudden loss of orientation, helplessness, uncertainty. Governments as well as their oppositions feel that fate has defrauded them.

But nothing will return to the way it was. There is no way back; we have to find ways out, alternatives that will make German life and politics independent of happenings in Dallas, the civil war in Texas, and the powerlessness of the powerful in the White House. It is not appropriate that this land and the people who live here, that Germany should flounder in fear and uncertainty because madmen in the American South play with fire, because their security service fails, or because the internal political conflicts of an allied country shake the world. We live in a state of profound conflict between the Rhine and the Neisse,¹ and we do not have the time to be silent onlookers or extras in a drama whose outcome we cannot influence. Here in Germany, we must understand that our fate is better controlled by us than by a Big Brother who is himself subject to events beyond his control. It is high time that the Federal Republic of Germany make sovereign use of the sovereignty it acquired eight years ago.²

Sovereignty means respecting alliances but not being enslaved by them. This means developing policy that is not dependent on American nuclear arms; policy

that does not depend on strategies of intercontinental weapons, or speculation about occupying forces and the Big Lift,³ or power struggles in a NATO council that can be paralyzed by Texan snipers. Sovereignty means acting according to the measure of fifty million Germans who want to survive in the area between the Elbe and the Rhein,⁴ in the knowledge of a war that was lost, a nation that was split in two, and a geographic position that is not on the Atlantic but in Central Europe.

Germany must establish a situation in which it is free of the vicissitudes of international politics, the arbitrary acts of some overseas assassin, his victim, and whoever his successor may be. This means that the actors in German politics must step up and take direct and immediate responsibility for everything we can legitimately do to stabilize Central Europe.

The object and the goals of such a political initiative would first and foremost be to establish a legal status for Berlin, a status that would ensure that the city remain free and accessible. It would include pacifying the German-German border and putting an end to the latent civil war between the Federal Republic and the GDR. It would further include the expansion of trade agreements between the Federal Republic and its East European neighbors, and even diplomatic recognition.

What we are demanding is not yesterday's news; it is brand new. Up until November 22, 1963 the differences between the supporters and the opponents of German policy could be considered mere differences of opinion that Washington would thoughtfully resolve. But the Big Brother is no longer big, and we do not have time to wait for him to make a comeback; in other words, for the conflicts in internal American politics to be resolved.

Our demands to the ruling coalition in Bonn are not unreasonable, or even unrealistic. Diplomatic relations with Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia are nothing more than the logical continuation of Schröder's foreign policy.⁵ Probing talks conducted with these countries and including both German states on the topic of disengagement in Central Europe—a nuclear free zone and the possible withdrawal of all occupation forces—could enhance the relevance of the fact that the Federal Republic will not be getting nuclear arms, and relieve tensions. Developing technical contacts between the Federal Republic

and the GDR could ease intra-German travel conditions, and lead to establishing a space within which official talks to normalize intra-German relations could be held without either side losing face or prestige.

Sovereignty means taking charge of your own affairs. But nowadays sovereignty comes in only two forms: through the power to use nuclear weapons—that was the goal of Franz Josef Strauss—or through neutrality. In a military alliance, the partner who does not have nuclear weapons will remain marginal. Even if a modern war is fought with conventional weapons, it will be based on a strategy that bears in mind the use of nuclear arms—as a military measure or to exert political pressure. You remain dependent on the partner who has the bomb. If you want out of this dependence, you have to bow out of the area of conflict.

In this whirl of conflicts we should not do the new American government the disservice of burdening it with the responsibility for solving the German question. The German government must act on its own as a sovereign entity. The German opposition must demand this.

NOTES

1 The Rhine and the Neisse are the two rivers that mark the western and eastern borders, respectively, of unified Germany.

2 The official occupation by the allies ended in 1955.

3 “Big Lift” stands for the immediate transfer of American military personnel from the US and various military bases to Western Europe.

4 The Elbe and the Rhein rivers mark the eastern and western borders, respectively, of West Germany.

5 Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989) was a member of the conservative Christian Democratic Union, minister of the interior from 1953 to 1961, foreign minister from 1961 to 1966, and minister of defense from 1966 to 1969. He supported the creation of the Emergency Laws.

VIETNAM AND GERMANY

(1966)

Here is the information being systematically spread among the populace: America is defending the freedom of the West in Vietnam. America is providing its allies with inspiring evidence of its commitment, and doing so under the toughest conditions. We should be thankful. Vietnam could be Germany tomorrow. These are all lies. The only thing that can be proven is that the people who are expected to believe this stuff, and the press that makes them believe it, and the politicians who reinforce it, have a role to play in this war. The role is clear, and can be described—but it is only very indirectly linked to German security issues. The one hundred million marks that Bonn sent to Vietnam and the peace bells¹ the press organized in Berlin have nothing to do with Vietnam. They have everything to do with German politics.

Johnson depends on Western support for his Vietnam War. The protests against the war in his own country have long become public knowledge worldwide. They have impacted the Congress and the Senate; they play a role in universities. Significant numbers of people in the American Civil Rights Movement are now part of the Vietnam War resistance. As Dean Rusk made clear at the NATO Ministers' Congress in Paris, Johnson needs the support of the NATO countries as an argument against the opposition in his own country. The powers that refuse to give their support can still be mobilized on behalf of Berlin, or American influence in Europe, or traditional ties with England. Wilson is part of this complicated game. He is in trouble himself—with his balance of payments, with Rhodesia—and as discussed with Johnson in December, he wants to reduce his military engagement "east of Suez," that is in Aden and in Singapore. In return for American support, he offers approval of and silence on the war in Vietnam. But there is some speculation that Wilson is afraid the Bonn-Washington axis may grow stronger if England were to dissociate itself from the Vietnam conflict, and Germany might end up acquiring nuclear arms. This is a relatively unlikely scenario, but realistic enough when we see the fears expressed in the English media.

Bonn, which grew up in the era of John Foster Dulles—as Adenauer’s trips to America in the 1950s triumphantly demonstrated—now supports the Vietnam War for egotistical, if not aggressive, interests. The war provides albeit questionable proof of the threat from the East; it justifies the strategy of planned defense, of rocket bases along the GDR border. The war provides the occasion to remind the US on a daily, even hourly, basis of its security guarantees for Berlin and West Germany. It supplies the nervous edge and the ammunition to set off conflict wherever conflict is deemed necessary in Germany. Barzel, after all, confirmed what had already been documented by the federal government: there can be no peace in Europe until the two Germanies are reunited. In other words: Vietnam today could be Germany tomorrow. Those who are propagating these ideas must be suspected of planning such a situation.

The dubious “moral rearmament” club expressed all this very concisely and openly in full page ads in German dailies. The ads wished the Chancellor a pleasant journey and asked him to tell the American people that “we Germans are grateful for the sacrifices of lives and goods that America is making in Vietnam in the name of freedom and our freedom as well.” And then came the twist that we expected: “The questions around reunification and the Oder/Neisse line (sic!) will only truly be resolved when we mobilize all our strength to establish a free world order based on universally binding moral principles. America and Germany must decide to move forward with the ideology of freedom.” Forward?? Where to?

Such malicious considerations obscure the actual facts, which are quite clear and simple on the topic of Vietnam: in 1954, the country, under the leadership of Diem, was forced to become an ally of the US—which it therefore is not—when Dulles manipulated it into the Manila Pact,²³ and when free elections did not take place in 1956 because Vietnam would have become neutral and rejected dubious alliances. Other points are also often obscured: notably that South Vietnam has never known such Western “freedoms” as freedom of the press, freedom of opinion, or freedom of religion, and that the Vietcong is a popular movement of the people that can not be simplistically labeled “Communist.”

For all this to remain obscure, the Berlin media imposed a publication boycott on Wolfgang Neuss. Then *Die Welt* published only eight lines of the over 120 lines that make up the declaration against the Vietnam War issued by writers and university professors, but printed a counter-declaration by Krämer-Badonis⁴ as

well as three series of letters to the editor that oppose the virtually unpublished writers' declaration. It is part of Bonn's engagement with the Vietnam War to withhold information from the public, so that connections remain unclear and the public does not understand, but continues to participate.

It is unlikely that Bonn's drive to acquire nuclear weapons will be satisfied by its Vietnam solidarity or create a Vietnam War in Germany. Nevertheless, "Actions that could undermine and are undertaken to disrupt the peaceful coexistence of nations . . . are unconstitutional."

NOTES

1 During the Vietnam War, West Berliners were called upon to send small duplicates of the Berlin peace bell to the widows of American soldiers killed in Vietnam as a sign of solidarity.

2 Herbert von Borch (1909-) is an author and journalist.

3 The Manila Pact was a defense alliance of the Southeastern Pacific nations against communist expansion in the region. It was dissolved on June 30, 1977.

4 Rudolf Krämer-Badoni (born Rudolf Krämer; 1913-1989) was a German author who tended to be conservative and anti-communist.

THREE FRIENDS OF ISRAEL

(1967)

Israel is presently enjoying the benefits of three kinds of sympathy. There is the sympathy of the European Left that does not forget that its Jewish fellow citizens were persecuted by the same fascism it was combating. This solidarity is fully shared by the younger generation, which has taken a stand against [Hans] Globke and [Friedrich Karl] Vialon and continues to rail and demonstrate against an ongoing SS-style spirit and practice whose last, and again first, victim was Benno Ohnesorg.¹ The European Left has never had any reason to give up its solidarity with those who were persecuted over issues of race. For them, National Socialist policies were compromised well before the terror against the Jews, and no reparations have ever repaired the damage. There is no reason for the European Left to abandon its solidarity toward those who were persecuted; this solidarity reaches well into the present and includes the state of Israel, founded as a result of British colonial policies and National Socialist persecution of Jews.

The people who live in Israel today—not only the Jews, but also the Arabs—were not the subject, but primarily the object of the founding of this state. Anyone tempted to question the existence of this state should know that once again the former victims and not the perpetrators would be the ones to suffer. If the request for reconciliation with Poland makes reference to the suffering that National Socialism inflicted upon Poland, then the same applies to Israel.

The second kind of sympathy that Israel enjoys at the moment comes from other motivations; these are more egotistical, less unconditional, different, but they are equally advantageous for the country. American oil interests are involved, whose consequences in Third World countries, particularly in Iran, have been analyzed and described by Bahman Nirumand. Similar analyses of American oil policies—in Syria, Libya, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia—are not yet available, but it would be naïve to assume they do not play a role in the conflicts in the Middle East, or in the US continuing to designate the Gulf of Akaba as international waters and maintaining a presence in the area of the Suez Canal

by way of reliable allies. Solidarity with Israel together with the NATO accord between Greece and Turkey justify the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, to protect its southern flank. The US needs a friendly Israel near the Suez Canal; this is not because the Suez Canal is the only route for oil transports to Great Britain and the US (the claim that larger tankers could navigate around the Cape of Good Hope at the same cost seems credible). The strategic importance of the Canal lies in its being the route that Arab countries would use if ever they become masters of their own oil.

The policies of the West European Left could not possibly be considered friendly towards Arabs since these policies expect Arabs to abandon their claim to Palestine and coexist with Israel. But the policies of the United States not only want to maintain the state of Israel for the Israelis, they also want to ensure that the American economy has access to Arab oil. Anyone who thinks Israel would have been destroyed if it hadn't waged this war should know that it resulted in more than just an Israeli victory. Anyone who condemns the Arabs should consider that Arab policies against Israel include legitimate interests, whether or not we are willing to recognize these.

The third kind of sympathy toward Israel has been expressed by a particular kind of press in the Federal Republic in a form that would normally be viewed as black humor, or perceived as utter mockery, but has been tolerated as politics: I refer to the delivery of gas masks to Israel. The ruthlessness and success of the Israeli attacks set off a frenzy here, and theories about a blitzkrieg sprouted in all directions. Twenty-five years late, and in Sinai, *Bild* finally won the battle of Stalingrad. Anti-communist resentment flowed seamlessly into joy over the destruction of Soviet MIG fighter planes; the fact that the Soviets stayed out of the conflict was taken as encouragement to mimic the Israeli initiative and apply it to the German question. The invasion of Jerusalem was seen as the prelude to a military parade through the Brandenburg Gate. If the Jews had not been gassed to death, and had been taken along to the Ural Mountains instead, the Second World War would have ended differently. The errors of the past were recognized as such, anti-Semitism was regrettable, a purging took place, the new German fascism had learnt from its past mistakes. Anti-communism will be victorious with the Jews, not against them.

A questionable reconciliation occurred, not because the humanity of the Jews was suddenly recognized, but because of the ruthless way they waged their war;

not because of their rights as citizens but because they used napalm; not because we acknowledged our own crimes but because we admired the Israeli blitzkrieg,² in solidarity with brutality, with actions that drive citizens from their homes, and with conquest. The spirit of “I get to say who is Jewish” allied itself with Israel and, at the same time, with the killers of Berlin. If Israel were a socialist country, there would be no such sympathy. There would only be the sympathy of the European Left: steadfast, rational, and honest.

Those who refuse to tolerate a single word of criticism about Israeli policies, or listen to a single word about the Arabs’ legitimate interests (which do not make their threat to destroy Israel any more acceptable), those who see the demand that Israel should return to its pre-war boundaries as Soviet imperialism—a total confusion of concepts—are not the people who help to create peace for Israel. You can recognize the interests of a country and yet consider that its policies are not suitable to achieve those interests.

The solidarity that links the Left to Israel must not let itself be appropriated by the sympathies of the US or the *Bild* publishers; these forces are not focused on Israel, but on self-interests that are hostile to the Left. The solidarity of the Left embraces a man like Moshe Dayan³ if he is targeted by killers, but it does not embrace his right-wing radicalism or his politics of conquest. The same goes for the Left’s solidarity with Arab nationalism on the one hand, and its rejection of Nasser’s⁴ persecution of Communists on the other. The search for reasonable and stable political solutions threatens to be quashed by the current climate, which makes Israel either friend or foe, a climate that the Left is also succumbing to in its apparent need to decide between Soviet and Israeli politics, a quandary that threatens to tear it apart. Adherence to party politics is apparently more important than reason. We may well ask: does Israel want to survive, or does it want to win? As the subject of its own history, Israel will have to answer this question itself.

NOTES

¹ On Globke, see note 2, “Hitler Within You.” On Vialon, see note 3, “On the Topic of July 20.” Benno Ohnesorg (1940-1967) was shot dead while taking part in a peaceful protest against the visit of the Shah of Iran in Germany on June 2,

1967. This was a watershed moment for the Student Movement, as it was the first such death and it radicalized many of the people involved.

2 In a blitzkrieg in June 1967, Israel occupied the Sinai, the so-called West Bank, and the Golan Heights.

3 Moshe Dayan (1915-1981) was an Israeli general involved in the Sinai and the Six Day Wars; he was later foreign minister from 1977 to 1979.

4 Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) was president of Egypt from 1954 to 1970.

The Left in the Federal Republic and West Berlin is not anti-Communist. Ten years ago, when the GDR's statehood was still somewhat uncertain, and Franz Josef Strauss could openly admit to an intimate circle that it was the purpose—the strategic task—of the *Bundeswehr* to take over the GDR, at that time criticism of the GDR could still be viewed as anti-Communism; and there was every reason to ensure its statehood, and block the imperialistic intentions of the Federal Republic. August 13, 1961 was justified. But it looks as though the GDR's foreign policy has not developed beyond this point, much like the Communist parties of Western Europe that are still stuck in social reforms and parliamentarian-ism. For them, seats in Parliament and the welfare state are no longer part of the proletarian class struggle; they are ends in themselves. The French Communist party and its union, for instance, ensures the continued existence of capitalism in France, and the GDR is using these measures to demonstrate the status quo of its statehood, thus showing that its statehood has become an end in itself. The visa requirements, which make no changes in power relations or consciousness, thus turn out to be exactly what they are perceived as: harassment.

The GDR—which might be expected to stop thinking only about how to consolidate its position and to remember international socialism, a form of socialism that should be supporting the Left in the Federal Republic and West Berlin, by making its own state more democratic for instance, and thus operating as a living example of democratic socialism—this GDR is now imposing bureaucratic forms of harassment that will fan the flames of precisely the kind of anti-Communism it need no longer fear, but which presents a grave threat to the Left in the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

None of this relieves the Left of reconsidering, discussing, and formulating its relationship to and expectations of the GDR. The so-called German question really should become an issue for the extra-parliamentary opposition. The possibility that the GDR could one day play the same counterrevolutionary, role in Germany that the KPF [French Communist Party] plays in France—this possibility must be recognized, carefully considered, and if necessary, averted.

NOTES

1 In early summer 1968, the GDR introduced passport and visa requirements for visitors from West Germany. Kurt Kiesinger was Chancellor at the time.

2 August 13, 1961, is the day the Soviet sector of Berlin (and eastern Germany) was blocked off from the other sectors, and construction on the Wall began.

3 The Hallstein Doctrine, named for Walter Hallstein (1901-1982), a secretary of state in the West German foreign ministry from 1951 to 1958, stated that third party diplomatic relations with the GDR would be regarded as an unfriendly act by the Federal Republic, because of its claim to sole representation of the German nation.

You say the Shah is a “simple, outstanding and conscientious personality, just like a normal citizen.”

That sounds rather euphemistic when you think that his monopoly of opium plantations alone provides millions in annual profits, that he is the major source of the narcotics smuggled into the US, and that as late as 1953 heroin was unknown in Persia. In the meantime, through the Shah’s initiative, 20 percent of all Persians have become heroin addicts. In this country, people engaged in such business are not usually described as conscientious; they are considered criminals and are locked up, unlike “normal citizens.”

You write, “The only difference is that my husband is not just anybody, but that he has to bear greater and heavier responsibilities than other men.”

What do you mean “he has to?” The Persian people didn’t beg him to become the Shah of Persia. The American secret service set him up—you know, the CIA—and it wasn’t cheap. The CIA apparently spent nineteen million dollars to overthrow Mossadegh. We can only speculate about where the development aid money may have gone, because the bits of jewelry he has given you—a diadem worth 1.2 million marks, a brooch for 1.1 million marks, diamond earrings for 210,000 marks, a diamond bracelet, a golden handbag—hardly add up to two billion. But don’t you worry, the West will not be so petty as to compromise the Shah for embezzling a few billion, trafficking in opium, bribing businessmen, relatives, secret security folk, or for the bit of jewelry he bought you. He is the guarantee that Persian oil will never be nationalized again, as it was under Mossadegh, not before the wells run dry, around the end of the century, when the contracts signed by the Shah have elapsed. He is the guarantee that not one penny will flow into Persian schools to teach the Persian people how to take their fate into their own hands, use their oil to build up their own industry, spend hard currency on agricultural machinery to irrigate the land, and master the hunger in the land. He is the guarantee that rebellious students and schoolchildren are regularly shot dead and parliamentarians who are concerned with the country’s welfare are arrested, tortured, and murdered. He is the guarantee that an army of 200,000 men as well as 60,000 secret service men and 33,000 policemen, well-armed and well-fed thanks to US funding and led by 12,000 US army advisors, are holding the country for ransom. All this is to prevent the one thing that could save the country: the nationalization of Iran’s oil, as happened under Mossadegh on May 1, 1951. Like a pig at the trough . . . the millions that the Shah blows

in St. Moritz or transfers to Swiss banks are hardly important when measured against the billions that his oil makes for the likes of British Petroleum Oil Comp (BP), Standard Oil, Caltex, Royal Dutch, Shell, and other English, American, and French companies. God knows, the responsibility he bears for the profits of the West is indeed “greater and heavier” than other men’s.

But maybe you weren’t even thinking about something as tiresome as money, maybe you were just thinking about land reform. The Shah spends six million dollars to have public relations offices promote his benevolence. And it is true that before the land reform the big landowners held 85 percent of all agricultural land while now they hold 75 percent. One quarter of the land now belongs to the peasants, and they are paying it off over fifteen years at 10 percent interest. Now the Persian peasant is “free”; he no longer gets only one-fifth of his harvest. He now gets two-fifths; the other three-fifths go to the landowner who sold him only the land—not the irrigation systems, the seed, or the draft animals. That’s how they have managed to make the peasants even poorer, more indebted, more dependent, more helpless, more submissive. Truly, an “intelligent spiritual man,” the Shah, as you so rightly point out.

You write about the Shah’s worries about an heir, “On this point the Iranian Constitution is very strict. The Shah of Persia must have a son who can one day ascend the throne, and into whose hands the Shah can later place the fate of Iran . . . On this point the Constitution is strict and rigid.”⁴

Strange that the Shah should not give a damn about the rest of the Constitution, that he should be the one to determine who becomes member of Parliament, contrary to the Constitution, and make all parliamentarians sign an undated resignation form before they have even been admitted, that not a sentence can be published in Iran without having been censored, that it is illegal for more than three students to gather in a group on the campus of the University of Tehran, that Mossadegh’s Minister of Justice had his eyes ripped out of his head, that the public is barred from court cases, that torture is part of daily life in the Persian justice system. Is the Constitution less strict and rigid about these things? Just to give you an idea, here is an example of torture in Persia:

“At midnight on December 19, 1963 the investigative judge began his questioning. At first he asked me questions and wrote down my answers. Then he began to ask about things that I was not concerned with or didn’t know about. I

could only answer that I didn't know anything. The investigative judge struck me in the face and then on my right hand and my left hand with a rubber truncheon. He injured both hands. With every question he beat me. Then he forced me to sit naked on a hot electric burner. Finally he took the burner in his hand and held it to my body until I became unconscious. When I was revived, he asked the questions again. He got a bottle of acid from another room, tipped the contents into a measuring cup, and dipped the truncheon into the container . . .”

Are you surprised that the president of the Federal Republic invited you and your husband to this country in spite of all this horror? We are not surprised. Why don't you ask him what he knows about planning and constructing concentration camps? That is his area of expertise.

You'd like to know more about Persia? A book just came out in Hamburg, written by one of your compatriots who is interested in German science and culture like you are, and like you has read Kant, Hegel, the Brothers Grimm, and the Mann brothers: Bahman Nirumand's *Persia, Model of a Developing Country or Dictatorship of the Free World*, with an afterword by Hans Magnus Enzensberger. It is the source of the facts and citations that we have used to inform you. I don't know if there are people who can sleep well at night and are not ashamed after reading that book.

We had no intention of insulting you. But we don't want the German public to be insulted either by articles like yours in the *Neue Revue*.

Yours sincerely,

Ulrike Marie Meinhof

NOTES

1 *Neue Revue* was a weekly society paper published since 1946, now called *Revue*.

2 The Persian Prime Minister Mossadegh succeeded in getting the Shah to leave the country in 1953. A military coup d'état however allowed the Shah to return. Mossadegh was arrested and put on trial.

[3](#) Hubert Humphrey (a Democrat) was the Vice-President of the United States under Johnson. In 1962 he lost the presidential race to Richard Nixon by a small margin.

[4](#) The Shah's marriage to Soraya officially ended in divorce because she did not produce a son.

JÜRGEN BARTSCH AND SOCIETY

(1968)

During the trial of Jürgen Bartsch, everything you could possibly think of was done to keep the most important issue out of the trial, out of public view, and discussion.¹ It was kept out of the sentence, out of the deliberations around the sentence, and out of the justification for the sentence. But in actual fact, the whole event revolved around this one issue: the story of Jürgen Bartsch. In fact, as the trial piled up the sordid details of this sad individual's life, it not only exposed his suffering but also the suffering of the society in which this person has lived and murdered—suffering on a scale that is hard to imagine and that we heard about in the most brutal detail. The court did everything humanly possible to ensure that the conditions of life that underlay Jürgen Bartsch's development were not addressed in the trial; the court did everything it could to exclude the possibility that the young man might better himself, stop killing, change, and it thereby rendered the other possibility impossible—the possibility that this trial would reveal the need for change, and the opportunity for change. In his closing words, the judge said, “May God help you control your criminal urges.” May God help us close our eyes to the enormous need for change faced by our society.

It started with adoption. The Bartsch family had to wait seven years before they could adopt him. This was because of the “risky family tree,” because his father was a laborer and poor, and a man who already had a family, and his mother had lived without a man for years, and was sick and poor. A Nazi blur of eugenics was swilling around in the minds of the welfare and youth agencies. The fact that the child had already spent a year in an institution should have caused concern and should have led to a decision to quickly arrange for adoption, quickly establish a clear situation, a secure nest. But the judge himself provided an example of this Nazi biologism when he told the mother that, after all, the boy was not “her own flesh and blood,” and the father also subscribes to such ideas when he says he would have treated his own child differently. No one ever told him that genetics are unimportant, that the environment is what counts, that only nurture, and nothing else, determines a child's future. The adoption process dragged on for

seven years; for seven years the child was kept in a state of uncertainty, as though adoption were a disgrace for a child instead of its good fortune and an honor for the parents.

Then they put the child in a home because the mother had to help in a shop, because the competition is tough for a small-time butcher, because a person who sells food has to struggle to survive. And the only solution they could come up with was a home, because this society is still set up in such a way that the ten million women who work outside their own homes, of whom well over a million are mothers with children under fourteen, all have to struggle to find more or less suitable care for their kids, and are left alone to handle the strain of both employment and family responsibilities, even though they are a necessary part of the work force. But there's hardly any room in the kindergartens, all-day school is a utopia, and part-time work is hardly possible.

Then he was sent to a different home, because he had grown too old for the first one, because homes for children are organized according to age groups: there are different homes for infants, for small children, for school-age children, and for apprentices. Children growing up in institutions, who already live in fear and insecurity because of their backgrounds and futures, are further tormented by being moved from place to place, which means they lose their friends, their counselors, and the environment they know. Pedagogically this is absolute madness. Everybody knows it, yet nobody does anything about it. It's not that we don't understand; it's that there's no money or commitment to change.

He arrived in a Catholic-Prussian institution, with fifty kids in the sleeping hall, corporal punishment as a training method, kids marching in step when they went out for a walk, close supervision in the evenings, and religious studies. And no youth agency came in to close the place down and cancel the counselors' right to counsel these kids.

So he ran away, then had to go back, and ran away again. He ended up at a police station; the police became his educational institution, which goes well with the commando voice of the father, believing that beatings don't do any harm, and after all he needs to be prepared for life. This boy was prepared for military barracks, not for life, and he thinks barracks are life. Our family policies teach parents nothing about raising children, nothing at all.

NOTE

[1](#) Jürgen Bartsch killed four boys between 1962 and 1966. after a long court case he was sentenced to life in prison. On the slim chance of being set free, he had himself castrated in April 1976. He died as a result of the operation.

EVERYBODY TALKS ABOUT THE WEATHER

(1969)

. . . we don't. It was unexpected, but didn't come totally out of the blue. Iran is really one of the most functional developing countries, and the Shah one of the most functional despots in the Third World, with Persian oil clasped tightly in his fist and in the fists of American, English, and French oil companies, and with the Persian opposition safely in the dungeons of the secret police. Ever since the fall of Mossadegh there have been no more complaints.¹ When Nirumand's book about Persia came onto the German book market, no one was interested—what could possibly be wrong with Persia?² The Shah was good-looking, his wife had just been on a diet; what could be the problem? And then came the unfortunate police-state visit.³ The façade came crashing down. In Berlin, the police used their truncheons like they hadn't in years. In Hamburg, Senator Ruhnau⁴ saw to it that preventive custody was brought in. The police had paid Persians to applaud, and then attack German and Persian student protesters. The truth about the Shah's regime of terror spilled out across the world, and at the same time an extra-governmental opposition formed here.

The realization that West German capital and the Iranian terror regime are closely allied was pounded into the students by the police. The same goes for the awareness that the opposition here—in the metropolitan centers—and the opposition in Third World countries must work together. Bahman Nirumand had supplied the consciousness-raising materials with his book. His work within the Confederation of Iranian students and the German student movement is uniquely representative of the way anti-imperialist movements are going international.⁵ The attempt to get rid of him by refusing him a residence permit is also an attempt to intervene in the process to internationalize the socialist movement; it is an attempt to delay it, even crush it completely. Those who want to expel him may well be over-estimating the role one individual can play, but their purpose

is absolutely clear, especially since Nirumand is an important person for the Confederation and the APO.⁶

Nirumand's expulsion order is the result of obvious machinations. In September 1968 after Lücke's visit, Professor Stein (CDU), the managing director of the Federation of German Industry, submitted a report in which he urgently warned that the Shah's irritation about the protests here should not be underestimated.⁷ He drew attention to the danger that the Shah, offended as he was, might intensify his economic dealings with the Eastern Bloc if he were not appeased. When Kiesinger made promises in Tehran in 1968 that objective reporting on Iran by the German mass media would be ensured, he was obviously indicating that the educational work being done by the Confederation of Iranian students would be discouraged.⁸ Nirumand's expulsion goes some way toward fulfilling this promise. German industry and commerce have caved in to the Shah's threats, and Bonn has caved in to German industry and commerce. It is painfully obvious. It is also painful to see politicians letting themselves be turned into henchman of the Shah, into enforcement officers for business interests, as it is painful to see that they don't have enough class to camouflage the inconsistencies of their system—the inconsistencies between the interests of German capital in Iran and the strategy of the political establishment to isolate the SDS in the German student movement by offering reforms and separating so-called radicals from the so-called well-meaning groups. Nirumand's expulsion threatens to set off precisely the kind of mass solidarity and politicization effect they want to avoid—an inconsistency that is useful to the Left, since intelligent Senate policies would beg Nirumand to accept the residence permit we want for him.

Nirumand's case has a humanitarian side to it; yet, protesting against this is still considered apolitical. It is viewed as a mere moral issue that cannot trigger learning processes or damage the system. The fact is that Nirumand is married to a German woman and that his daughter Mariam started school in Berlin last fall. The fact is that this family that wants to stay together would be destroyed or turned into a family of refugees if the residence permit is denied. The fact is that his wife and child would be torn out of their social environment. Why are protests against this seen to address only what is being called an "unreasonable"

fate? Why are protests against this politically irrelevant? Why do they mobilize nothing more than crocodile tears?

Because women in this society do not need to be expelled in order to be rendered politically impotent. The social work they do raising their children goes on in the isolation of their private lives, though not in response to their own needs or those of the children. It goes on behind closed doors and in response to the norms of an achievement-oriented society whose demands hit children at school. The experiences that women have in the process, and the difficulties they encounter, are never aired in public. If they are expelled, they can just take their children, for whom they are of vital importance, with them, and their experiences and difficulties, too. They are interchangeable as workers—given what women's work is—and as consumers. In this society, women are not perceived as unique, irreplaceable beings. Things would be different if the Left had functioning women's organizations; such organizations could and probably would point out that the apolitical aspects of the protests about Bahman Nirumand's wife are in and of themselves an example of the oppression of women, based on the failure to recognize their needs, and on the difficulty for women to see their private trials and tribulations as social problems and to organize them accordingly. It is apolitical to protest about women, because women's issues are human, humanitarian issues. There! Everybody's talking about the weather again! What they view as apolitical is the almost completely internalized oppression of women, an oppression that is still quite beyond comprehension.

School policies that turn children into consumers of things see children as interchangeable. If Mariam Nirumand were enrolled in an anti-authoritarian kindergarten—she is already too old for projects in progress at the moment—then her expulsion would destroy the group structure of her group of children. The children and parents would be vigorously involved in trying to prevent this expulsion and the destruction of their socially relevant work in the kindergarten. This would be considered political protest. If the Nirumand family lived as part of an extended family, a Scandinavian example of which we were recently shown on TV, the protests about Nirumand's wife and child would not be apolitical because their biographies would no longer be only their personal business.

We understand the connections between consumer-terror and police-terror, and why German capital has an interest in the exploitation of the Persian people. But we have hardly even begun to see the connections between the profits sought

by German capital and the oppression of women and children. Only when the protests about Nirumand's wife and child stop appealing to fate and equal rights, and attack the class structures of capitalist society, one of whose features is the oppression of women and children, only then will the Senate never again dare to deny Bahman Nirumand his residence permit. We have to stop talking about the weather when we talk about women and children.

NOTES

1 Mohammed Mossadegh (1882-1967) was the democratically elected prime minister of Iran from 1951 to 1953. He was removed from power by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, and pro-monarchy forces in a complex coup led by British and US intelligence agencies.

2 Bahman Nirumand (1936-) is an Iranian-German publicist and author. He studied in West Germany and Berlin and was active in the student movement. In 1967, he published *Persia: Model of a Developing Country*, a bitter critique of the Shah's policies. The book became important for the anti-imperialistic and international aspects of the revolt.

3 The police state visit refers to the official state visit of the Shah of Iran to West Berlin on July 2, 1967. There were protests in several German cities in response. During a clash between police and protesters in front of the German Opera in Berlin on the evening of July 2, the student Benno Ohnesorg was shot dead by police (see note 1, "Three friends of Israel").

4 Heinz Ruhnau (1929-) was Senator of the Interior from 1969 to 1973.

5 Founded in 1960, the Confederation of Iranian Students was the largest Iranian opposition group outside of Iran.

6 The Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO) was a political protest movement active in West Germany during the latter half of the 1960s and early 1970s. A central part of the German student movement, its membership consisted mostly of young people disillusioned with the Grand Coalition ruling the German Parliament (*Bundestag*).

7 Gustav Stein (1903-1979), a member of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), became director of the Federation of German Industry in 1957 and was a member of the German Parliament from 1961 to 1972. Paul Lücke (1914-1976) was a founding member of the CDU and a member of the German Parliament from 1949 to 1972. From 1965 to 1968 he served as Minister of the Interior.

8 Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1904-1988) was Chancellor (CDU) of West Germany from 1966 to 1969, and had been a member of Hitler's National Socialist Party between 1933 and 1945, although Kiesinger later claimed he had become a member out of opportunism rather than conviction.

Olaf Radke and Wilhelm Rathert, two members of the board of the IG-Metal [Metalworkers Union] provide a realistic assessment of the union's failure to negotiate women's wage rights: "The unions did not succeed in completely deleting the clauses on partial payment or special wage categories for women from the wage agreements." Radke/Rathert state that the deletion of these options would have given women a wage increase of up to 25 percent while "industry would have experienced a maximum increase of 5 percent in wage costs."

In other words, it is impossible to push for the principle of equal pay for equal work without also making changes in the existing distribution of wealth; equal wages cannot be secured by the unions' "indexed wage policies." Wage policies that are oriented toward increases in productivity across the board and do not strive to "redistribute the revenues of the people and thus change the positions of power as well as the social order" can do nothing to push through women's demands for equal rights. But such redistribution would increase the proportion of the total production costs paid out for wages and would thus represent a change both in the "status quo of distribution," and in the status quo of the social structures. Not a profound change, but perhaps an exemplary one.

From this perspective, Radke and Rathert's assertion that "the employers are opposed in principle to abolishing discriminatory wage categories for women" only appears to be a furious, aggressive attack. In reality, it is an admission that union policies, quite independent of the employers, have been sacrificed along with any intention to change and humanize social conditions. Olaf Radke needs to answer the question he himself posed elsewhere: "Can such union policies endure, given the citizen's constitutional right to look after their own interests as an integral aspect of human dignity and development of the personality, which the Constitution prioritizes over reasons of state?"

Wage differentials are the clearest indicator that equal rights cannot be had without a struggle for liberation; demands for liberation that are changed into a campaign for equal rights will only provide a few formal privileges and only for women of the less dependent classes. Basically, this adds up to waiving all claims to equal rights.

The lower pay scales for women reflect the low regard for their work and their productivity. This disdain, audible in such praise as "hard-working woman" or "intelligent woman" or "courageous woman," which are used to mark a departure

from the norm, must be diagnosed as both the cause and the effect of lower wages. Already in 1889 Clara Zetkin blamed women's low wages on the low regard for housework: "The cause was the low regard that was and had to be assigned to a woman's unpaid labor since, compared to mechanically produced industrial products, the work she produced represented only a tiny percentage of the average social production, which led to the false conclusion that women are less productive." This contempt for women's work was reflected in the wage scales and has been maintained to the present. But it does not stand up to factual, comparative descriptions of comparable work by women and men. For instance, in a car plant, the women who polish the doors earn less than the men who polish the roofs. The employers' justification: roof-polishing requires different pressure than door polishing. In a foundry, the men who paint core elements are paid at level 4 because women who would be paid at level 2 or 3 for the same work are simply not employed in foundries. The employers' justification: men can, after all, not be paid according to women's pay scales. These somewhat extreme examples violate the principle of equal pay for equal work. It would be easy to use documentary film and analyses of work situations to prove that countless jobs require no more strength or skill from men than is expected of women, although they command a higher wage. This is not necessarily because the wage agreements are being violated; it is because of the one-sided job descriptions within the wage agreements themselves.

The situation has severe consequences. Low wages for women justified by contempt for women's work have led to contempt for women themselves and skewed what might be considered humanly reasonable for men and women. Millions of women today labor at industrial work stations where the timing is broken down into seconds or fractions of seconds. Their activity is reduced to the continual repetition of a few tiny movements of the hand, or fine hand and foot controls. Claims are made that women are much less sensitive to monotony than men, and that this is "a psychological trait of women," just like their passivity, their tendency to daydream, to focus on others, to let things happen. (To understand how cynical the comment is that they let things happen, you only need to see how production pieces on a rhythmically controlled assembly line are jerked out of women's hands if they don't work fast enough.) This kind of monotonous and often high-pressure work leaves its mark. The work is stupifying, deadening; it causes nervous tension and illness. At the women's conference of the German Unions Association in 1955, someone said, "Women

who work on an assembly line for ten years are no longer worth marrying.” Since that date the lines have not got any slower, and the exploitation of the workers has grown more intense.

Such conditions are considered reasonable, although specialists have stated that a production activity should last no less than one minute, otherwise, the worker’s soul and health are endangered.² Such conditions are considered reasonable because women are seen as inferior—less sensitive to monotony³—because they are paid less, because the consequences for women—their simplemindedness—are written off as part of women’s nature. Helga Läge rightly points out that “if there is little intellectual stimulus during women’s leisure hours, as is often the case, such people can grow quite dull; their capacity for new experiences decreases to such an extent they no longer feel how monotonous their work is.”

All this is considered reasonable. My writing about it here will not change anything, because the lower wages paid to women provide their employers with far-reaching benefits. The work stations are usually highly mechanized, on the brink of automation. They have not been automated for economic reasons, because a woman can be more quickly adjusted than a machine, or turned off—i.e. dismissed—if sales falter or new models come onto the market. Women are cheaper than machines. One of the reasons they are cheaper than machines is because they are paid less than men, and do not have equal rights. (The job loss caused by automation could surely be compensated by shorter working hours, once the right decisions have been made and proper conditions established for a production that serves humans rather than a production where humans serve productivity.)

If policies on equal rights do not include demands for liberation, or the intention to recognize and remove the causes of the inequities found in capitalist modes of production, then this means having constantly to provide evidence of exactly the kind of equality that demands for equal rights are based on. It means countering the facile thesis that women are different, different from men, which underlies the ideology of profit. (Of course women are different, but not in regard to their productivity in industries whose technical progress is so advanced that physical strength is not an issue.) Besides, no evidence can be brought, at least not in any convincing or clear manner, as long as the living and working

women adapt the extent of their working lives to the employment needs of industry. They think they are working for their families and do not realize they are following quite different sets of rules.

How is a working woman supposed to fight for better wages and working conditions when she sees her work as a transgression of her true vocation, and considers it temporary? When she can hardly expect to benefit from any forthcoming improvements? And when, besides being humiliated by lower wages, she is also accused of betraying her true self, her true essence, her social self? She is caught in a trap. At home, which is where she belongs, she cannot fight; on the job, where she should fight, she's in the wrong place. The children are at home, or on the way, and when she's at work, she works. What else can she do but struggle? "In the mellow evenings they are too exhausted to think about where they have come from or where they are going" (Brecht).

How are unions supposed to bring about change when, in line with social democracy, they have exchanged their demands regarding the liberation of men and women for demands for formal equal rights? How can more solidarity for women be put into practice within the unions when the unions no longer set the goal of changing social conditions, liberating the workers from the slave/master mechanisms, or abolishing the difference between capital and labor, without which equal rights are impossible? when the oppression of women is no longer seen as part and parcel of universal oppression or their achieving equal rights as a step toward the liberation of all?

Women with an education and more status are both affected and not affected by this problem. In a way, they are the victims of equal rights. Since the social struggle for liberation is over and has been distorted into a struggle between the sexes, they have automatically ended up on the side of the oppressed. Although they have a higher social status, they have also become targets in the attacks against working mothers, in the ideology of motherhood, and the education of girls as housewives and mothers. The crisis comes when they have children of their own: motherhood knows no social difference. The educated woman has the same resources as the working class woman when it comes to defining her new role; she is just as likely to be suspected of not wanting to devote her life to motherhood; she experiences the same psychological pressure and often the same practical difficulties due to the shortage of kindergartens and the lack of help. She gets caught in the same trap, though it can be more temporary as she normally has

more ways and means to solve her problems. Her largely non-rational university education has deprived her of socio-critical awareness and does not let her see that her situation is part of a larger complex of problems that only have little to do with her as an individual. Her imagination, emotional intelligence, and experience are rarely broad enough to let her imagine the situation of the other women who work in industry and business; nor are her morality or socio-political knowledge sufficient for her to develop political solidarity with them.

The discrimination of women—all women—must continue so that the establishment of equal rights for working women is undermined, and the liberation of the working population prevented. The slander against all working mothers must go on, as must the ideology that all women are destined to become housewives and mothers; otherwise the criticisms directed against society and the ruling class for refusing to help find solutions for the problems encountered in raising children while working outside the home would have to be addressed. This is the direction that may lead toward understanding the causes of the feminine mystique that we can describe in much more differentiated ways than Betty Friedan did, once we are aware of these complexities.

It is high time to protest. But there is no protest. Protest is not only triggered by studying the methods and means of oppression. It is set off by the final product: millions of dumb, deadened, apolitical, struggling women, who adore Farah Diba and Soraya, who mean well but get it all wrong, and then beat their kids. And that is the majority.

NOTES

1 In the '60s, \$1 US was approximately 4 DM (obsolete currency replaced by Euro); thus most women earned well under \$1 per hour.

2 This is the opinion of someone we consider an absolute specialist and whom we may quote on the condition that he not be named. It does not fit with union policies that have given up demanding change. [UM]

3 Helga Läge, p. 119, "Both the literature and the praxis concur that women are generally less sensitive to monotony than men and therefore tolerate monotonous work more easily." [UM]

The conflict that became public again in Frankfurt, after I don't know how many decades—if it ever was so decidedly public before—is not a fabrication. It is not a conflict to dither over, nor is it a theoretical conflict you simply ponder. Anyone who has a family knows it by heart, but this was the first time the private matter was clearly made public.

The *Stern* journalist who quickly shrugged it off—a debate on the oppression of the female members of SDS had long been simmering within the organization—did not notice that this is not just about the oppression of the women in the SDS, but about the oppression of his own wife as well, within his own family. The *konkret* journalist, who saw the tomato incident as one among many at the conference, and who used the label “women’s liberationists” for those women who expressly rejected an authoritarian appeal to the law—this man did not feel targeted either, although he was. Maybe he didn’t get hit this time. And Reimut Reich’s² suggestion that women should refuse to have sex further confirms Helke Sander’s position that men are completely unwilling to face up to the conflict. He, too, wants to push it back into the private sphere that it just burst out of with a lecture on tomatoes. The Berlin women who intervened in Frankfurt no longer want to cooperate. They bear the entire burden of raising children but have no influence on the history, purpose, or direction of this work. They no longer want to suffer insulting comments for not having a good education, or only a partial education, or not being able to work in their professions because they are raising children—all of which leaves its mark, for which they are usually held responsible. They made it clear that it is not a personal failure for a woman not to be able to combine raising children with work outside the home; it is a societal failure, since society makes these two domains irreconcilable. They made a few things very clear. And when men didn’t want to engage with this, they threw tomatoes at them. They didn’t whine, or play the victim begging for sympathy and equal rights and all that jazz. They analyzed the private sphere in which most of them live and whose burdens are their burdens; they noted that in this private sphere men are, in fact, the functionaries of capitalist society who impose oppression on women, even if they don’t want to. When the men couldn’t respond, they threw tomatoes at them.

The purpose is not to set off permanent marital fights; the purpose is to make the conflict public, to bring it into a space where communication and understanding can be made possible among those who reach for such missiles in

their passionate attempts to make their arguments heard over those that proclaim men are superior because they hold socially superior positions.

Frankfurt was a success for these women because a number of names were put to a number of things, because this occurred without resentment or lamentations, because the women who did what they did in Frankfurt have some organizational experience and have done a few months (not years, as Bissinger claimed) of work with women, acquiring knowledge about possibilities and difficulties.

It is not in the interests of women for the SDS to make women's issues its own. If the organization wants to support women, so much the better; but there should be no patronizing instructions about what to do. The reactions of the men at the conference and of the still friendly reporters showed that entire trainloads of tomatoes will have to be thrown at appropriate targets for the message to really sink in. The only real results the Frankfurt event can hope to achieve is that more women think about their problems, organize, learn to understand the issues and formulate their thoughts. Meanwhile, all a woman wants from her man is to be left in peace with the matter, have him wash his own shirts for a change, so she can head off to a committee meeting on the liberation of women. And he can just cut out his stupid comments on the name of the association, because its usefulness will become apparent once it gets down to work. Ever since the Frankfurt events, there is no doubt that this association is faced with mountains, not molehills, of necessary and difficult work.

NOTES

1 At the twenty-third delegates conference of the SDS in September 1968 in Frankfurt, the Berlin "Action Committee for the Liberation of Women" gave a talk. The spokeswoman, Helke Sanders (1937-), a filmmaker and author associated with the feminist movement, accused the anti-authoritarian leadership of the SDS of practicing the same strategies to oppress women within the organization as were prevalent in society. When the next speaker Hans-Jurgen Krahl (1943-1970), who was a key member of the SDS, did not respond to this accusation, the women threw tomatoes at him. Manfred Bissinger (1940-) was the editor of *Stern* at that time.

[2](#) Reimut Reiche (1941-) is a German sociologist, psychoanalyst, and sexuality researcher.

WATER CANNONS: AGAINST WOMEN, TOO

(1968)

THE STUDENT AND THE PRESS: A POLEMIC AGAINST RUDOLF AUGSTEIN AND HIS GANG

The blast that catapulted the student and extra-parliamentary opposition groups into the international as well as the local limelight, into the greater and the lesser public eye, was triggered by the shot that killed Benno Ohnesorg in Berlin on June 2, 1967. Since then, this oppositional movement has caught the attention of the international press, and has become the stuff of conversations at the dinner table. Since then, it has been making headlines and setting off family fights.

Finally, we have generational conflicts again, conflicts between men and women, between people with different opinions, between friends and enemies. Henri Nannen's¹ attacks on Lübke are making them both look bad; *konkret* is annoyed with Rudolf Augstein² for not retracting his campaign to destroy the reputation of Nirumand though he knows he should. People are no longer just playing the roles of adversaries in order to be nice to each other again afterward. People are no longer concealing their annoyances, or sweeping conflicts under the rug, or explaining nausea as a consequence of a pill, or fighting melancholy with coffee, or stomach aches with mint tea, or depression with champagne, or vapid sobriety with schnapps.

Student actions rather than workers' struggles have set off this new irritation. They have brought the contradictions of this society to the surface. Malaparte's image of dogs with slashed bellies who don't howl because their vocal chords have also been cut is no longer totally apt. We are hearing a few howls again—at least a few.

Whether wives are the ones wailing, or sons are feeling on the verge of tears, or Rudi Dutschke is educating the public in snarling tones on the marketplaces—these activities have one thing in common: fake harmony has

gone down the tubes. Cover-ups and appearances are breaking down. Conflicts are becoming visible, personal conflicts are increasingly being ascribed to social ones, or seen as an expression of social conflicts.

The murderer is not guilty; his victim is.

The situation started getting international attention on June 2. That day there were already various and different views, as we can see from the commentaries published on the events: they contain and disclose the defense mechanisms and strategies of concealment that have been implemented ever since by those who are not interested in letting social conflicts become visible. Normally, those who suffer from social conflicts are the ones who benefit from making them visible. Concealing them must be in the interests of those who benefit from them, who are well ensconced.

STRATEGY OF CONCEALMENT 1: PETTY BOURGEOIS RESPECTABILITY AS A VALUE IN ITSELF

In Augstein's first commentary after June 2, entitled "Why they are demonstrating," he wrote, "As a TV viewer I do not like slogans such as 'Johnson the murderer' or 'Shah-Hitler-Ky.'³ People who protest should consider that anyone who wants to destroy things must also offer alternatives."

Augstein does not care if the parallels drawn between the Shah, Ky, and Hitler, or the stigma of murderer attached to Johnson are appropriate. Nor does he consider that the people using these slogans may have thought them through. Just like any man on the street in some provincial place, he is shocked at bourgeois respectability being offended. In the words of the lead article in the *Koblenzer Rheinzeitung* (June 9 and 10, 1967):

"When noisy rows replace rational argument then there is a point at which disturbance becomes anarchy."

Augstein wrote, "Tomatoes should not be thrown at his—the Shah's—head, and anyone who throws tomatoes at him should expect to be targeted by water cannons—women too. Those are plain rules of behavior."

And the *Lübecker Nachrichten* commented, “The rotten eggs, tomatoes, and bags of milk used in the disturbances are not worthy instruments of debate for our younger generation of intellectuals.”

Springer’s *BZ* wrote on June 3, 1967: “Anyone who offends rules of decency and order must expect to be called to order by those who are decent.”

Wherever the issue is perceived as one of bourgeois respectability, Springer, the provincial press, and Augstein react in equally small-minded ways. They are more concerned with maintaining bourgeois reputations than with revealing truths or protesting violence. The new limitations imposed on *Stern* because of horrific images from Vietnam coincide completely with the Springer media’s engagement in Vietnam and Rudolf Augstein’s notions about public order and behavior.

STRATEGY OF CONCEALMENT 2: THE INNOCENCE OF THE SYSTEM

While the Springer media would like to simply get rid of the students, remove them completely from the scene—as the *Berliner Morgenpost* put it on June 3: “Anyone who means well for Berlin should drive these radicalized hooligans out of the temple; they are ruining Berlin’s reputation”—the more liberal press wants to protect the system, explaining that the events of June 2 are, in fact, inexplicable.

Augstein said, “A police force that beats up on women is a dehumanized gang. I just can’t understand it any other way.” (He plainly doesn’t understand it.)

Kai Hermann wrote in *Die Zeit*⁴ of June 16: “It is a senseless task to try to make sense of the senseless death of Benno Ohnesorg.”

The lead article of the *Neue Ruhr Zeitung* commented, “There is not a single argument that could ascribe any meaning whatsoever to the death of Benno Ohnesorg.” Questions about the system that spawned the police terror in Berlin, the system that prefers to beat up and kill its opposition than refuse to pay homage to the head of a police state, those questions remain taboo. Given this belief in the senselessness and inexplicability of Benno Ohnesorg’s death, and given the belief in the innocence of the system, it is only one small step to the notion of

The *Lübecker Nachrichten* (June 30) said, “We don’t think students should keep away from political engagement. The question is not about whether they should be engaged, but about how.”

And the *Koblenzer Rhein-Zeitung* (June 10 and 11) wrote, “Our young people, students included, want engagement. It’s not as if they are mouthing slogans about affluence. On the contrary, they want to face difficult facts. Youthful willingness to get engaged is a good thing. It is a necessary thing. We just need to ask—what kind of engagement?”

***DER SPIEGEL*, THE PROVINCIAL PAPERS, AND THE SPRINGER PRESS**

Rudolf Augstein commented, “If we had a political party that held honest discussions and made honest decisions, many of these protesting students would be involved in it.” Augstein knows no such party exists; he does not explain why this is so. The system is under a taboo. Just like the *Berliner Morgenpost* (October 21) that asked, “What does Fritz Teufel⁷ have to do with Vietnam?” And the *Rhein-Zeitung* that wondered, “What is the connection between the Vietcong and academic freedom or lack of it?”

Nor does Augstein understand the systemic connection between social justice here and an imperialist war over there, or between the refusal to democratize the university system here and the refusal to democratize the countries of the Third World. Augstein writes, “The thankless university reforms are the only issue German students have to engage with besides abstractions in Greece, Persia, Vietnam, China—countries they know largely through printed works.”

There must be some explanation for this rather disconcerting agreement between *Spiegel*, the provincial papers, and the Springer press—this concord of defense mechanisms and strategies of concealment that even a superficial analysis quickly lays bare; this lack of conceptual analysis and conceptual clarity that the provincial plagiarists, Springer writers, and even a clearly superior journalist such as Augstein display. There must be a reason why there is only a tiny difference between the liberal press and the Springer press, a difference expressed in the Springer press already calling for the students to be ghettoized and violently

suppressed while the liberals are still leaning toward more pacifist methods of defense—and thereby coming into conflict with the Springer press. But is the difference between the rubber truncheons, tear gas, and martial arts troops that the Springer press wants (*BZ* February 7, 1968) and the water cannon that Augstein calls a matter of course really so great? It is true that there are big differences between the *Spiegel* and the Springer press when the topic is something other than students—such as the recognition of the GDR, the Oder-Neisse border, the grand coalition, the *Bundespräsident*, and the re-legitimation of the KPD.⁸

The liberal press, the Springer media, and the provincial press are claiming together now that the issue is not a mere change in politics under existing power relations, but a change in these very power relations. That is what is at stake in Vietnam and in Bahman Nirumand's book on Persia, and what was at stake during the anti-Shah and the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations. The press does not just draw together because they are deliberately and exclusively interested in maintaining the existing power relations, but because there is no need for them to reflect on these relations since they are doing rather well. And if there is no need for them to reflect on the existing power relations, then they cannot imagine other ones, because it is indeed very difficult to imagine that the masses who read the *Bild-Zeitung* here and the illiterate masses in Persia and the passive masses overrun by children in South America might be capable of taking their lives and fates into their own hands and organizing and representing their own interests.

But the process has started with Vietnam; it has become thinkable. The students have begun to make it known and to explain it; there is no press to help them with their task. Those who write about them seem to have succumbed to the same news boycott that has been imposed on what the students have to say.

NOTES

¹ Henri Nannen (1913-1996) was a publisher who served as a long-time editor for the liberal, sometimes left-leaning weekly magazine *Stern*, a direct competitor of *Der Spiegel* (see next note).

2 Rudolf Karl Augstein (1923-2002) was a journalist and publisher who founded the influential and widely distributed weekly magazine *Der Spiegel*, generally considered politically left-liberal.

3 Nguyen Cao Ky was known as the fanatically anti-Communist head of the South Vietnamese government from 1965 to 1967. As a former air force commander, he flew bombing raids over North Vietnam until 1965.

4*Die Zeit* is an influential liberal weekly national newspaper, whose intended readership includes academics and the educated and intellectual bourgeoisie.

5 Hans K. Kapfinger was sole owner of the *Passauer Neue Presse*, a daily newspaper for the city of Passau, since 1946.

6 Wolfgang Lefevre (1941-) was one of the well-known student activists associated with Rudi Dutschke and the protest movement.

7 Fritz Teufel (1943-) was a key student activist in West Germany, and co-founder of the Kommune I, a politically motivated residential cooperative which existed between 1967 and 1969.

8 KPD stands for *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*, the German Communist Party.

FILE NUMBER XY: DISSOLVED

(1968)

The TV program *File Number XY: Unresolved Crimes* is an enormous, fantastic, and mass fraud. Once a month on a Friday evening several million German and Austrian television viewers go in search of criminals, and help the police find wanted people. They are told the frightful deeds of real live villains, become eye witnesses when clues are found, and wait up steadfast in front of the TV for the first results, the final clues from Eduard Zimmermann, ¹ whose goal “as we all know” is to put an end to the rise in crime. The fraud is twofold: first of all, the viewers are given the impression that something is actually happening, that there is more than just talk—there is action—which is why the show is so popular. Secondly, the viewers are made to believe they have played an active role, because they were allowed to participate, and because what happens is in their own personal interests. The gangster we catch today cannot pull a fast one on us tomorrow. The whole thing is a fraud because nothing really happens, and you can be pretty sure that the felon or murderer or thief who is named today will not be the one who will get you tomorrow or the day after. In one year, thirty of the forty-five people who were wanted were caught; a mere thirty of the thousands who are operating in total freedom. This is hardly successful crime fighting, which is what the program claims to be about. And the responsibility assigned to the viewers is total nonsense, in quantitative terms alone: the two crooks whose fate millions of viewers were asked to wait up for until 10:30 on December 13 are only two among thousands. What is the point of all this? And why do the viewers fall for it?

The program is well constructed. It is an entertaining detective show. In fact, it is part of the entertainment sector of the *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen*² that broadcasts it to Germany and Austria. There may well be many more viewers than we can even imagine—especially on those days we find the show particularly irritating—who don’t fall for the fraud at all, but just watch it for fun. Still—let’s look at Eduard Zimmermann’s own concept based on what he divulged at the tenth

anniversary program to justify himself, and explain what he wants and what he sees as the objective of the show. There was finally some action, something was finally being done, he said. Furthermore, if we didn't succeed in stopping the rise in crime then the danger that another strong man would . . . and so on and so forth. Besides, we really ought to consider the victims of the crimes, he said; those who are robbed and violated. They are humans too.

The trouble is that there is no action, and the viewers' ostensible action is an illusion as well. The program's suggestive message may well be striking a chord with the many people who feel the need to get out of their subaltern roles at work and their consumer roles at home, who want to escape the permanent condition of powerlessness, the feeling of not being the subjects of their own lives, but the objects of outside interests. The feeling of having no influence, of knowing that the people "up there" do what they want anyway, the feeling of isolation in their own living rooms, the desire to pound their fists on the table—the program responds to all this, which is why the fraud is tolerated, because it responds to the need for personal action, the need to be counted, to be more than just a little cog in the machine, to be an individual who is addressed as an individual, and who is important as an individual.

Germans, as we know, are fed up with politics. Generally, they equate political engagement with National Socialism, which gave them a bad time. Along comes Herr Zimmermann, who tells them they have to help fight crime, otherwise a new Hitler will come along and do it for them. Which makes Hitler a crime fighter—but a crime fighter who overshot his target—which is why we have to beware of the next guy and clean up the country ourselves. Everyone is their own strong man, all grown up now. And in the process, the Germans' devotion to Hitler is being retroactively justified, which could reawaken the Germans' willingness to get politically engaged, and restore historical continuity—all part of the Germans recovering from the humiliations of the postwar period.

The victims, those who have been robbed and violated, are people, after all, as Zimmermann says. A strange statement, given the fact that no one has ever denied this, and even stranger when it is juxtaposed to the threat of the strong man, whose victims the discourse blatantly ignores. The show doesn't hunt down Nazi criminals, concentration camp guards, or judges (*Kammergerichtsräte*) at the People's Court (*Volkgerichtshof*), like this Herr Rehse who was recently let

off in Berlin.³ Instead Zimmermann asks his viewers to identify with the victims of all manner of blackguards, cradle-snatchers, highwaymen, graverobbers, and racketeers. How do you do that without a full measure of self-pity? Self-pity for the humiliations you suffered and never understood because of your National Socialist past, say, or because of territories you lost in the East, or because of denazification. How else could Zimmermann dare not to mention the victims of National Socialism when he refers to the strong man, and talk instead about the victims of petty everyday crime? This is only possible because he alludes to the latent but omnipresent self-pity of the Germans, a product of the history they have not understood.

We know, from reading Freud, Reich, Mitscherlich, and others, that we Germans have greater difficulties than others with our suppressed aggression, because we cannot hate those we ought to hate, precisely those who have suppressed our aggressions and continue to do so—our bosses, parents, the ones “up there.” We used to hate the Jews and the Communists. You can’t hate the Jews now; it doesn’t seem to work anymore to hate the Communists; and hating the students is still prohibited by the democratic superstructure. So Zimmermann suggests we hate criminals. He turns them into the scapegoats of German history—they are the reason why Hitler surfaced. He makes them the scapegoats of our present day and assigns them the brunt of political displeasure—so that no new Hitler should rise up. Mitscherlich writes, “Scapegoats are created from groups of outsiders; lack of knowledge about them is actively promoted (people don’t want to know about them) so that they can be used without opposition or blame.”⁴

Do Herr Zimmermann and his viewers know what causes criminal behavior? Do Herr Zimmermann and his viewers know about the drastic conditions in German prisons? Probably not. This is why these petty and not so petty criminals can be demonized, though their deeds are mere bagatelles compared to the crimes of National Socialism. This is why they can be turned into objects of public hatred, and why it is easy to ignore the fact that someone who has been tossed to millions of viewers as prey will never recover, not even once his case has been heard and his sentence served.

File Number XY: Unresolved Crimes is an enormous fraud perpetrated against the viewers; it is a fraud that continues to pass because it speaks to a number

of real needs. The program may actually be serving as a test to see to what extent criminals can be deployed as hate objects in Germany and Austria, and to what extent such fascist methods can both mobilize and control Germans and Austrians. Zimmermann claims the Germans are not a people of informers or headhunters. It would be nice if he were proven right.

NOTES

1 Eduard Zimmermann (1929-), a journalist and former television presenter, created *File Number XY: Unresolved Crimes*, which first aired in October 1967, and was broadcast for the tenth time on December 13, 1968.

2 *Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen* is one of the federal public broadcasters in West Germany.

3 Hans-Joachim Rehse (1902-1969) was the judge at the People's Court in Berlin during the Third Reich. As such he was responsible for 231 death sentences. In 1968 he was sentenced to five years of penitentiary; upon appeal he was found not guilty.

4 See Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, *The Inability to Mourn* (Munich, 1968), p. 98-99.

NAPALM AND PUDDING

(1967)

There is one criticism that we cannot help but level at the members of the Berlin pudding-commune: ¹ unready for the sudden publicity they attracted, they did not make use of the opportunity to explain their actions on TV or in the press. Instead of steering the excited attention they garnered toward Vietnam, and instead of answering the pertinent questions posed by the press with truths about Vietnam—with facts, figures, and policies—they talked about themselves. The way these people live together doubtless has a special meaning for them, but in regard to their pudding action it provided a particularly brilliant irritant for the police, the press, and the politicians, and a brilliant way to provoke knee-jerk reactions from these authorities that exposed their moral and political uncertainty in regard to the Vietnam War. With their pudding action and the efforts they deployed to shock the good burghers, the commune members were able to disrupt the system that Springer publishers and their political cronies have long established to boycott news items. In fact, they found very amusing ways to break down the conspiracy of silence that oppositional activity in the Federal Republic is usually met with. However, they used the sudden publicity they attracted solely for private exhibitionism, snubbing the journalists who interviewed them as well as their viewers and readers, and wasting the opportunity to make available the considerable knowledge they have of what is going on in Vietnam to a poorly informed public. They are obviously still suffering from confusion over their own taboo-breaking love lives, and have read only “Maoists,” not Mao himself: “At a mass meeting the most important thing is to awaken the sympathy of the crowd”—which they managed to do—“and to create fitting slogans”—which they failed to do. Once you realize that these students’ actions were not the result of youthful abandon or the ferment of puberty, but were triggered by the more in-depth knowledge and relative independence they have, i.e., more time to spend in discussion, and better access to sources of information than other parts of the population, then it is that much

more serious that this Berlin Eleven did not find it necessary to explain the rules of their game.

Still, students have been the ones whose anti-Vietnam protest actions over the past few months have broken down the German press's conspiracy of silence, and turned demonstrations into happenings the public must confront. Students are the ones developing new models of oppositional political behavior that can no longer be written off as pseudo-liberalism, or silenced. Students are the ones forcing those who support the American war on Vietnam, who—as we know—are the same people that support the emergency measures act, to show their true colors. It all started with police truncheons, but now there are demands that the Socialist Student Federation be forbidden and certain students be expelled from their universities, on allegations that the border between political radicalism and crime has been crossed.

It is thus not a criminal act to drop napalm on women, children, and old people; protesting against this act is a crime. It is not a criminal act to destroy the harvests necessary for the lives and the survival of millions; protesting against this is a crime. It is not a criminal act to destroy energy plants, leper colonies, schools, and dikes; protesting against this is a crime. Terror tactics and torture are not criminal acts; protesting against them is. Suppressing the development of free will in South Vietnam, banning newspapers and persecuting Buddhists is not undemocratic, but protesting against this in a “free” country is. It is considered rude to pelt politicians with pudding and cream cheese but quite acceptable to host politicians who are having villages eradicated and cities bombed. It is considered rude to stand on busy street corners and in train stations and discuss the oppression of the Vietnamese people, but quite acceptable to colonize a people in the name of anti-communist policies.

Hubert Humphrey was allowed to announce in Berlin that “Berliners will surely understand that the United States feels obliged to fulfill its promise to the people of South Vietnam just as they have kept their promise to maintain the freedom of Berlin” (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, April 8).

Berliners should know that the people of South Vietnam never asked for such a promise, and that this statement by the Vice President of the United States is not an assurance; it is a threat. It is a threat to continue to impose American policies in Berlin regardless of whether Berliners want this, or want something

All you need to do is conjure up some “supra-provincial scale,” which is much easier to do than explain what you mean by this—especially as readers of *Die Zeit* feel they aren’t provincial because they read *Die Zeit*, especially as the petty bourgeois despise no one more than the petty bourgeois—and presto! terror from the Left is the same as terror from the Right. That’s how easy it is, at least in Germany, where fascism is still seen as an episode of hooliganism, a momentary lapse in the German spirit, a misfortune of German history, a stroke of fate that had no source in society, and maybe did somehow somewhere have “a sublime purpose,” which was just pursued with the wrong methods.

When the annual opening ceremonies took place at the University of Hamburg in November (A Thousand Years of Fusty Odors from under Academic Gowns) and a few SDS students disrupted them, and when these disruptions occurred during the new rector’s speech on the topic of the economy and grew noisier and noisier, until they could no longer be ignored and became unbearable for the rector who was justifying Schiller’s economic policies and proclaiming anti-union ideas, such as the thesis of the wage-price spiral and talking about development aid as though the Third World were not being exploited; when a majority of the students in the main auditorium had eventually had enough and could no longer just sit there and accept the reactionary lecture without protesting, could no longer be silent as working people were being insulted and German imperialism justified, there came a point when the mood was close to turning against the rector and the professors and the ceremoniousness and all the opening activities and no one could hear themselves anymore, and no microphone was strong enough, and the ceremony was on the verge of chaos. That’s when the head of the AStA¹ went to the mike, the same person who had earlier provided the students with an ABC of the deplorable state of affairs at the University of Hamburg, and whom the students were willing to listen to. He said that if people wanted to hold discussions with the new rector they should do so afterward. They should let him have his say first because all this noise and uproar was not conducive to discussion. So the rector continued his speech, and the mood against him remained suppressed; people were quiet and disciplined, as was right and proper. But when the rector finished his speech, the university orchestra started up in full sound and the professors held their procession out of the hall with one of them shouting to the students that they all belonged in concentration camps, and Thielicke² telling them they should be careful they don’t turn into psychiatric

trucks, or demonstrators' cars that were overturned and damaged in arbitrary acts by the police during the blockade of the Springer building in Berlin. There are people who have decided to not only name what is intolerable but to oppose it, and disarm Springer and its accomplices.

Now that it has become evident that methods other than demonstrations, Springer hearings, and protests can be implemented, methods different from those that failed because they could not prevent the attack on Rudi Dutschke; now that the shackles of common decency have been broken, we can and must discuss violence and counter-violence anew and from the very beginning. Counter-violence, as was practiced over Easter, does not easily garner support. It does not easily attract frightened liberals to the side of the APO (extra-parliamentary opposition). Counter-violence runs the risk of turning into violence, when police brutality sets the measure for action, when helpless rage takes over from sovereign reason, when the paramilitary interventions by the police provoke paramilitary reactions. The establishment, the "gentlemen at the top"—to use Rudi's words—those in the parties, governments, and associations must be made to understand that there is only one way to permanently restore "peace and quiet," and that is to expropriate Springer. The fun is over. Protest is when I say I don't like this. Resistance is when I put an end to what I don't like.

NOTES

1 Klaus Schütz (1926-) was mayor of West Berlin from October 19, 1967, to May 2, 1977.

2 On April 11, 1968 in West Berlin, Rudi Dutschke was shot and seriously injured by Josef Bachmann, who was close to radical right-wing groups. Immediately afterward the largest and most militant demonstrations ever by student and youth groups took place. In many places, efforts were made to prevent the distribution of Springer publications. The Vietnam Conference was held in February 1968 in Berlin. Numerous foreign delegations took part, and after a demonstration ban imposed by the Senate was lifted, over twelve thousand people participated in a demonstration at the end of the conference. A few days later, a counter-initiative was organized by the Berlin Senate and the DGB (German Federation of Unions, or *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*). The

the deposit of useless, but expensive, profit-making wrappings (the consumer pays the costs of garbage removal); or through advertising that is as radically hypocritical as it is costly. Millions in effort, time, and investment are wasted on built-in obsolescence, on planned wear and tear, so that the refrigerators, electric razors, stockings, toys, or light bulbs fall apart earlier than necessary, considering the time and energy invested in producing them, and all to artificially maintain a demand that in turn will increase rates of profit through production and sales, profits which will be invested privately, not to satisfy social needs but to facilitate the accumulation of capital. (What capitalism provides can be bought in a department store. What cannot be bought in a department store, capitalism provides only partially, incompletely, or insufficiently: hospitals, schools, kindergartens, health systems, etc.) In any case, when socially produced wealth is destroyed by setting fire to department stores, this does not differ qualitatively from the systematic destruction of social wealth through fashion, packaging, advertising, or built-in obsolescence. From this perspective, setting fire to department stores is not an anti-capitalist action; on the contrary, it maintains the system and is counter-revolutionary.

The progressive aspects of setting fire to a department store do not lie in the destruction of goods, but in the criminal act, in breaking the law. The law that gets broken in the process does not protect people from seeing the effort and labor they invested and the value they produced destroyed, spoiled, and wasted. It doesn't protect them from the lies that advertising tells them about their own products; nor does it protect them from being separated from the products they produce because of the way their workplace is organized and the way information is concealed, which subjects them both as producers and as consumers to the mercy of those who make the profits and invest them according to their own tastes. According to their own tastes means according to the logic of profit, in other words, investing where they can make other, even greater profits, and not where the money can be used effectively and by all—say, in education, in the health system, for public transport, for peace and quiet and clean air and sex education.

The law that gets broken when department stores are set on fire is not a law that protects people. It is a law that protects property. The law says that another person's property must not be destroyed, endangered, damaged, or set on fire.

COLUMNISM

(1968)

The columnist functions as a pressure release valve. Columnists can write what they want the way they want. This creates the impression that any journalist can write what they want the way they want in their particular newspaper.

In a daily paper, the column can refer to the lead article. However, while the lead articles of daily papers tend to be written by the editors, in other words, by those who do the dirty work, and in some ways determine the content of the paper, and while daily papers have to deal with heaps of news items every day so that the editors' opinions are often restricted to the editorials (though the fact that news items and opinion pieces are not strictly separated in German dailies is a topic in itself), and while the lead article and the editorial column in daily papers may complement one another, columnists are editorial outsiders. Columnists have no influence on the remaining content of the paper, and the editors have no influence on the columnists. Columnists are relatively well-paid; their names are printed in bold. Columns are luxury items; columnists are stars. They are the big fish in their own tiny pond.

The investor expects two things from columnists. They should develop their own personal reading public, preferably readers who would not buy the paper if they weren't in it. That is the profit factor. Columnists who cannot achieve this will sooner or later lose their job. Then there's the prestige factor. The columnist's fenced-in but independent thinking gives the whole paper the aura of independent thinking. The columnist's outrageousness gives the paper the aura of outrageousness. The columnist's occasional and courageous expression of unpopular ideas gives the paper the aura of courage to express unpopular ideas. By investing in the columnist's originality, nonconformism, and independent thinking, the publisher pays for appearances—in order to publish his paper not only for profit, in the sense of the classic definition that the press is a business “that produces empty space for advertising which can be financially offset by an editorial section.” If, on occasion, an advertising contract is cancelled because

deception, a personality cult. You have to be a columnist to be allowed to describe the freedom of the columnist as the other side of the editor's lack of freedom. To prevent theory from turning into practice, we pay for the luxury of columnists: powerless individuals, outsiders, stars.

You cannot say it all in three columns of text. You can only sketch things out, and so have to expect misunderstandings, onesidedness. What if this paper were to really open up to discussions, really listen to how people across the land are criticizing its articles, fearless and unedited? It is opportunistic to claim to be struggling against the conditions that one is actually reproducing. It is opportunistic to use the methods that stabilize a system and claim to be seeking change. It is opportunistic to clamp down on editorial freedoms and the extra-parliamentary opposition and cave in to the market, i.e., to profits. It is opportunistic to limit the anti-authoritarian position to the authoritarian form of the column. *konkret* is less a left-wing paper than an opportunistic paper.

In the subsequent issue of konkret, publisher Klaus-Rainer Röhl responded to Ulrike Meinhof's criticism.

NOTES

1 Wolf Biermann (1936-) is a singer, songwriter, and lyricist who, out of his political convictions, settled in the German Democratic Republic in 1953, but was expatriated in November 1976 for criticizing the Socialist regime.

2 *WamS*, or *Welt am Sonntag*, is the Sunday edition of the Springer daily, *Die Welt*. For a long time William S. Schlamme was this paper's conservative—or Meinhof would say reactionary—columnist.

3 Sebastian Haffner (born Raimund Pretzel, 1907-1999) was a prominent publicist who was also a columnist at the weekly illustrated newspaper *Stern* (first published in 1948) between 1962 and 1975. He supported the protest movement of the late 1960s and was a regular contributor to *konkret*.

4 Günter Wallraff (1942-) is an investigative journalist and author. He is known for his writings on guest workers and other marginalized groups.

At the outset Ulrike Meinhof took the position of an absolute political outsider in the Federal Republic, and this is how her texts must be seen today. Among the younger generation of the late 1960s, this position increasingly became a kind of left-wing mainstream, precisely the mainstream of the 1968 movement. In fact, at the end of the 1960s, Ulrike Meinhof developed into a propagandist of the New Left, somewhere between the Black Panthers and Mao Tse Tung, without ever relinquishing her ties to older forms of communism.

This means that she did not take the classic position of the free journalist when she wrote about the Federal Republic, which after all she openly attacked. To put it in more positive terms, she was an outstanding propagandist and an equally outstanding polemicist in the struggle against the West German system, against democracy, and against capitalism. Just before she went underground in 1970, she subscribed to partially erroneous assessments of the Federal Republic that the GDR had been spreading and preaching for decades as hate propaganda, among other things the notion that the young, post-war democracy had secretly been a clandestine fascist state. All of this is not meant to deny the honesty of Ulrike Meinhof's political engagement; on the contrary, many Communists who got mired in wrong ideas first became Communists out of conviction, out of commitment. They wanted to improve the world and saw Communism as the better world.

An astonishing paradox is that although Meinhof lived in quite capitalistic circumstances in a large villa and belonged to the West German media establishment, her articles, some of which can be called visionary, defined the contemporary *Zeitgeist* of the so-called intellectuals as well as broad academic circles—despite the gap that was widening between West and East to the detriment of actual existing forms of socialism. To put it ironically, the 1960s in the Federal Republic saw the development of a social climate in which many intellectuals spoke and wrote in ways that were extremely left-wing, which provided them with extremely comfortable right-wing lifestyles.

What did it mean to be a Communist in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s where the Communist Party had been outlawed since 1956? What did it mean to be a Communist in the Cold War? The details of how Communists infiltrated the Federal Republic under the direction of East Berlin and Moscow remain a dark chapter. Former East German networks refuse to speak, and many GDR files were hastily destroyed by members of the old politburo and their henchmen in the final days of the regime in 1989. Many members of the West German

Left, intellectuals, even the very old, who still wield considerable powers of interpretation in the new Federal Republic, continue to foil historical research in one way or another. And free historical research also encounters limitations when facts are systematically covered up and immanent boundaries seldom crossed. It's like a mental block when the *Ungeist* of political correctness and the mainstream thinking of 1968, which strangely sees itself as left-wing, and even more strangely as socially just, continue to rule the humanities. As a result, Meinhof's highly stimulating, and in the context of the Left, absolutely avant-gardist columns are still being glorified today, rather than analyzed objectively.

The GDR operated against the Federal Republic at many different levels. The state-organized infiltration system from East Berlin, designed to undermine the West, procured its so-called allies or "fellow travelers"—who were not supposed or allowed to be card-carrying members of the Communist Party, so that they could outwardly maintain the appearance of personal independence—from all social realms of the Federal Republic, especially from the media, the unions, the justice system, various churches and the West German political parties, as well as some of the capitalist enterprises, such as Daimler Benz, now Daimler Chrysler. One victim of infiltration that was particularly successfully infiltrated was the SPD and its youth organizations. Until its collapse in 1989 and 1990, the GDR managed to carpet the Federal Republic with sham capitalist businesses that played according to the rules of the western markets and at times even benefited from special privileges. One of these sham businesses was the *konkret* publishing house, whose magazine *konkret* printed Ulrike Meinhof's columns.

These are only a few examples of the infiltration from East Berlin that took place from 1945 until the collapse of the GDR in 1989; in other words, for the duration of the Cold War. The Federal Republic had absolutely nothing to set against this. Even the options available to the western intelligence services were significantly limited compared to those available to the East, since it is easier to interfere in a democracy than in a dictatorship that is hermetically sealed from the outside. The distant goal of communist ideology as promulgated by those in power in Moscow, and later Beijing, was that Communism should rule the world. The more concrete goal pursued by Moscow and East Berlin was to install a Communist dictatorship in West Germany and Western Europe. This is the front where the young journalist Ulrike Meinhof was engaged in her columns, films, and features.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

KARIN BAUER, associate professor and chair of the Department of German Studies at McGill University, is the author of *Adorno's Nietzschean Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, and Readings of Wagner*, and many articles and essays on issues of German literature, culture, and thought.

ELFRIEDE JELINEK, winner of the 2004 Nobel Prize for Literature, is the author of *Greed, The Piano Teacher*, and many other books. Her play, *Ulrike Maria Stuart: A Queen's Drama*, which reconfigures the power struggle between England's Elizabeth I and Scotland's Mary Stuart in terms of the struggle between Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike Meinhof, premiered at the Thalia Theater in Hamburg in 2006.

ULRIKE MEINHOF (1934-1976) became one of the most influential journalists and public intellectuals of the German Left in the 1960s, known primarily through her columns in the magazine, *konkret*. She became an internationally known fugitive when she aided in the prison escape of Andreas Baader and formed the Red Army Faction, also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang. She was imprisoned in 1972 and found, four years later, hanged in her cell.

BETTINA RÖHL, publicist, journalist, and daughter of Ulrike Meinhof, is the author of *So macht Kommunismus Spass! Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl und die Akte Konkret (This is How Communism is Fun: Ulrike Meinhof, Klaus Rainer Röhl and the konkret File)*. The book chronicles the history of the Left in the FRG of the 1950s and 1960s and traces the lives of Röhl's parents and the history of their magazine *konkret*.

LUISE VON FLOTOW is professor of Translation Studies at the University of Ottawa. Her numerous publications include scholarly works as well as

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—Karin Bauer
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